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After over three decades of centralisation, Cameroon, like many African countries, 
introduced decentralisation reforms in the 1990s partly as a means of empowering 
democratically elected lower levels of government as agents of development. However, the 
lack of clarity on decentralised authority and deconcentrated functions, coupled with local 
councils’ perception of central government oversight as interference, are major challenges to 
intergovernmental relations in Cameroon. This study examines the extent to which 
decentralisation has influenced intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division, an 
administrative unit within the Northwest Region of Cameroon. The study uses semi-
structured interviews with purposefully selected local council executives and central 
government officials in Mezam Division.  
According to the findings of the study, there exist intergovernmental institutions in Mezam 
such as the Mezam Divisional Committee on Local Finance, the Technical Committee for the 
Recovery of Global Taxes in Bamenda, and the sub-committee of the Bamenda Local Tax 
Committee. These intergovernmental relations institutions however deal exclusively with 
financial issues, and central government still plays a dominant role because certain key 
decisions are made at the central government level without consulting the central government 
representatives and the local councils in Mezam Division. To improve intergovernmental 
relations in Mezam Division and Cameroon, central government should adopt a policy on 
intergovernmental relations contained in a Framework document specifying the modalities 
for relations between the central government, regional councils and local councils in 
Cameroon, more authority should be transferred to the local councils, more emphasis on 
local-intergovernmental relationships (between central government representatives and local 
council executives), and collaboration between and amongst central government 
representatives and local council executives in Mezam Division should be improved on 
through the setting up of institutions like the Mezam Local Development Forum 










Na sentralisasie oor ’n tydperk van drie dekades het Kameroen, soos vele ander Afrikalande, 
in die jare negentig desentralisasiehervormings ingestel, deels as wyse om demokratiese 
verkose laer regeringsvlakke as ontwikkelingsagente te bemagtig. Die gebrek aan 
duidelikheid oor gedesentraliseerde gesag en gedekonsentreerde funksies, tesame met 
plaaslike rade se beskouing dat toesig deur die sentrale regering inmenging is, is groot 
uitdagings vir interregeringsverhoudinge in Kameroen. Hierdie studie ondersoek die mate 
waartoe desentralisasie interregeringsverhoudinge in die Mezam-afdeling beïnvloed het – dié 
afdeling is ’n administratiewe eenheid in die noordwestelike streek van Kameroen. Die studie 
maak gebruik van semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude met doelgerig-geselekteerde uitvoerende 
bestuurders van die plaaslike rade en amptenare van die sentrale regering in die Mezam-
afdeling. 
Volgens die bevindinge van die studie, bestaan daar interregeringsinstellings in Mezam soos 
die Mezam-afdelingskomitee vir Plaaslike Finansies, die Tegniese Komitee vir die verhaling 
van Globale Belasting in Bamenda, en die subkomitee van die Plaaslike Belastingkomitee 
van Bamenda. Hierdie instellings vir interregeringsverhoudinge handel egter uitsluitlik oor 
finansiële aangeleenthede, en die sentrale regering speel steeds ’n oorheersende rol omdat 
sekere sleutelbesluite op sentrale regeringsvlak geneem word sonder om die sentrale 
regeringsverteenwoordigers en die plaaslike rade in die Mezam-afdeling enigsins te 
raadpleeg. Om die interregeringsverhoudinge in die Mezam-afdeling en Kameroen te 
verbeter, behoort die sentrale regering ’n beleid in te stel oor interregeringsverhoudinge wat 
in ’n raamwerkdokument vervat is waarin die voorwaardes vir betrekkinge tussen die sentrale 
regering, streekrade en plaaslike rade in Kameroen uiteengesit word. Meer gesag behoort aan 
die plaaslike rade oorgedra te word, daar behoort groter klem geplaas te word op plaaslike 
interregeringsverhoudinge (tussen verteenwoordigers van die sentrale regering en 
bestuurslede van plaaslike rade) en samewerking onderling en tussen verteenwoordigers van 
die sentrale regering en bestuurslede van plaaslike rade in die Mezam-afdeling behoort 
verbeter te word deur instellings soos the Mezam Plaaslike Ontwikkelingsforum 
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1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
One of the characteristics of post-independent Africa was the centralisation in African states. 
Upon obtaining their independence, almost all African countries ensured that every element of 
power and decision-making revolved around the central government. Thomas (2010:112) notes 
that this centralisation was mainly manifested in two ways: the creation of the One-Party State 
and the subordination of ‘peripheral’ state institutions to the core executive. Thomas (2010:113) 
states “The One-Party State was justified as a means to consolidate ‘Unity’ in ethnically divided 
societies with separatist tendencies; the absence of a multi-party democratic culture in Africa and 
the need to recreate and consolidate consensus politics typical of pre-colonial Africa; and the 
desire to precipitate the economic development of the underdeveloped states.” Local government 
was among the ‘peripheral’ governmental institutions that was completely absorbed by the core 
executive, the others being Parliaments and the Judiciary. Tordoff (1994:555) explains that 
decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa until the late 1980s was a mechanism used by the central 
government to tighten its control rather than facilitating local autonomy. 
The inability by independent African states to further strengthen the role of local governments 
was a major setback given some significant gains recorded by the departing colonial 
administrations. According to Olowu (1989:206), the British government, after World War II, 
used local self-governance as a means to prepare its African colonies for independence. They 
considered effective local governments as an essential step towards preparing the colonies for 
future political and economic development. The French on the other hand granted relative local 
autonomy to the nationalists in a bid to further delay the full independence of their colonies 
(Thomas, 2010:116). After independence, municipal officials in some countries such as Senegal, 
Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire were appointed and not elected as before, while in Anglophone 
African countries, the powers of traditional chiefs or authorities were significantly reduced or 
completely removed (Tordoff, 1994:557). Hence, the once vibrant, quite empowered and 




little or no stakes in the national development processes. As Thomas (2010:116) explains: 
“…locally elected institutions and officials were uprooted, replaced by officers and agencies 
directly controlled from the centre. Responsibilities such as education, health, road maintenance 
and the collection of taxes were controlled by regional administrators who reported to, and took 
orders from superiors in the state capital. National initiatives thus suppressed local initiatives and 
local communities had little or no influence over policies and decisions that affected them”. In 
such a prevailing climate, there was visibly no relationship between the central government and 
local government as the local governments were merely an extension of the central governments. 
Local governments functioned as per the instructions of the central government with no need to 
consider the local realities. 
Almost three decades after achieving their independences, the centralised governmental system 
had failed considerably on their “desire to precipitate the economic development of Africa” 
which was a justification for centralization. According to statistics from the World Bank 
obtained at the time, while all developing countries experienced a 3.5 percent growth rate (GNP) 
from 1960 to 1970, and at a 2.7 percent growth rate from 1970 to 1979, African countries 
recorded only a 1.3 percent and 0.8 percent growth rate over the same periods (Wunsch and 
Olowu, 1990:2). Wunsch and Olowu (1990:11-13) paint a clear picture of the drastic failure of 
excessive centralisation by identifying three ways in which centralisation policy contributed to 
eroding human development processes in Africa. These included the exploitation and abuse of 
the powerless by the powerful; the over optimistic view of bureaucracy as the ideal management 
strategy; and the erosion of local social “tools” or “technologies” of human action which 
weakened the diverse small scale organisations needed for local development. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s marked yet another turning point in Africa’s political and 
economic development. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, marking the end of the Cold War, 
apparently ushered in a shift from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Multi-party politics 
replaced the One-Party System, and central governments were urged to consider working with 
other actors within the state construct. This wave of democratisation included among others 
decentralisation reforms. African governments were encouraged to recognize and strengthen the 
role of local governments in promoting development at the local level according to the needs 




Paragraph 7): “Africa has no alternative but to empower its people ‘urgently and immediately’. 
Failure to do so would cause Africa to become further marginalised in world affairs, both 
geopolitically and economically.” This was a recognition of decentralisation and participation as 
the way forward for Africa. 
In the post-Cold War era, decentralisation has been one of the main governance reforms being 
undertaken in Africa. According to Dickovick and Wunsch (2014:1), more countries in Africa 
have engaged in decentralisation than any other part of the world since the end of the Cold War. 
This is because, most African central governments have commenced or intensified the transfer of 
authority and resources to other spheres of government or sub-national governments such as 
states, provinces, regions, districts and municipalities or councils (Dickovick and Wunsch, 
2014:1). This transfer of competencies and resources from the central to the local equally has a 
bearing on the dynamics of the relationship between the central government and the local 
governments. The World Bank (1999:114) recognised central government commitment to the 
new rules of their intergovernmental relationship with local governments as one of the 
precedents for proper democratic decentralisation. Therefore, within the decentralisation policy 
arrangements, there was the need to create an avenue of cooperation between the central 
government and the local government. 
The Republic of Cameroon is one of the African countries that has been through the various 
stages of institutionalised centralisation (through the creation of the One-Party State and 
subordination of local governments). It was once a federal republic from 1961 to 1972 and since 
the creation of the unitary system to replace the federal system, Cameroon has experienced 
different forms of decentralisation. The current context of decentralisation in Cameroon can be 
traced back to the constitutional amendment of 1996 by Law No 96/06 of 18 January 1996, and 
the 2004 Laws on Decentralisation (Cheka, 2007:182). This new direction meant local councils 
would have new responsibilities regarding local development as prior to this, they were merely 
involved in discharging social functions such as officiating civil marriages, and issuing birth and 
death certificates as defined in the 1974 Laws relating to Councils (Cheka, 2007:184). The shift 
in responsibilities from the central government to the local governments in Cameroon equally 
meant a redefinition of the relationship between the central and the local government. The need 




decentralisation, authority is concurrently exercised by the central government and the local 
government. This study identifies and analyses the institutions and processes of 
intergovernmental relations between Councils in the Mezam Division of the Northwest Region 
of Cameroon and the central government since 2010 when decentralisation became fully 
operational.    
1.2. PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW 
This preliminary literature review defines some of the key concepts in this study such as unitary 
government, federal government, decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. It also 
analyses structural functionalism and institutional pluralism as the theoretical underpinnings for 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations.  
1.2.1. Unitary government 
A unitary government is one in which authority is centralised at the national level, while little or 
no autonomy is granted to the lower levels or spheres of government (Kahn, Madue & Kalema, 
2011:28). Authority is concentrated with the central government, while the other levels or 
spheres of government exercise only the authority assigned to them by the central government 
who can in some cases override the decisions of the other levels or spheres because the final 
decision rests with the central government (Fox and Meyer, 1995:132). Most often, the lower 
levels are field offices of the central government and execute only the decisions made by the 
central government. 
In modern times, many unitary states have resorted to decentralising authority to lower spheres 
of government and have features of both centralisation and decentralisation. Cameroon, for 
example, is a decentralised unitary state. 
1.2.2. Federal government  
According to Smith (1995:7), a federal government is a constitutional government in a 
decentralised political system in which the constituent territorial units practice a politics of 
accommodation. The distinguishing feature of the separation of authority between the centre and 
the lower spheres of government from other forms of political devolution, is the constitutional 




government is to achieve both political integration and political freedom through the 
combination of shared rule with self-rule on some matters. This is explained by the fact that 
humans achieve greater fulfilment by participating in a wider community that at the same time 
upholds and values diversity and local or individual identity.  
1.2.3. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation according to UNDP (1997:4) is the reorganisation of authority in which a 
system of co-responsibility is established between institutions of governance at the central 
government, regional/state government and local government levels in line with the concept of 
subsidiarity. Some of the forms of decentralisation include: political decentralisation 
(devolution); administrative decentralisation (deconcentration); fiscal decentralisation; and 
delegation. Political decentralisation, otherwise known as devolution according to Manor 
(1999:6), is the transfer of authority and resources to democratically elected lower levels of 
government with minimal control from the central government. Administrative decentralisation 
or deconcentration on the other hand is the transfer of authority from the central government to 
local government officials who report to a central government ministry, agency or department 
(Arthur, 2012:30). Fiscal decentralisation is the transfer of funds from the central government to 
the lower levels of government, or the granting of authority to the lower levels of governments to 
internally generate their own revenues at their various levels (Arthur, 2012:29). Delegation 
according to Ahmad and Talib (2011:60) is “the lending of central authority, responsibility, and 
resources for exercising administrative and substantive functions to subordinate units or 
organisations in the centre. Although these organisations and agencies are considered 
decentralised, they reinforce centralisation and decision-making at higher levels”. 
1.2.4. Intergovernmental Relations 
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) is the manner in which relations are conducted between the 
different levels/spheres of a governing hierarchy within a country (Kahn et al., 2011:4). They are 
innovative mechanisms through which cooperative engagements are maintained among and 
between horizontal and vertical parties. Intergovernmental relations are defined by Phillimore 
(2013:229) as the institutions and processes through which interactions occur between 




of government, be it federal or unitary, indicates that there should be some sort of 
intergovernmental relations among and between the different government levels. 
1.2.5. Theoretical Framework 
Several theories can be used to analyse the relationship between decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations. This study focuses more on the structural functionalism and the 
institutional pluralism theories. However, the use of these theories is not exclusive because other 
theories can be employed in the course of the study to enhance analyses. 
Structural Functionalism 
Parsons’ (1961:37) theory of social action suggests that there are four basic survival 
requisites/problems for society to maintain itself. These requisites/problems which he refers to as 
functions are Pattern-Maintenance, Goal-Attainment, Adaptation, and Integration. 
- The Pattern-Maintenance function: This refers to the need for mechanisms that can 
maintain the stability of patterns of institutionalised cultures defining the structure of the 
system. The focus is on the institutionalisation of values that maintain the stability of the 
system even if these values (be they religious beliefs or ideology) do change (Parsons, 
1961:38). In this study, the pattern-maintenance function is concerned with tension 
management or how the actors in the social system deal with internal tension. The 
management of conflicts that could arise among different actors of decentralisation at 
various levels determines its stability despite the variations in ideologies or beliefs, hence 
the need for robust conflict resolution mechanisms. 
- The Goal-Attainment function: Social systems which are complex systems, have needs 
which must be met. A system has numerous goals which can be adjusted to the changing 
priorities of the system. Individuals are not committed to the values of the system, but 
their motivation to facilitate the functioning of the system according to its exigencies 
(Parsons, 1961:39). Therefore, the different actors of decentralisation at various levels 
must set their goals or priorities of what they intend doing, as well as defining their roles. 
- The Adaptation function: This function provides the facilities needed for the attainment 
of the system’s goals. Due to the multiplicity of system’s goals, the facilities must be 




1961:40). It means different actors of decentralisation must secure the necessary 
resources needed to achieve their goals. 
- The Integration function: Most systems are composed of independent units or subsystems 
of the inclusive system. Integration is concerned with how these units contribute to 
ensuring the proper functioning of the entire system. Legal norms and the proper 
institutions to manage these norms can be used to facilitate integration in highly 
differentiated societies (Parsons, 1961:40). In this study, actors of decentralisation at 
different levels, should be contributing to ensuring that decentralisation is effective by 
harmonising their actions in the different domains hence the interrelationships amongst 
them which are intergovernmental relations. 
Holton (2001:155) presents Parsons’ four functional requisites (in no specific order of priority) 
as Adaptation (A), Goal-attainment (G), Integration (I), and Latency (L), commonly referred to 
as the AGIL Paradigm. In Adaptation, society interacts with outer nature to generate available 
resources for social distribution; Goal-Attainment is concerned with how resources are arranged 
to attain human goals; Integration is concerned with how the various units of the whole system 
are harmonised, perhaps through coordination and maintenance of viable interrelationships 
among them; and Latency ensures the stabilisation of individual’s values into patterns of social 
values.    
One of the strengths of Parsons’ theory of social action is the emphasis on the relationship 
between the social system and its environment. However, Parsons’ critics also note that Parsons 
fails to elaborate the medium of communication between the social system and its environment 
(Holton, 2001:160). 
Institutional Pluralism  
According to Cohen and Peterson (1998:9) there is the need to dismantle the “monopoly of the 
central design of administration” by emphasising the organisational and institutional distribution 
of roles required to execute specific tasks. They propose Institutional Pluralism or Institutional 
Partnerships which are “a progressive network of central, non-central, and private organisations 
and institutions sharing roles and tasks related to producing and distributing public goods and 
services” (Cohen and Peterson, 1998:9). Institutional Pluralism therefore advocates for a shift 




Institutional Pluralism is a strategy for improving service delivery and accountability. Cohen and 
Peterson (1998:9) note that, “by increasing the number and diversity of institutions and 
organisations involved in brokering and providing services, accountability is ensured and the 
management of service delivery is improved upon and tailored to the needs of the local people.” 
Therefore, rather than a centralised model of central government monopoly over given public 
tasks, Institutional Pluralism advocates for government institutions as brokers networking with a 
range of central, local and non-state institutions and organisations who perform roles needed to 
deliver a given public good (Cohen and Peterson, 1998:9).  
Within the context of this study, Institutional Pluralism by virtue of its definition advocates for 
decentralisation through the dismantling of central government monopoly and transferring some 
responsibilities to the lower spheres or levels of government, hence intergovernmental relations. 
Central governments should also go further to work closely with the different institutions at the 
lower level indicating that the focus is not just on creating institutions in geographical areas, but 
clearly defining their tasks and roles, and working closely with them in providing public goods 
and services. Moreover, the relationship goes beyond the sharing of roles and tasks to benefiting 
from each other’s knowledge and resources. Hence, decentralisation creates lower spheres of 
government institutions which should continuously work with the central government institutions 
to promote development. 
However, one of the major weaknesses of Institutional Pluralism is the financial, technical and 
human resource deficits that could be existing in lower governmental institutions which make 
them unable to perform specific tasks. This can be used as a justification for continuous central 
government monopoly. Also, as noted by Cohen and Peterson (1998:13), some politicians at 
national level tend to be more control-oriented, and highly centralised governments use the 
Distributive Institutional Monopoly for the allocation of public sector tasks. 
1.3.  PRACTICAL OVERVIEW OF DECENTRALISATION AND THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS STRUCTURE IN CAMEROON 
Decentralisation, as practiced in Cameroon today, is defined by Chapter X of the 1996 
Constitution and the 2004 Laws on Decentralisation. To explain the decentralisation structure in 
Cameroon, it is essential to present the administrative organisation of Cameroon as seen in 
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The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon empowers the President of Cameroon to define the 
organisational structure of the Republic of Cameroon, and make appointments to various civil 
positions by decree (Article 8 [9] & [10], Constitution of Cameroon) (Republic of Cameroon 
(RC), 1996). The structure of the government of Cameroon can be explained from two distinct 
yet interdependent dimensions: administrative decentralisation or deconcentration, and political 
decentralisation or devolution.  
From a deconcentration perspective, there are four levels of government (Presidential Decree No 
2008/376 of 12 November 2008 on the Administrative organisation of Cameroon) (RC, 2008c): 
- The Central government (President, Prime Minister, and the Ministers); 
- 10 Regions headed by Governors; 
- 58 Divisions headed by Senior Divisional Officers (SDOs); and 
- 362 Subdivisions headed by Divisional Officers (DOs). (See 1 in Figure 1.1 above) 
The Governors, SDOs and DOs are appointed by the President and placed under the supervision 
of the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation. They represent the President 
and the central government in their respective administrative units (Governor in the Region, 
SDO in the Division, and the DO in the Sub-division). Hence, they are in charge of coordinating 
- on behalf of different Ministers - the activities of the regional, divisional and subdivisional 
offices of different ministries in their respective administrative units (See 2 in Figure 1.1 above). 
Governors are superiors to the SDOs and the SDOs are superiors to the DOs. 
From a devolution perspective, there are three levels of government to which authority has been 
transferred (Article 55, Constitution of Cameroon) (RC, 1996): 
- The Central government (President, Prime Minister, and the Ministers) 
- 10 Regional Councils headed by an elected Regional President  
- 374 Local Councils – the Law on the decentralisation, rules applicable to local councils, 
identifies 3 categories of local councils: 
 City councils (made up of 2 or more Sub-divisional Councils) headed by 
appointed Government Delegates (currently 12); 
 Sub-divisional Councils headed by elected Mayors and located within the territory 




 Councils headed by elected Mayors (currently 319). (See 3 in Figure 1.1 above) 
According to the Constitution of Cameroon, regional councils and local councils have 
administrative and financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests. Their 
duty is to promote the economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of 
their respective communities (Article 55 [2] Constitution of Cameroon) (RC, 1996). 
Presidents of regional councils and mayors of councils and sub-divisional councils are elected, 
while the government delegates in city councils are appointed by the President of the Republic. 
A city council is made up of at least two or more sub-divisional councils, hence all sub-
divisional councils must be located within the territory of a city council. Regional councils and 
local councils are placed under the authority of the Minister of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation who supervises their activities through the Governors (appointed) in the regions 
and the Senior Divisional Officers (appointed) in the divisions. It is worth noting that all local 
councils are situated within the divisions, the administrative unit controlled by the Senior 
Divisional Officer (SDO). However, apart from city councils, all councils and sub-divisional 
councils are part of subdivisions controlled by the Divisional Officer (DO), but the law gives 
supervisory powers over local councils exclusively to the SDO. In certain circumstances, the 
SDO can mandate the DO to represent him/her in some council meetings.  
Decentralisation in Cameroon is built on three principles: subsidiarity, complementarity, and 
progressiveness. According to the principle of complementarity, authority transferred to the 
regional councils and local councils is not exclusive because this authority is jointly exercised by 
the central government and these regional and local councils. This explains why some of the 
responsibilities transferred to the regional and local councils are also part of the functions of the 
regional, divisional and sub-divisional offices of central government ministries. Cameroon 
therefore operates a 3-tier decentralisation system comprising the central government, regional 
councils and local councils (as shown in Figure 1.1 above). However, as of now, the regional 
councils still exist only on paper and only the local councils are operational. This study focuses 
on the relationship between the central government and the local councils. 
The decentralisation process in Cameroon, particularly the intergovernmental relations structure, 
has been the subject of much controversy in both the academic and the professional arena. 




within the local government sphere in Cameroon demonstrates the limits and ‘instrumentality’ of 
Cameroon’s version of decentralisation. The supervision of mayors by SDOs bears testimony to 
the fact that the central government’s agenda has since independence been that of continuously 
exercising their authority over local representatives (Oyono, 2004:96). This is a similar opinion 
held by Kofele-Kale (2011:526) who stipulates that the appointment of officials to supervise the 
actions of elected local governments is a demonstration that the central government cannot or 
does not trust these local governments with the management of their local affairs. Mback (in 
Eyoh and Stren, 2007:69) commenting on the decentralisation laws states that these laws have 
not clearly defined and differentiated the authority or responsibilities transferred to local 
governments and the central government in Cameroon, hence there is a risk of interference and 
conflicts. Also, according to Mbuagbo (2012:16-17), one of the immediate sources of conflict 
between city councils and sub-divisional councils in Cameroon emanates from ambiguities and 
lack of clarity in the law on the financial regime of Councils in Cameroon regarding internally-
generated revenue of these local councils given that they are located within the same territory. 
Tani, Abangma, & Bruno (2012:100) note that decentralisation in Cameroon has led to the 
creation and restructuring of numerous institutions at the central and local level to discharge 
specific functions. However, the practical implementation of decentralisation since 2010 has 
revealed numerous dysfunctions within the system resulting from the inability of ministries and 
their deconcentrated services in the divisions and subdivisions to effectively adhere to the 
decentralisation reform. 
On the other hand, authors such as Owona (2012:9) and Kuate (2014:14) uphold the legitimate 
obligation of the central government to supervise the actions of the regional and local councils in 
Cameroon. This study unveils the real purpose of central government oversight over local 
councils which is still being considered as a mechanism of interference by the central 
government in the local councils. Moreover, the study of intergovernmental relations in the 
implementation of decentralisation in Cameroon focuses more on the formal structures and 
institutions. This study also seeks to investigate the informal processes of exchange and 
interaction which is also characteristic of intergovernmental relations. 
Analysing the relationship between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in 




limited approach. There is limited knowledge on the existing formal and informal operations and 
institutions of intergovernmental relations in Cameroon; the existing mechanisms for the various 
levels of government to hold each other accountable; the various instruments for coordinating 
joint activities and resolving conflicts between the central government’s field offices and the 
local councils; and the mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the city council and the sub-
divisional councils. These are the issues which this study seeks to address by analysing the 
implementation of decentralisation within Mezam Division. Therefore, the study follows the 
approach proposed by Ribot (2002:1-2) in which decentralisation is examined in terms of centre-
local relations with the focus on strengthening the local governments. 
1.4.  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
One of the main challenges of the decentralisation process in Cameroon is the multiplicity of 
governmental actors involved in its practical implementation at the local level (Patricia & 
Bekono, 2012:3-5). There is lack of collaboration between these actors, and the supervision of 
local councils by central government through the senior divisional officers, though legal, has 
been perceived as a mechanism of domination and a centralisation tendency. Moreover, authority 
transferred to local councils and deconcentrated government services overlap in most cases. As 
the World Bank (2012:11) notes, the legal framework of decentralisation in Cameroon is 
“overlapping, cumbersome and contradictory, and in many respects open to different 
interpretations. This is because decentralised functions are not clearly defined and distinguished 
from ‘deconcentrated’ central government operations”. Instead of promoting collaboration 
between the local councils and deconcentrated government services, the overlap has rather 
created a situation in which local councils perceive deconcentrated government organs as 
threatening their autonomy. 
In addition, local government executives in councils within the Mezam Division are a 
combination of elected mayors and an appointed government delegate, especially within the 
Bamenda City Council. This has created a situation of conflict in which the sub-divisional 
councils complain of their authority and resources being usurped almost completely by the 
government delegates. Mbuagbo (2012:16-17) uses the laws governing local finances in 
Cameroon to illustrate the areas of potential conflicts between the city council and the sub-




Financial Regime of Regional and Local Authorities states that, “local authorities shall be 
corporate bodies governed by public law who shall have legal personality and administrative and 
financial autonomy for the management of regional and local interests. They shall freely manage 
their revenue and expenditure within the framework of budgets adopted by their deliberative 
bodies”. Law No. 2009/019 of 15 December 2009 (RC, 2009b) on the local fiscal system in 
Cameroon in the same vain provides that “city councils and sub-divisional councils shall not be 
entitled to the same sources of revenue. The fiscal revenue of the city council shall delimit the 
revenue sources for city councils and sub-divisional councils respectively.” However, as 
Mbuagbo, (2012:17) states, “a closer reading of this law opens a window of conflict between the 
different city councils and sub-divisional councils in Cameroon because the sources of revenue 
are few, and the law does not specify the territory of operation of city councils (which covers the 
territory of the sub-divisional councils). More so, the sources of fiscal revenue for city councils 
sometimes apply to the sub-divisional councils. Hence, there is no clarity on which authority 
(city council or sub-divisional council) is really entitled to collecting what revenue and for what 
purpose. These ambiguities and lack of clarity in the financial regime of local councils is the 
immediate source of conflict between city councils and the various sub-divisional councils in 
Cameroon.” 
These difficulties all point to the fact that there is a problem with the implementation of 
intergovernmental relations in the ongoing decentralisation process in Cameroon. This is mainly 
due to differences in the interpretations of the transfer of authority and resources between the 
central government and the local governments. Central government oversight over councils is 
perceived as interference, and coordination and conflict resolution is a persistent challenge. 
1.5.  AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main aim of the study is to examine the extent to which the implementation of the 
Cameroonian decentralisation model has influenced intergovernmental relations in Councils of 
Mezam Division in the Northwest Region.  
The objectives include:  





- To describe the international perspective of decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations; 
- To identify the laws and institutions that govern decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations in Cameroon; 
- To explore the existing formal and informal institutions and processes of 
intergovernmental relations in the implementation of decentralisation in Mezam Division 
(the case study); 
- To examine the perceptions of officials on the nature of intergovernmental relations in 
Mezam Division; 
- To critically analyse the positive and negative influences of decentralisation on 
intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division; 
- To formulate recommendations on improving intergovernmental relations in the ongoing 
decentralisation process in Cameroon 
 
1.6.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main research question is: To what extent has the implementation of decentralisation 
influenced the practice of intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division? 
The research questions include: 
- What is the relationship between the concepts and practices of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations? 
- How is decentralisation and intergovernmental relations practiced in the French Republic 
and the Republic of South Africa? 
- What are the laws and institutions governing decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations in Cameroon? 
- How has the implementation of decentralisation led to formal and informal processes, as 
well as institutions for intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division? 
- What are the perceptions of various officials on the state of intergovernmental relations in 
Mezam Division? 
- To what extent has decentralisation influenced intergovernmental relations initiatives in 




- How can intergovernmental relations be improved in the current decentralisation process 
in Cameroon? 
 
1.7.  METHODOLOGY 
This study makes use of the exploratory research design and more precisely, the case study 
method. The main idea in an exploratory study which according to Ghosh (1992:210) is the 
discovery of facts and insights. The aim of the case study method is to know the factors and 
causes which explain the complex behavioural patterns of a unit and the place of the unit in its 
surrounding social milieu. The study seeks to understand how decentralisation in Mezam 
Division has influenced the practice of intergovernmental relations.  
The relevance of the exploratory research design can be further justified by the fact that it would 
provide a better understanding of the uniqueness of the Cameroonian context of 
intergovernmental relations in decentralisation which has been subject to many interpretations. 
Also, with much attention been focused on the formal legal and institutional frameworks of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, the exploratory design would be 
appropriate to investigate the informal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations within a 
particular case study, Mezam Division. 
This case study research, which is also empirical field research, makes use of qualitative research 
methods. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with local council executives in 
Mezam Division, officials of some central government divisional offices and the office of the 
Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division. This facilitated the collection of information on 
the practical implementation of decentralisation in Mezam Division and its effects on 
intergovernmental relations with the perspective of the various central government actors at the 
local level. This was complemented by interviews with officials of the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation at central government level. 
Mezam Division was selected for the study because it has all the attributes of local councils and 
deconcentrated local authorities in Cameroon. It has all the various types of local councils (a city 
council, sub-divisional councils and councils). Moreover, some of these councils are governed 
by the ruling party and others by the Opposition party. Hence, the researcher verified the 




intergovernmental relations in Mezam. The headquarters of Mezam Division, Bamenda, hosts all 
the Mezam Divisional offices of all deconcentrated state services. This has made accessibility to 
the various actors of decentralisation easy. 
For primary data, the study employed the purposive sampling method which selects key 
informants that can best help the researcher understand the central phenomenon as these key 
informants are considered to be “information-rich”. Participants selected for the research 
included officials from the local councils and deconcentrated central government services who 
are directly involved with the decentralisation process such as the mayors, government delegates, 
divisional representatives of central government ministries, services in charge of local councils 
in the Office of the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division. At the central government 
level, some technocrats on decentralisation in the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation were also interviewed.  
Secondary data was obtained by reading through existing literature on decentralization and 
intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, South Africa, the French Republic and the world at 
large from books, journal articles, and reports. Most of the literature that was consulted focuses 
on efforts by different governments around the world at implementing decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations. Other literature illustrates some attempts at explaining how different 
systems of government such as federal and unitary governments orientate intergovernmental 
relations.  
The purpose of the literature review was to identify and explore different types of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations initiatives. Although there are many examples 
of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations internationally, the study identified literature 
related to decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in the French Republic and South 
Africa. This is because, the decentralisation system in Cameroon is modelled according to the 
French system on the one-hand, and South Africa, like Cameroon, is a unitary government. The 
information collected from the literature review was useful in analysing the research findings 
from the fieldwork, and to propose strategies for improving intergovernmental relations in 
Mezam division. 
The secondary data for the study were collected from multiple sources mainly in South Africa 




University Belpark Campus Library; Department of Political Science, University of Yaoundé II; 
Department of Political Science and University Library, University of Buea; Department of 
Political Science, University of Dschang; Department of Political Science, University of 
Bamenda; Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD) archives; 
United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) library; Mezam Divisional Office archives; 
Bamenda City Council archives; Bamenda I Council archives; Bamenda II Council archives; 
Bamenda III Council archives; Bafut Council archives; Bali Council archives; and Tubah 
Council archives. 
More so, in recent years, the internet has become an indispensable source of secondary data for 
research. The online library of Stellenbosch University provided access to numerous published 
journal articles which analyse key questions around decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations. Reports and articles were equally accessed on the website of international development 
organisations such as the World Bank Group, and intergovernmental organisations such as the 
United Nations and the European Commission. The website of the French government provided 
access to the different legislations on decentralisation policies in France and the institutional 
reforms that have accompanied the French decentralisation process since 1982 to date. 
1.8.  DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
This study focuses on decentralisation and intergovernmental relations as practiced in Cameroon. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to pretend that one could study the more than 374 
councils, city councils and sub-divisional councils located in over 58 divisions of Cameroon, as 
well as all the other stakeholders of decentralisation. Hence geographically, the research focuses 
on the councils in Mezam Division of the Northwest Region of Cameroon. This is because of its 
diversity in terms of having all the types of local councils in Cameroon (city council, sub-
divisional council, and councils), as well as diverse political ideologies since some of the 
councils are controlled by the ruling party while others are controlled by the Opposition.  
In terms of temporal delimitation, the study shall focus on the period from 2010 to date. This is 
because although decentralisation was mentioned in the Cameroon Constitution since 1996 and 
the Laws on Decentralisation had been promulgated since 2004, the effective transfer of 




realistic to look at the period when competencies and resources were transferred to local 
councils. 
In terms of content, this study focuses on the contribution of decentralisation to 
intergovernmental relations in the Mezam Division. It investigates how the various legislative 
texts on decentralisation in Cameroon deal with intergovernmental relations. It also identifies 
various intergovernmental relations mechanisms (formal and informal) in the Mezam Division, 
and the perceptions of council executives in Mezam and central government official on the 
practice and nature of intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division and in Cameroon. 
 
1.9.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Decentralisation is undoubtedly one of the policy instruments through which governments can 
improve on service delivery and accountability. The creation of lower spheres of government 
shifts some responsibilities to governments which are closer to the people and are knowledgeable 
of local needs and priorities. This provides an opportunity for the various levels of government to 
design common strategies on how to tackle developmental issues. This study has a policy, 
administrative and a scientific relevance, particularly with regards to the Cameroonian context.  
From a political point of view, this study would identify the various mechanisms through which 
the implementation of decentralisation is fostering intergovernmental relations in Cameroon (the 
formal and informal processes, and the challenges faced by the various actors involved). The 
outcomes and recommendations would provide the major decentralisation actors from the central 
government and local government with the required information needed to further enhance 
intergovernmental relations. It is worth noting that the current decentralisation policy in 
Cameroon is more like an experiment because the government opted for a much more 
progressive implementation mechanism. Hence, all the institutions have not yet been set up like 
the regions which are yet to go operational. On the other hand, other institutions have been set up 
and are being modified to suit the current trend such as the recent creation of a separate Ministry 
of Decentralisation and Local Development from the former Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation. Thus, the research serves as an exploratory study whose 
findings could inform actors and stakeholders of decentralisation on the perception of local and 




From an administrative perspective, this study examines the working relationship between the 
supervisory authorities, the local councils and the deconcentrated central government services. 
Although there seems to be an overlap in the responsibilities of the deconcentrated central 
government services and the local councils, their activities are complementary because they are 
all geared towards promoting local development. In some cases, the role of the supervisory 
authority is sometimes misunderstood and considered as another form of authoritarianism. This 
study would create a nexus between the government oversight mechanisms and the autonomy of 
local councils within the implementation of decentralisation in Cameroon. This is crucial to 
understanding the relationship between the central government and local governments. 
With regards to scientific relevance, since the 1990s, numerous academic and development 
institutions have extensively done research on decentralisation in Cameroon. The relationship 
between the central government and the local governments has most often been presented from 
the negative perspective of the burden of government oversight on local councils. This study 
explores the practice of intergovernmental relations within Cameroon’s model of decentralisation 
in the context of a particular case study. This in-depth study should clarify the purpose of 
government oversight over local councils, identify the shortcomings, and how all the actors at 
various government levels can work together for decentralisation to achieve its stated objectives. 
It will equally explore the mechanisms for coordination and conflict resolution between various 
local councils, and between the local councils and deconcentrated central government services. 
This would significantly contribute to the current literature on decentralisation in Cameroon. 
1.10. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The proposed chapter outline for this study is as follows 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
It presents the background to the study, preliminary literature review, practical overview of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, statement of the problem, 
research questions, objectives, the methodology, delimitation of the study in terms of geography 
or space, time and content, significance of the study with reference to its policy, administrative 




Chapter 2: Literature review on decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. 
It analyses the existing literature on decentralisation and intergovernmental relations according 
to the conceptual framework and the various approaches to these concepts. It also establishes a 
relationship between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations from the definitions and 
approaches.  
Chapter 3: International context of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations.  
This chapter presents the context of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in 2 other 
countries in Europe and Africa. These include France and South Africa. The Cameroonian model 
of decentralisation is inspired directly from the French model, and South Africa which has 
aspects of a unitary government like Cameroon. 
Chapter 4: Policy and regulatory framework of decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations in Cameroon. 
This chapter presents the various laws and institutions governing decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, both at central level and at local level. 
Chapter 5: Presentation of the Case study: Mezam Division. 
This chapter presents the Mezam Division which is the focus of this study, and explains in detail 
the research design and the methodology that will be used for the collection and analysis of data, 
some of the challenges encountered during the research, and ethical considerations for the 
research. The chapter presents some of the findings of the research based on the data collected 
through the interviews. 
Chapter 6: A Critical analysis of intergovernmental relations initiatives in Mezam Division.  
This chapter analyses various intergovernmental relations initiatives in Mezam Division using 
information from the literature review, the international context, the policy and regulatory 
framework, and the case study (fieldwork). The analysis is based on some mechanisms for 
intergovernmental relations such as supervision, coordination, conflict resolutions and 




or is changing the relationship between the central government and local councils in Mezam 
Division and the challenges faced.  
Chapter 7: A normative approach to intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division.  
This chapter formulates proposals to improve the relationship between the central and the local 
governments in Mezam Division, and Cameroon judging from the results obtained regarding the 
situation in Mezam Division. The proposals could therefore serve as a normative approach to 
effective and sustainable intergovernmental relations in the implementation of decentralisation in 
Cameroon.  
1.11. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter is the main introduction to the thesis. It presents the background to the study 
focusing on the overall context, the preliminary literature review which defines some key terms 
and the theoretical framework, and a brief explanation of the decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations structure in Cameroon. The chapter further presents other major 
components of the introduction which include: the statement of the problem; the aim, objectives 
and research questions; aspects of the research methodology; the geographical, temporal and 
content delimitation of the study; and the policy, administrative and scientific relevance of the 
study within the Cameroonian context. The chapter outline presents a brief description of the 
seven chapters in the thesis. The researcher follows the sequence of first describing and 
explaining the concepts and literature Chapter 1 and 2), and the macro context of decentralisation 
and intergovernmental relations through an analysis of the international context (Chapter 3). This 
is followed by a presentation of the Cameroon case, the practical research in Cameroon and the 
synthesis of the challenges encountered by the intergovernmental relations approach in 
Cameroon (Chapters 4 to 6). Chapter 7 highlights a normative approach as recommendations to 













The literature review of this study explores various analyses on decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations from different scholars and institutions. Firstly, the literature focuses 
on the conceptual framework of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations through 
elaborate definitions and clarification of the concepts. Secondly, it establishes the relationship 
existing between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations based on the conceptual 
clarifications and the various approaches. 
2.2. THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION 
This section analyses the concept of decentralisation by examining various definitions and the 
types of decentralisation. It equally presents some proposed overarching advantages of 
decentralisation, as well as some popular misconceptions around the concept and practice of 
decentralisation. 
2.2.1. Definition of decentralisation 
Decentralisation according to UNDP (1997:4) is the reorganisation of authority in which a 
system of co-responsibility is established between institutions of governance at central 
government, regional/state government and local government levels in line with the concept of 
subsidiarity. The purpose is to improve on the overall quality and effectiveness of the 
governance system, while strengthening the authority and capacities of the governance systems 
at sub-national levels. The World Bank (1999:108) defines decentralisation as the transfer of 
political, fiscal and administrative authority to lower levels of government. It implies therefore 
that countries without autonomous elected lower level governments - with the capacity of 
making decisions on certain policy issues - cannot be considered as decentralised. Also, 
decentralisation could mean creating such governments or widening the resources and 




Masuri & Rao (2016: 4-5) refer to decentralisation as “efforts to strengthen village and municipal 
governments on both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, decentralisation 
strengthens citizen’s participation in local government by, for example, instituting regular 
elections, improving access to information, and fostering mechanisms for deliberative decision-
making. On the supply side, it enhances the ability of local governments to provide services by 
increasing their financial resources, strengthening their capacities, and streamlining and 
rationalising their administrative functions.” Decentralisation, according to the European 
Commission (2004:85), occurs when the national government transfers authority and resources 
to regional and local authorities which are democratically elected. Authority and resources are 
transferred to these authorities because at that level, the authority is exercised in a more effective 
and efficient manner. The authority being exercised is autonomous and subject only to legal 
requirements. Moreover, the local authorities are called upon to be answerable for the exercise of 
these powers to the local community whom they represent through electoral and consultative 
processes. The success of decentralisation notes the European Commission (2004:85) would 
largely depend on the provision of the necessary financial, technical and human resources needed 
by the regional and local authorities to fulfil their mission. 
According to Ahwoi (2010:4), “decentralisation is a tool of public administration reform that 
involves the transfer of functions and powers, skills and competencies and means and resources 
to lower levels of governance, normally structures of good government, though in some 
jurisdictions, the transfer is to other spheres of governance”. Using Ghana as an example, Ahwoi 
(2010:4) notes that political decentralisation ensures the transfer of functions and powers; 
administrative decentralisation ensures the transfer of skills and competencies, while fiscal 
decentralisation ensures the transfer of means and resources. In the same light, Ribot (2002:1) 
defines decentralisation as “the act of a central government formally relinquishing powers to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a politico-administrative and territorial hierarchy.” Ribot 
(2002:2) notes that through decentralisation, local institutions can be strengthened to have a more 
symbolic, accessible, and productive role in impacting the local populations within their 
respective local communities. This would normally involve transferring some financial resources 
and decision-making authority from the central government. Ribot (2002:1-2) also perceives 
decentralisation as centre-local relations as he states that “decentralisation reforms is not about 




about strengthening the latter through mechanisms supporting the objectives of national 
unification, democratisation, and greater efficiency and equity in using public services and 
service delivery”.  
Owona (2012:9) follows the same direction as Ribot by defining decentralisation as a method of 
administrative organisation in which the state creates decentralised public entities, grants them 
jurisdiction and resources, while preserving the supervisory and monitoring power over these 
entities. It is a means of power sharing between the central government and local authorities 
according to Kuate (2014:14).  
The above definitions make reference to some key elements of decentralisation which include 
creating or strengthening lower levels of government, transfer of authority and resources to these 
lower levels and co-responsibility between the central government and the lower levels. 
Decentralisation has been considered to have numerous benefits for various countries. 
2.2.2. Types of decentralisation 
The concept and practice of decentralisation has different interpretations around the world and 
according to different authors. The commonly used typologies of decentralisation are 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution and divestment/privatisation. 
Deconcentration 
Deconcentration is the shifting of responsibilities from a ministry, agency or department at the 
central government level to field offices who cannot make decisions but act according to the 
directives from the central level (Ahwoi, 2010:5). The practice of central government dispersing 
responsibilities for some services to branch offices at the lower levels of government is 
deconcentration. However, deconcentration does not involve transfering authority to lower levels 
of government, and it is unlikely that the potential benefits or pitfalls of decentralisation can be 
perceived (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird, 1998:4). Deconcentration can also be referred to as the 
simple dilution of centrality whereby some political and administrative responsibilities are 
distributed to non-central offices (Ahmad & Talib, 2011:60). The staff of these deconcentrated 
offices are recruited by central government and serve under its control, thus deconcentration is a 
means of increasing central control. With regards to accountability, these government agents 




Deconcentration has been the most common form of decentralisation practiced in Africa after 
independence. It is still commonly used today alongside other forms of decentralisation. 
Deconcentration is sometimes referred to as administrative decentralisation. 
Schneider (2003:38) defines administrative decentralisation as the dispersal of policy 
responsibilities by the central government to field offices. Although this dispersal alters the 
geographical and spatial distribution of authority, the autonomy of the institution receiving the 
authority from the central government remains unchanged. Litvack et al. (1998:6) note that 
administrative decentralisation deals with mechanisms through which political institutions use 
fiscal and regulatory actions to turn policy decisions into allocative (and distributive) outcomes. 
Administrative decentralisation, according to the European Commission (2007:16), is the 
transfer by central government of decision-making responsibility and resources to governments 
in the lower levels or central government field offices to ensure the provision of some public 
services or functions. Arthur (2012:30) defines administrative decentralisation as the central 
government transferring responsibilities to local government officials who are part of central 
government ministries, departments or agencies. One of the major characteristics is the making 
of decisions by the central government, while the role of local government officials is to 
implement these decisions most often without questions. Administrative decentralisation is very 
often considered as a limited form of decentralisation because the transfer of authority to local 
institutions is not based on political representation controlled from communities at the local 
level, but on political decisions made at the centre (European Commission, 2007:16). 
Another name for administrative decentralisation, according to UNDESA (2005:65), is 
institutional decentralisation which refers to the administrative institutions and mechanisms at 
the sub-national and intergovernmental levels through which the central government manages 
and supports decentralisation processes. Within this framework, there are some mechanisms that 
are used to establish a relationship between formal government bodies and key local actors such 
as traditional institutions (where they exist), non-governmental organisations, and private sector 
organisations. The purpose of institutional or administrative decentralisation is to structure 
interactions among the various levels of government which can be used to create a balance 




incentives for suitable behaviour and commendable performance by relevant stakeholders at all 
levels (UNDESA, 2005:65). 
The key ingredients of administrative decentralisation, according to the European Commission 
(2007:16), are: 
- Existing levels of government below the central government, field offices and agencies; 
- A dynamic system for local – intergovernmental relationships; 
- Capacity building mechanisms for institutions at the lower levels; 
- Establishing a clear system of accountability between local and central government 
(control/tutelle); 
- Execution on behalf of central government; and 
- The provision of public goods, services and functions at lower levels of government. 
A major challenge arises with the level of local control over civil servants. Are civil servants 
appointed to local councils answerable to these local councils or to the central government where 
they received their appointments? Most often, administrative decentralisation is a mechanism 
used by central governments to control local governments. 
Delegation 
Delegation, according to Arthur (2012:26), is the assignment of specific decision-making 
authority, such as the transfer of managerial responsibility for some clearly defined functions to 
public organisations located inside the normal bureaucratic structure of central government. It 
implies the lending of central authority, responsibility, and resources for exercising 
administrative and substantive functions to subordinate units or organisations in the centre. 
Ahmad & Talib (2011:60) explain that although these organisations and agencies are considered 
to be decentralised, they merely reinforce centralisation and decision-making at the central 
government levels.  
Devolution 
Devolution or political decentralisation, according to Litvack et al (1998:6), is a situation 
whereby decision-making authority, finance and management authority is transferred to semi-




service delivery are usually transferred to municipalities who elect their mayors and councils, 
can raise their revenues locally, and can independently take and implement decisions on local 
investments. UNHABITAT (2002:4) notes that the local government’s discretionary authority to 
decision-making is at the heart of devolution which is bound only by the broad national policy 
guidelines; local government’s financial, human and material capacities, and the physical 
environment within which the local governments must operate. Devolution involves the 
constitutional conferment of authority on formally constituted provincial/regional and local 
governments to perform specific functions (Ahwoi, 2010:5). These provincial/regional and local 
governments exercise their authority and carry out their functions without necessarily referring 
back to the central government because they are legally responsible for the outcomes of 
exercising their authority and executing their functions (Ahwoi, 2010:5). 
UNDP (1997:6) establishes certain preconditions for devolution in its purest form. Firstly, the 
autonomous, independent nature of local governments, perceived as a different level of 
government over which central government should exercise no direct or minimal control; 
secondly, local governments should exercise their authority and perform their public functions 
within a clearly and legally recognised geographical boundary; thirdly, local governments are 
corporate bodies with the authority to secure the necessary resources for the performance of their 
duties; fourthly, devolution should have as outcome the "development and strengthening of local 
governments as institutions" so that the local citizens perceive them as a responsive and effective 
governmental unit that seeks to satisfy local needs; and finally, in devolution, the existing 
relationships between central governments and local governments should be coordinated,  
reciprocal, and mutually beneficial. The paradigm shift from centralisation to decentralisation 
reforms in Africa is understood to mean the introduction of devolution which is a term employed 
by the Constitutions of most African countries. 
Political decentralisation, according to the European Commission (2007:15), refers to the partial 
transfer of political authority from the central government to governments at the lower levels. 
Political decentralisation is a process that transcends election of local leaders to the transfer of 
political authority that provides citizens and locally elected representatives with a greater voice 
in taking decisions and implementing actions in various domains extending beyond political 




2005:11). In the realm of political decentralisation, decision-making authority is conferred to 
local governments (including people and communities) whether it concerns financial decisions 
like drafting the budget of the local council, in matters of planning local development like 
conceiving a development plan for the community, service delivery concerns like decisions on 
where to construct a road, where to install a new pipe-borne water system, or in which locality 
should a school or health center be constructed (UNDESA, 2005:11). 
Manor (1999:6) defines political decentralisation as the transfer of authority and necessary 
financial and technical resources to democratically elected lower level governments who enjoy 
partially independence from central government control. In other words, authority is genuinely 
devolved to local governance units of governance which are available and accountable to the 
local citizens, who benefit from full political rights and liberties (Blair, 2000:21). Political 
decentralisation, notes Litvack et al., (1998:6), ensures that the responsibilities for providing 
some services are transferred to democratically elected local governments which can locally 
generate their revenues and can independently decide on the nature of local investments. In order 
to measure the degree of political decentralisation, political scientists check the extent to which 
the authority to make decisions has been transferred to lower levels of government, to local 
citizens, or to representatives that are elected locally (Cohen & Peterson, 1998:3). 
The European Commission (2007:15) identifies the following elements as the ingredients of 
political decentralisation: 
- Existing lower levels of government separated from the centre by the Constitution; 
- Elections at the lower levels of government that are free and fair; 
- The discretion of lower levels of  government to plan and spend their resources; 
- Local political processes that are inclusive or participatory; 
- A properly organised system of downward accountability; and 
- The existence of public institutions which are adapted to decentralised context. 
Most often, political decentralisation is considered as a genuine means of decentralising 
government because of the numerous benefits it is expected to bring with it. Some of these 
benefits include advancing democracy at local level, promoting participation in local affairs and 




From the above-mentioned definitions, it can be said that political decentralisation creates a 
platform where local councillors can easily interact with local civil society and private sector 
organisations to promote local development. In such interactions, various stakeholders can 
clearly identify the locality’s priority needs, and it creates space for accountability. This explains 
why political decentralisation can also be regarded as democratic decentralisation. 
Divestment/Privatisation 
Divestment involves the transfer of planning responsibilities, administrative or other public 
functions from the government to non-state actors such as voluntary associations, private 
institutions, or non-governmental organisations (UNDP, 1997:6). It concerns transferring 
responsibilities and necessary resources for executing certain government functions to 
organisations/institutions in the private sector (Ahmad & Talib, 2011:60). This implies that 
functions that were hitherto the government’s responsibility are now being executed by non-state 
development actors like local community groups, businesses, non-governmental organisations, 
cooperatives and voluntary associations. Governments can mandate parallel organisations such 
as national industrial and trade associations, professional or ecclesiastical organisations, political 
parties, or cooperatives, with the right to license, regulate or supervise their members in 
performing functions that were previously controlled by the government. In other cases, the 
responsibility for producing goods or supplying services could be shifted to private organisations 
in privatisation (UNDP, 1997:6). Local public – private partnerships equally fall within this 
category. 
In addition to the above-mentioned forms of decentralisation, the World Bank’s (1999:108) 
definition of decentralisation makes mention of three key aspects which have been further 
developed by other authors and institutions. These include political decentralisation, fiscal 
decentralisation, and administrative decentralisation. Political and administrative decentralisation 
have already been explained in detail under devolution and deconcentration respectively above. 
This section presents fiscal decentralisation. 
Fiscal decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation, according to Arthur (2012:29), is the transfer of funds from the central 




governments to internally generate their own revenues at their various levels. It also concerns 
local government’s authority over decisions on budgetary and financial issues. Fiscal 
decentralisation can also be defined as the assignment by central government of responsibilities, 
including sectoral functions and local revenue sources, to lower levels of government. Due to the 
inadequacies of local revenue sources relative to the assigned expenditures of lower 
governmental levels, there is a possibility for intergovernmental transfers to close this fiscal gap 
and alleviate interregional resource disparities (UNDESA, 2005:64-65). 
Fiscal decentralisation is also referred to as financial responsibility, a fundamental feature of 
decentralisation. Local governments effectively executing their decentralised functions requires 
that they should have sufficient revenues which should either be generated locally or obtained 
through fiscal transfers from the central government, and the local governments should have 
decision-making authority on local expenditures (UNHABITAT, 2002:64). There are two 
fundamental rights transferred to local councils in fiscal decentralisation: the funds to execute 
decentralised functions; and authority to generate revenue and decide on spending. There are five 
main forms of fiscal decentralisation according to UNHABITAT (2002:64) which include: 
- Self-financing of local governments through user charges; 
- Co-financing or co-production of local initiatives, in which local citizens take part in 
service provision, contribute labour and money for infrastructural developments; 
- Increasing local government revenues through indirect charges, sale of property or taxes; 
- Intergovernmental financial transfers of general tax revenues collected by the central 
government to local governments for general or a particular purpose; and 
- Providing loan guarantees which authorises municipal borrowing and mobilisation of 
national or local government resources. 
Fiscal decentralisation, according to the European Commission (2007:18), has the following as 
key ingredients: 
- Allocating responsibilities among the different governmental levels; 
- Introducing the budgetary planning cycle at lower levels; 
- Allocating tax responsibilities for each of the levels of government; 




- Existing mechanisms for central government control (upward accountability); and 
- Assessment of the impact of fiscal decentralisation. 
Generally, local councils face a fiscal problem due to inadequate financial resources and their 
inability to raise revenue. Arthur (2012:29) encourages local governments to harness various 
local revenue sources because it ensures that local development is financed from below thereby 
creating an opportunity for local actors to engage fully in decision-making, and push for more 
accountability from those charged with managing the resources. 
Decentralisation would be considered limited if it is not accompanied by fiscal decentralisation. 
This is because the responsibilities transferred to lower governmental levels should be 
accompanied by the necessary financial resources needed to execute the responsibilities.  
2.2.3. Advantages of decentralisation 
The policy of decentralisation is believed to have numerous positive outcomes if properly 
implemented. Based on his analysis of various literature on decentralisation, Smoke (2003:9-10) 
identifies the improvement of government’s efficiency, enhanced governance, reduced 
inequalities and poverty reduction as the potential advantages of decentralisation.  
Improvement in the efficiency of government: Proponents of decentralisation argue that in 
different parts of a country people have different needs and Local governments being closer to 
the people have access to local information and better understand the local context. Therefore, 
they are also better placed to identify the types of services their constituents need than the central 
government which can significantly improve on allocative efficiency. This is probably one of the 
driving forces for decentralisation, particularly in Africa, as it is considered that through 
decentralisation, services would be more efficiently rendered to the local populations (Smoke, 
2003:9). Through decentralisation, local government and its partners, could develop innovative 
strategies for responding to various local development challenges (Cheema and Rondinelli, 
2007:7). 
Enhanced governance: According to Cheema (2005:120) decentralisation can promote an 
accountability culture amongst political and government officials through direct interactions 




However, this would depend on the type of government and the interest of the local citizens in 
interacting with the local government officials for the right purpose. Also, as Smoke (2003:9) 
recommends, people must not have everything they wish for when key national goals have to 
take precedence over local needs. The process of governance and collective action are not purely 
local and in the process of governance, some sacrifices have to be made for the national good 
when necessary. 
Reduction of inequalities, poverty, and improved development: Cheema and Rondinelli 
(2007:7) opine that decentralisation can enhance the capacity of local governments (alongside 
civil society and private sector organisations) to ensure that services reach larger numbers of 
people. In essence, decentralisation can enhance the process of allocating new resources to poor 
and remote areas that hitherto had few or no services (Crook, 2003:83). Given that local 
governments are acquainted with local needs, they could be in a better position to distribute 
public resources more equitably and target poverty within their own jurisdictions, although in 
some situations, central government should be involved in redistribution from richer to poorer 
areas (Smoke, 2003:9). Prud’homme (2003:20) suggests that decentralisation has a positive 
impact on income redistribution as governments can take from the richer regions to provide for 
the poorer regions. In this sense, decentralisation is used as a tool for inter-regional equity. 
Decentralisation is an indispensable element for local economic development and it is a 
requirement for State Owned Enterprises (particularly at local levels) to promote sustainable 
social development (Edoun, 2015:98). 
From these arguments, one could say decentralisation can be regarded as a means for 
governments to better provide for the needs of their citizens in every nook and cranny of the 
country. This is not just about providing the needs of the citizens, but needs that have been 
expressed by the citizens within their respective contexts. 
2.2.4. Challenges and misconceptions of decentralisation 
Despite the arguments indicating the positive outcomes of decentralisation policies, the 
implementation of this policy encounters some challenges and misconceptions. Some of these 




Local elite capture  
According to Olowu (2003:44), political decentralisation can facilitate the capture of local 
governments by strong local elites due to their desire to maintain their power and networks. 
Cheema (2005:121) supports this argument by asserting that some decentralised political systems 
create avenues for authoritarian figures or movements to build or consolidate their fiefs and 
avoid central government intervention. The problem of elite capture is rife, particularly during 
the nascent stages of the implementation of decentralisation when the local populations have 
little or no knowledge of the decentralisation process  
Inadequate administrative and managerial capacity 
The shortcomings or failures of decentralisation policies have often been attributed to minimal 
levels of administrative and managerial capacity within local governments (Cheema and 
Rondinelli, 2007:8). Decentralisation most often entails the transfer of responsibilities to lower 
levels of government and these responsibilities require technical knowledge for planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Most local governments do not have the qualified 
staff who can effectively take on these responsibilities.  
Inadequate mechanisms for coordinating different actors and policies  
There are many actors involved in the implementation of decentralisation both at central 
government and at local government level. Smoke (2003:13) notes that decentralisation efforts 
are hampered by lack of coordination of various actors, accompanied by failure to link various 
decentralisation components at national, local and intergovernmental levels. For example, 
finance ministries or national treasuries are responsible for intergovernmental transfers; sectoral 
ministries (education, health, public works, and agriculture) influence transfer of responsibilities; 
and interior ministries, local government ministries, most often have the responsibility to develop 
local government institutions. At local level, there is the need to coordinate activities of local 
governments, central government field offices, civil society actors and traditional authorities.  
On the other hand, Cheema (2005:121) reveals that in some democracies, particularly countries 
operating a federal system of government, there are tensions on policy issues between the central 




environment is characterised by different visions of decentralisation and competition over 
control of the decentralisation agenda which can provide access to central government and 
international donor funds. 
The precedence of political will 
One of the most omnipresent assertions regarding decentralisation, according to Smoke 
(2003:12), is the lack of political will being the greatest impediment to progress and a 
fundamental requirement for success. The central government most often stands accused of 
having a lack of political will to decentralise, whereas in some cases, the central government has 
the political will, but the attitude of the other units of government (perhaps due to political 
ideologies) is lukewarm. A close examination of governance systems in the world today, in both 
developing and developed countries, shows an extremely strong political will to decentralise 
through the enactment of laws and the creation of various institutions to support decentralisation.  
However, the enactment of laws and the establishment of institutions do not in any way indicate 
that the process would be without flaws. In Africa for example, most of the countries have laws 
and institutions that were borrowed from former colonial masters that do not necessarily fit the 
Africa context. Also, the pace of decentralisation is so slow in other countries because of the 
length of time between the promulgation of the laws, creation of institutions and effective 
transfer of competencies and resources.  
In addition to Smoke’s analyses, another misconception regarding decentralisation is that the 
central government fully transfers authority and resources to unchecked local governments. As 
presented by Olowu (2003:44), this is the misconception that “devolution means the abdication 
of all service responsibilities by the central government whereas in reality, the central 
government must assume responsibilities for policy formulation, regulation, monitoring and 
evaluation, and certain delivery aspects of some services.” Decentralisation is thus the sharing of 
responsibilities and resources between the central government and local governments. 
In the same vein, UNDP (1998:1) proposes that decentralisation should not be conceived as an 
alternative to centralisation because both are necessary. This is due to the complementary roles 




objectives. Also, conceiving decentralisation exclusively as a public sector reform, is misleading 
because decentralisation transcends administrative reform to include roles and relationships of all 
actors (public and non-state actors) in society. This explains why UNDP rather uses the term 
‘decentralised governance’. 
2.3. THE CONCEPT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
According to Smith (2003:621), intergovernmental relations have been conceptualised in the 
French context as ‘centre-periphery’ or centre-local relations, and in North America as 
‘intergovernmental’ relations. This section examines the concept of intergovernmental relations 
with emphasis on its definition, intergovernmental relations approaches, dimensions and tools. 
2.3.1. Definition of intergovernmental relations 
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) is the manner in which relations are conducted between the 
different levels/spheres of a governing hierarchy within a country. It entails innovative 
mechanisms through which cooperative engagements are maintained among and between 
horizontal and vertical parties (Kahn et al., 2011:4). Aside coordination and cooperation, 
intergovernmental relations have other aims, according to Maud and Wood (1974:45), such as 
controls and interventions by government institutions at the higher levels, and convening 
consultations with all other levels of government. In some cases, according to Kahn et al. 
(2011:5), these elements are not used to foster coordination and cooperation but to either 
“reinforce the subjugation of one level of government to another, or to promote dependence of 
lower levels of government on the higher levels for assistance and support.”  
According to Thornhill, Malan, Odendaal, Mathebula, Van Dijk, and Mello (2002:8) 
“intergovernmental relations encompass all the interdependent relations amongst the various 
tiers/spheres/levels of government. They include the coordination of public policies determined 
by the legislative and executive bodies of the various government structures. It also refers to the 
actions and transactions of political office bearers and officials on any level/sphere of 
government that have a bearing on the decisions and actions of another level/tier/sphere of 
government.” Thornhill et al. (2002:8) note that the number and type of government institution 
operating within a country illustrates the multiplicity of intergovernmental relations, and these 




requirement for delivering public goods and services efficiently and effectively. This can include 
relationships between central government departments, regional/provincial government 
departments, municipal government departments; national legislatures, regional/provincial 
legislatures, municipal councils; national executive, regional/provincial executive, and municipal 
council executive.  
Phillimore (2013:229) defines Intergovernmental relations as “the processes and institutions 
through which interactions occur between governments within a political system.” He affirms 
that the existence of more than one level of government be it a federal or unitary government 
indicates the practice of intergovernmental relations of some sort. Phillimore (2013:229) further 
emphasises that although an analysis of traditional intergovernmental relations has concentrated 
on formally established structures and institutions, informal processes of exchange and 
interaction is also worth considering. Malan (2005:228) in line with Phillimore describes 
intergovernmental relations as “a set of formal and informal processes, as well as institutional 
arrangements and structures for bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation within and among the 
three spheres of government”. He identifies some major determinants of the nature of 
intergovernmental interactions: the degree of cooperation; the system’s dynamics; stakeholders 
involved in managing and accommodating interdependence at any given time; geographical and 
social diversity; and ongoing comprehensive transformation (Malan, 2005:228-229).  
Intergovernmental relations, according to Phago (2013:111), examine the various arrangements 
within the country through which the national government relays information, and provides 
resources and other forms of support to the other levels of government below 
(provincial/regional government and local government). They also focus on the mechanism 
through which governments at lower levels communicate with the higher spheres, although there 
are some inherent challenges such as capacity deficits to facilitate the coordination of various 
activities. 
2.3.2. Features of intergovernmental relations   
Wright (1978:8-14), from his study of the United States system, identified five distinctive 
features of intergovernmental relations. These include the holistic component, human 




The holistic component 
Intergovernmental relations comprise every existing engagement among the various 
governmental units within the country. These include central-local, central-
regional/provincial/state, regional/provincial/state-local, central-regional/provincial/state-local, 
and inter-local relations (Wright, 1978:8). It does not matter whether the country operates a 
governing system that is unitary or federal. The existence of more than one sphere of government 
paves the way for intergovernmental relations.  
The human component  
Wright (1978:9) states that the actions and behaviours of the people who occupy official 
positions determine the level and nature of the intergovernmental relations. In his opinion, 
intergovernmental relations are invisible, but relations among and between officials managing 
different units are quite visible. This means there would be no intergovernmental relations 
without relations among the officials managing different government units. The actions of each 
of these public managers are influenced by how they perceive the actions and attitudes of their 
peers in different levels of government (Wright, 1978:10).  
A continuous process  
Relations among various officials in different spheres should be conceived as a continuous 
pattern of day-to-day contacts among officials characterised by exchanges of viewpoints and 
information. This negates the perception of intergovernmental relations as occasional 
occurrences which have been formally ratified in agreements or rigidly established by statutes. 
The main preoccupation of the actors in the intergovernmental relationship is ‘getting things 
done’, that is, with the informal, practical, goal-oriented arrangements that can be realised within 
the officials’ formal, legal, and institutional context (Wright, 1978:12). 
Participation of all public officials 
It is imperative that all public officials participate actively in intergovernmental relations at all 
levels. Some of these public officials, as identified by Wright (1978:13), include: Mayors, city 
council members, governors, members of the legislature and presidents. However, the nature of 




public officials from the apex of the country to the local level. Moreover, participation should 
not be limited only to public officials as other actors such as traditional rulers, religious 
authorities, civil society and private sector actors should equally participate. This is because their 
actions at every level affects the functioning of government.  
The policy component 
The last distinctive characteristic of intergovernmental relations is the policy component which 
denotes the intentions and actions (or inactions) of public officials and the consequences of these 
actions (Wright, 1978:13). Although Wright (1978:13) proposes that policy, in the 
intergovernmental setting, is developed by all the public officials working in different 
governmental levels, all other societal actors should be included. The policy should be reflective 
of the cross section of the society, and the roles of the various actors should be clearly defined. 
According to Boraine, Levy, and Asmal (1995:4), intergovernmental relations can be classified 
into constitutional, political and financial relations. However, their focus on the constitutional 
dimension is based on the perception that the constitution which creates the various levels of 
government is drafted by the central government. Thus, the lower levels of government are 
subordinate to central government. Similarly, the first distinguishing feature of 
intergovernmental relations, according to Wright (1978:8), places the central government at the 
centre of all existing engagements among and between the various levels of government.  
2.3.3. Intergovernmental relations approaches 
There are several approaches to analysing relations between various levels of government in a 
country. Hattingh (1998:10) proposes four approaches which are: the constitutional/legal 
approach, the democratic approach, the financial approach, and the normative/operational 
approach. 
The constitutional/legal approach 
This approach highlights the importance of the constitution and other legislative texts as the most 
important elements in intergovernmental relations studies. The legality of the actions of various 
spheres of government and their interactions are determined by the provisions in the 




Constitution and legislation will contain a list of all government institutions with a clear 
description of the duties and responsibilities of each of the officials representing these 
institutions (Hattingh, 1998:11). This is the main approach to intergovernmental relations that is 
used in Cameroon as the Constitution and other legal text are often used in all instances to justify 
the actions of each of the levels of government. 
However, this approach can be problematic because there is a tendency to consider legislative 
provisions as accurate and static unless it is amended (Kahn et al. 2011:6). This implies that any 
actions undertaken outside the prescriptions of the legislation are likely to be considered “illegal” 
or “unconstitutional” even if they produce positive outcomes. As Kahn et al. (2011:6) notes, 
“This approach fails to explain the dynamics of the existing relationship among various 
government bodies, particularly the people working in these bodies. Their actions need to be 
analysed in order to make adjustments where necessary.” 
The democratic approach 
This approach focuses on the ‘autonomy’ of the other spheres or levels of government 
(provincial/regional and municipal) from the central government. Proponents of this approach 
advocate for less centralisation of authority and more devolution to regional and local 
governments (Kahn et al. 2011:6). If the context is taken as it is, it would mean the total 
‘independence’ of regional and local governments which is impossible even in the so-called 
‘advanced’ democracies. The notion of autonomy in the real world depends on the central 
government who decides the nature of authority and responsibilities to be transferred to the 
regional and local governments (Hattingh, 1998:12). 
The democratic approach to intergovernmental relations nonetheless has some difficulties 
particularly in its interpretation and application. The term ‘democracy’ is understood differently 
in various contexts and in some cases, the ideology of the ruling political party within a country 
influences the perception of democracy.  
The financial approach 
Financial relations occur when one level of government transfers financial resources to another 
through payment of grants, donations or payments for subsidies, or when the central government 




(Hattingh, 1998:12). In most cases, it is often recommended that the transfer of responsibilities to 
the lower spheres of government be accompanied by transferring the necessary financial 
resources required for the exercise of these responsibilities. This is because the regional and local 
governments most often rely on the central government for a bulk of their financial resources. 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007:133) raise a few concerns about intergovernmental fiscal transfers. 
These financial transfers, most often in developing countries, are poorly structured. The 
involvement of various ministries in managing programmes at local level can lead to confusion, 
transparency and accountability are hindered by subjective allocation, and local resource 
mobilisation can also be hindered by intergovernmental fiscal transfers.     
The normative/operational approach 
According to Van der Waldt, Du Toit, & Stroh (1997:136), this approach focuses on the need to 
consider every applicable norm to delineate the complete operationalisation of governmental 
relations without overemphasising one component at the detriment of other components worth 
examining. It applies all the general functions and normative features in administrative processes 
to analyse, investigate and describe the nature of a particular relationship. Also, this approach 
focuses on the importance of group norms or value objectives, given that it explores what is 
applicable or what should be considered acceptable (Hattingh, 1998:14).  
From the forgoing argument, the normative/operational approach to intergovernmental relations 
should therefore be looked upon as the interrelationship between all other approaches 
(constitutional/legal, democratic and financial approaches). To some extent, the constitution and 
legislation would lay the foundation for the type of autonomy which regional and local 
governments would have, as well as the various forms of financial transfers and resources.  
2.3.4. Dimensions of intergovernmental relations 
Phillimore (2013:230) identifies four dimensions of intergovernmental relations which serve as 
the foundation for analysing the institutions and processes of intergovernmental relations. These 





Vertical intergovernmental relations 
This is the most common form of IGR which involves the relationships between the central 
government and lower levels of or sub-national governments (Phillimore, 2013:230). Kahn et al. 
(2011:12) define vertical IGR as relations between government institutions in the different 
spheres or levels of government. Vertical IGR can either be bilateral or multilateral because in 
this relationship, the central government depending on the issue at hand, can either decide to 
work with all the lower spheres of government, a few, or just one of the spheres. However, the 
central government must not treat all the spheres of government equally on all issues, but has to 
work with the various units as per the nature of these issues (Phillimore, 2013:230). 
Authority is one of the central elements of vertical IGR because the central government controls 
more authority and the lower levels of government depend on central government (Kahn et al. 
2011:12). Although Kahn et al. criticize this dependency as limiting the discretion of the lower 
spheres of government to decide on the goals to be achieved by the community, Hattingh 
(1998:23) rather sees a relationship of reciprocity (interdependence) between the authorities. 
This interdependence grants lower spheres of government some bargaining or negotiating 
powers. 
Horizontal intergovernmental relations 
This occurs between the constituent units to tackle an issue of common interest. Most often, it is 
manifested through the creation of national associations of a constituent unit of government to 
collectively act on a particular issue or lobby the government on issues of common importance 
(Phillimore, 2013:231). Kahn et al. (2011:12) define horizontal intergovernmental relations as 
relations amongst and between government officials working in the same level or sphere of 
government and within a country, - this is only possible with the other tiers or levels of 
government and not the central government as there is only one national government. 
Horizontal intergovernmental relations differ from vertical intergovernmental relations in that the 
formal concept of authority is absent though present in relations between smaller and larger 
bodies; governments of the same level have similar negotiating abilities; and interdependence in 




physical assistance) which is contrary to policy and finance needed in vertical intergovernmental 
relations (Kahn et al. 2011:12). 
Sectoral intergovernmental relations 
According to Phillimore (2013:231), sectoral intergovernmental relations concern policy in a 
particular sector. It is the manner in which the different spheres of government relate in drafting, 
implementing and evaluating public policies within each sector of society. This concerns sectors 
in which all the spheres of government are involved. Phillimore (2013:231) notes that the nature, 
frequency, and intensity of interactions varies according to the policy areas, similar to the degree 
of conflict or cooperation. This can be determined by the financial reliance of sub-national 
governments in various policy areas, the constitutional authority, administrative and technical 
know-how of other spheres in a given sector, the political relevance of the policy issue, and the 
degree of trust the community has in the sphere of government regarding the given policy areas.  
Formal and informal intergovernmental relations 
Formal intergovernmental relations mechanisms include constitutional, statutory or non-statutory 
agreements and processes (Phillimore 2013:231). The informal intergovernmental relations 
mechanisms, though complicated to observe, are as necessary as the formal mechanisms. This is 
because the system is held together by informal interactions such as unspoken and unwritten 
rules or principles relevant to the operation and effectiveness of intergovernmental relations. 
Through a study of older federations in the United States, Switzerland and Australia, Phillimore 
(2013:231) further notes that the constitutions in these older federations said little about 
intergovernmental relations and established few institutions to manage interactions between the 
federal government and the state governments. The thinking was that coordination would prevail 
within the government though in recent federations such as South Africa, some formal 
mechanism and structures have been set-up to manage relations between the spheres of 
government. 
Commenting on informal relations, Hattingh (1998:38-39) identifies six degrees of intensity. He 
classifies Indifference, Manipulation, and Communication from lowest intensity to low intensity, 





 Indifference: At this level, there are no relations although relations could emerge as a 
result of a voluntary act by a member or members of the community; 
 Manipulation: Here, the government intentionally creates committees or other such 
institutions to represent the community and publicly supports their decisions and actions. 
It may be for the purpose of political or other gains; 
 Communication: The government establishes relations with communities by informing 
them of government intentions and actions that could affect their interests. In most cases, 
the media and newspapers are used; 
 Consultation: The government consults non-governmental organisations before taking 
any decisions on issues that could be of interest to them; 
 Advisory: The government nominates one or more advisory bodies consisting of 
representatives of non-governmental organisations to deliberate and formulate proposals 
on matters referred to them by government. Although the government still dominates, 
there is an indication that it can receive advice from the community; 
 Full Participation: The government is not the dominant partner and relations are based on 
joint decision-making. In this instance, the government and the community all have the 
authority to jointly investigate and discuss important issues and take decisions. 
In intergovernmental relations involving central government and the lower spheres or levels of 
government, all the above mentioned degrees of intensity can be applicable. This would depend 
on the depth of the relations and the issues to be handled by each of the spheres or levels of 
government. The intensity of relations would be low for countries that have just created the 
lower spheres of government without giving them any significant power and resources. The 
intensity would be higher in countries where there is already a culture of cooperation amongst 
and between all the spheres of government. However, the central government which in most 
cases holds most of the authority, can decide the intensity of the relations, especially in countries 
with unitary governments. Moreover, highest intensity (full participation) can pave the way for a 
more formal type of relationship because there is already a culture of cooperation. 
One other major factor which can determine the nature of intergovernmental relations is the type 




differ from governmental relations in unitary governing system. Take for instance the case of 
governmental relations in unitary governing systems which is applicable to this study. 
A unitary governing system is one in which authority is centralised at the national level, while 
little or no autonomy is granted to the lower levels of government (Kahn et al., 2011:28). 
Otherwise stated, in a unitary government, the central government accumulates almost all 
authority, while the other spheres or levels of government only exercise the authority which the 
central government assigns to them. The central government can in some cases override the 
decisions of the other spheres or levels of government because the final decision rests with it 
(Fox and Meyer, 1995:132). Hattingh (1998:114) identifies the following principles as pertaining 
to a unitary government: indivisible and unlimited supreme authority; the national legislature can 
promulgate, approve and amend laws on all issues affecting state life; national legislature 
approves financial resources and creates executive institutions to carry out its functions; national 
legislature assigns authority and resources to other spheres of government and regulates 
intergovernmental relations. 
Interactions between the various levels of government in the unitary system would be determined 
by the legislature due to their expansive authority (Kahn et al. 2011:28). Within a unitary 
government, there exists a situation in which lower levels of government are absolutely 
subjugated to the central government although this would depend on the type of control to which 
a subordinate body is subjected and the degree of discretion conferred upon the lower levels of 
government (Hattingh, 1998:115-116). 
The type of unitary government equally determines the nature of intergovernmental relations. 
Subordination to legislative authority would obtain in a unitary government where the legislature 
has the mandate to create institutions and allocate the necessary authority and resources. In 
strong presidential unitary government systems, the president of the republic is vested with the 
authority to create institutions (including other spheres of government) and allocate resources to 
these institutions. In this case, the other spheres of government are subordinated to the central 
executive, and it is the executive that determines the nature of the intergovernmental relations 





2.3.5. The tools of intergovernmental relations 
Radin (2003:610-614 and 2014:643-648), analysing intergovernmental relations in the US, 
examines four categories of intergovernmental relations instruments. These are structural, 
programmatic, capacity building and research, and behavioural instruments. 
Structural intergovernmental relations instruments 
These are the formal roles, relationships, configuration of leadership and authority, and the rules, 
policies and regulations governing intergovernmental relations (Radin, 2003:610, and 2014:643). 
Generally, the concern is with the manner in which the whole system of government is 
organised. Some of the structural instruments are: 
Reorganisation: These are the various changes in the established roles, relationships and the 
patterns of authority and leadership within the government organisational structure. This occurs 
mostly due to the changing needs and priorities of governments involving merging related 
programmes, or focusing of enhancing accountability and local autonomy (Radin, 2003:610). 
Commissions: Commissions can be created to handle specific issues across the different levels of 
government. While it is believed to promote coordination, its operations, at a symbolic level, can 
rather make coordination difficult and there is a tendency to centralise power at the centre 
(Radin, 2014:643). 
Coordination: It is used for the structural integration of units separated by functions, level or 
geography. It is one of the implicit purposes for reorganisation as it is believed that horizontal 
and vertical intergovernmental relationships can be easily managed (Radin, 2003:611 and 
2014:643).  
Deregulation: This involves the relaxation of mandates imposed on lower level governments by 
the higher level through regulations (Radin, 2003:611 and 2014:644). 
Decentralisation: This is when central government transfers some authority and resources to 





Regulation and Oversight: These are mechanisms used by the central government to check the 
work of lower levels of government. The focus can either be to evaluate programme 
performance, or to promote accountability (Radin, 2003:612 and 2014:645). 
Programmatic intergovernmental relations instruments 
According to Radin (2003:612 and 2014:645), these are the mechanisms through which the 
central government provide the lower levels of government with the necessary resources to 
tackle social and economic problems. The central government can design a programme and 
request that the lower levels of government apply for grants to fund projects within this 
programme. Some of the programmatic instruments of intergovernmental relations include: 
Providing broader purpose grants: This is when lower units of government are required to apply 
for specific categories of grants following specific guidelines laid down at the higher level, 
especially by the central government. In the US for example, applications from the Councils 
must be reviewed by state agencies before being forwarded to the national government (Radin, 
2003:612 and 2014:646). 
Partnerships: This is when governments at the lower levels cooperate with each other, with the 
central government (public-public partnerships) or with non-state actors (public-private 
partnerships) to achieve a specific purpose and a sense of shared responsibility for the outcomes 
of their activities (Radin, 2014:646). 
Collaboration: This involves granting of funds by the national government to a group of lower 
level governments provided they are able to share resources and work together (Radin, 2003:613 
and 2014:646). 
Intergovernmental relations instruments for capacity-building and research  
Otherwise known as intergovernmental relations instruments for ‘empowerment’, according to 
Radin (2014:646), these set of instruments are concerned with improving the management 
capacities of governments at all levels. Some of the specific tools in this category include: 
Research: It is an indirect intergovernmental relations instrument that seeks to help people 
understand problems and issues, various options for addressing these issues and the 




coordination and in some cases it can provide the lower levels of government with knowledge 
which can improve on their negotiating power with the central government (Radin, 2003:613 and 
2014:647). 
Banks of Information: Each of the levels of government can serve as an information bank to 
furnish information on almost everything. This can serve as the basis for intergovernmental 
relations although it would require that the information is accurate, properly collected and stored 
(Radin, 2003:613 and 2014:647). 
Capacity-building: Radin (2003:613 and 2014:647) considers this as one of the most widely used 
tools of intergovernmental relations wherein the central government enhances the capacities of 
the lower spheres or levels of government for effective and efficient management of programmes 
at these levels. The central government also seeks to ensure compliance with existing 
management norms and practices. 
Behavioural instruments of intergovernmental relations  
Wright (1978:8) notes that intergovernmental relations has much to do with the human beings 
appointed or elected to manage public institutions at various levels. Central governments’ 
concerns, notes Radin (2003:614 and 2014:647), can either be to provide the lower levels of 
government with more or less autonomy, or to ensure more or less accountability (the 
autonomy/accountability dilemma). The specific instruments for this category of 
intergovernmental relations tools are: 
Conflict management: Conflict is a constant term within the intergovernmental relations sphere 
for there will always be disagreements. It should therefore be properly managed as it cannot be 
avoided. Some of the mechanisms include building consensus among various actors in 
programmes and policy areas, and taking a negotiated approach rather than a ‘decide, announce 
and defend’ approach to promulgating rules and regulations (Radin, 2003:614 and 2014:647).  
Individual communication: According to Radin (2003:614 and 2014:648), improving 
communication between different levels of government could lead to the management of the 
autonomy/accountability dilemma. Where resources are scarce and there is political uncertainty, 




government (listening, delegating, managing conflict and building consensus). Therefore, the 
‘command and control’ communication method from top to bottom is ineffective. 
Group communication: Radin (2003:614 and 2014:648) proposes hearings which is a formal 
means of group communication in policy development as an instrument of intergovernmental 
relations. This is because it provides a platform for persons within and outside the government to 
express their views and the various governments can collect information and shape their ideas. 
Governments at various levels can use this as an opportunity to build consensus if they consider 
the autonomy/accountability dilemma in intergovernmental relations as an opportunity rather 
than a problem.  
Radin (2003:614 and 2014:648) notes that none of these four categories of intergovernmental 
relations tools is a panacea or solution to every issue. Various actors of intergovernmental 
relations must look at their context and what tool works well under which circumstances. For 
effective intergovernmental relations, all the set of tools are important because they complement 
each other and they can be used within any form of government (federal or unitary). 
Nonetheless, the behavioural instruments of intergovernmental relations must be considered 
closely because they deal directly with the human beings who would be using all three other 
intergovernmental relations tools. If the behavioural instruments are not robust and properly 
used, then intergovernmental relations would be built on a weak foundation. 
2.4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECENTRALISATION AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS  
The clarification of the concepts of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations indicates 
that a direct relationship can be established between these concepts. This section examines the 
features and the driving factors of this relationship. 
2.4.1. Characteristics of the relationship between decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations 
Some features of the connection between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations 
include: Decentralisation as the foundation of intergovernmental relations; the nature of 
interactions between central and local governments; intergovernmental fiscal relations; and 




Decentralisation as the foundation of intergovernmental relations 
Most, if not all, the definitions of decentralisation involve the notion of transfer of authority from 
central government to lower levels or spheres of government. UNDP (1997:4) emphasises 
decentralisation creating a system of co-responsibility between various levels of government. 
UNDP (1998:1) also considers these levels of government as having complementary roles in 
deigning strategies for achieving stated objectives.  
Moreover, some scholars have defined decentralisation as intergovernmental relations. Ribot 
(2002:1-2) considers decentralisation as centre-local relations because decentralisation should 
focus on strengthening the role of lower governmental levels in development rather than 
dismantling central governments. As Kuate (2014:14) points out, decentralisation is a means of 
sharing authority between governmental levels. This justifies the foregoing argument of 
complementary roles between the different levels or spheres of government.  
The nature of interactions between central government and lower level governments  
The relationship between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations is viewed as a 
mechanism for facilitating the central government’s interactions with the other government 
levels. These interactions can clarify the responsibilities and the accountability lines between the 
different levels. Owona (2012:9) defines decentralisation from a central government-centred 
perspective because the central government creates lower governmental levels, grants them 
authority and resources, and supervises their actions. Evidently, the central government would be 
both player and referee in the process. Olowu (2003:46) refers to this as the hierarchical control 
of lower levels of governments by central government. In Africa, Olowu (2003:46) notes that 
this hierarchical control is a means of ensuring accountability through mechanisms such as 
inspectorates, approval mechanisms of decisions made by the lower governmental levels, 
deployment of personnel from central government institutions to institutions in the lower levels, 
and the suspension or dissolution of lower level governments that do not comply with the law. 
Although, there are instances of misuse of power by the central government and its agents to 





Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations are the mechanisms in place for the effective transfer of 
financial resources from the central government to the lower level governments. According to 
Arthur (2012:29), fiscal decentralisation enables central government to transfer funds to lower 
level governments. Although in most cases, central government assigns tax collecting 
responsibilities to lower level governments to raise revenue, UNDESA (2005:64-65) explains 
that inadequacies of lower level government own-source revenue creates the possibility for 
intergovernmental transfers which can have a double purpose: close the fiscal gap and narrow 
intergovernmental resource disparities.  
Intergovernmental fiscal relations are a major component of fiscal decentralisation, and key to 
ensuring that lower level governments have the necessary financial resources. The transfer of 
funds must also be accompanied by effective accountability mechanisms, hence the European 
Commission (2007:18) proposes mechanisms for central government control. 
Decentralisation as an instrument of intergovernmental relations 
Radin (2003:611 and 2012:644) proposes decentralisation as a structural tool of 
intergovernmental relations. Decentralisation (particularly devolution or political 
decentralisation) creates and strengthens new lower spheres of government which pave the way 
for changing the nature of interactions between the central government and the lower spheres. 
This new relationship is made possible by the fact that the lower spheres of government, through 
devolution, have relative autonomy in taking their decisions and undertaking their actions. This 
point further strengthens the argument that decentralisation is the foundation of 
intergovernmental relations. 
2.4.2. Drivers of the link between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations 
The link between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations depends on some catalysts. 
These include: Clearly defined roles for central and local governments; principles of 





The roles of central and lower level governments 
It is not enough that central government creates lower spheres of government through 
decentralisation, - their roles must be clearly defined. The authority and responsibilities being 
transferred to lower governmental spheres has hitherto been the prerogative of the central 
government and the latter would frequently intervene to ensure balanced development for all 
lower governmental spheres. Therefore, the interactions between the central government and the 
lower governmental spheres would depend on their clearly defined roles (Wright, 1978:13). Each 
of them needs to understand their limits (although most often central government has no limits), 
and central government interference should not be seen as a burden but as a complementary 
action. Lower spheres of government on their part must work according to the laid down 
principles and act within the confines of the law (Hattingh, 1998:11). 
Principles of intergovernmental relations 
The creation of lower spheres of government should be accompanied by defining the principles 
underpinning the relationship between the various tiers of government. The principles should 
clearly state the coordination mechanisms for joint actions and the conflict resolution 
mechanisms when such conflicts do arise. These principles should be formalised in an act of 
parliament, or by a decree, or in the constitution, and should be agreed upon by all the different 
levels of government (Hattingh, 1998:11). However, there could be other informal mechanisms 
peculiar to particular regions of the country. These must be used to complement the formalised 
principles. 
Capacity-building 
When the central government transfers authority and responsibilities to the lower spheres or 
levels of government, such transfers should be accompanied by the necessary training for 
officials at all the governmental levels to understand their roles and the principles of their 
interactions. In some cases, people are voted to become mayors not because they are literate but 
because they are popular. Therefore, such people need to be properly trained (Radin, 2003:613 
and 2014:647). Capacity building can be an additional ingredient to the clearly defined roles and 
the principles of intergovernmental relations because it can serve as a platform for central and 




understanding through capacity building can, to some extent, improve on the relations between 
the actors. 
The human factor 
This is perhaps the most important determinant that connects decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations. As Wright (1978:9) states, the level and nature of intergovernmental 
relations is determined by the activities and attitudes of persons occupying positions at various 
governmental levels. The other drivers explained above will be determined by the actions of 
various humans managing the institutions at the lower governmental levels and central 
government level. In a situation of prevailing political ideology, there would be a conflicting 
relationship between the different levels or spheres of government. The ideal situation would be 
to go beyond political ideologies and put the interest of local citizens first. Moreover, it can also 
depend on the driving force behind decentralisation for if it is genuine, then the relationship 
between the different levels of government would be that of understanding and cooperation.  
From the characteristics and the drivers of the relationship between decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations, it would appear that the lines between both concepts are blurred. 
The basic reasoning behind decentralisation and intergovernmental relations is that the central 
government should ensure the lower levels of government have all that they need to effectively 
execute their functions (transfer of responsibilities should be concurrent with transfer of the 
necessary financial, human and technical resources linked to these responsibilities). Lower levels 
of government, on their part, should be ready to shoulder these new responsibilities while 
ensuring accountability to the central government. This, however, appears to be an ideal situation 
which is not always the case perhaps due to scarce resources, motives for decentralisation and 
political ideologies. Therefore, decentralisation and intergovernmental relations are inextricably 
intertwined for there can be no effective decentralisation without intergovernmental relations. 
Decentralisation is likely not to attain its goals and objectives of effective and efficient delivery 
of public goods and services locally if there are poor interactions between the different levels of 






2.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyses the theoretical basis of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. 
On the one hand, the chapter defines decentralisation, presenting its advantages, challenges, 
popular misconceptions and the various types of decentralisation. On the other hand, the chapter 
defines intergovernmental relations with its main features, approaches, dimensions, and the 
various tools of intergovernmental relations. The chapter equally focuses on how decentralisation 
relates to intergovernmental relations by identifying some of the characteristics and the driving 
factors of this relationship. The creation of lower levels of government particularly through 
political decentralisation or devolution evidently implies the need for improved governmental 
interactions between all spheres of government. The human factor has an indispensable impact 
on the link between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. The behaviour of 
individuals elected or appointed to occupy various offices at central government or lower 
government levels determines if government programmes would succeed or fail amongst which 











In various parts of the world, different countries have their unique practices of decentralisation 
and intergovernmental relations. In some cases, the practices in one country have influenced the 
way decentralisation and intergovernmental relations operate in other countries. This chapter 
examines decentralisation and intergovernmental relations as it operates in two different 
countries: The French Republic in Europe, and the Republic of South Africa in Africa. These 
cases were selected because they both operate unitary government systems which could serve as 
a lesson for Cameroon from the context of the developed and the developing world.  
3.2. DECENTRALISATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE 
FRENCH REPUBLIC 
The French Republic, founded after the French Revolution of 1789 experienced different forms 
of decentralisation such as the decentralisation laws of August 1871 and April 1884. These laws 
attributed some authority to lower levels of government such as departments and municipal 
councils which were elected (Rocheron, Houldsworth, Atger, El Bakir, & Longueville, 2016:4). 
However, before the 1980s, the French Republic was still an epitome of centralisation as politics 
was dominated almost entirely by the central government and its field operatives or 
representatives at various levels (Vlahos, 2013:6). 
The election of Francois Mitterand, a Socialist, as President of France in 1981, brought about 
sweeping reforms in the modus operandi of the French political arena. The idea of distributing 
authority and resources between the central government and lower spheres of government was 
introduced within the French society. Decentralisation, as it is practiced today in France, started 
in 1982 with the promulgation of laws that introduced and have since accelerated various 





3.2.1. The major phases of decentralisation in France  
There are three major phases of decentralisation reforms in France. These phases include: Act I 
of decentralisation from 1982 to 2002; Act II of decentralisation from 2003 to 2012; and Act III 
of decentralisation from 2013 to present. 
a) Act I of decentralisation 
This phase is mainly characterised by the promulgation of the Defferre Laws on decentralisation 
(named after the then French Minister for the Interior and Decentralisation, Gaston Defferre). 
These laws include law no 82-213 of 2 March 1982 on the rights and freedoms of communes, 
departments and regions (French Republic (FR), 1982); and law no 83-8 of 7 January 1983 on 
the distribution of authority between the communes, departments, the regions, and the central 
government (FR, 1983a) which was later completed by law no 83-663 of 22 July 1983 (FR, 
1983b). The Defferre Laws introduced three major changes in France: 
- The supervision of communes by the departmental prefect was replaced by legal checks 
exercised by administrative and regional audit courts - the prefects henceforth referred 
any issues deemed illegal to these courts; 
- Executive authority at departmental level was transferred from the prefect to an elected 
departmental council; 
- Regions were created, granted full authority and recognised as a level of government 
below the central government. 
The Defferre Laws laid the foundation for numerous other laws and decrees that were aimed at 
ameliorating the decentralisation policy of France. Some of these laws include:  
- Law no 92-12 of 6 February 1992 on the territorial administration of France (ATR Law) 
(FR, 1992); 
- Law no 95-115 of 4 February 1995 on the orientation of territorial planning and 
development (Pasqua Law) (FR, 1995); 
- Law no 99-533 of 25 June 1999 on the orientation for territorial planning and sustainable 
development (Voynet Law) (FR, 1999a); 
- Law no 99-586 of 12 July 1999 relating to the enhancement and simplification of 




b) Act II of decentralisation: The Constitutional amendments  
Act II of decentralisation in France was characterised mainly by the amendments made to the 
French Constitution in 2003. These amendments were officialised by Constitutional law no 
2003-276 of 28 March 2003 relative to the decentralised organisation of the French Republic 
(FR, 2003a). Article 1 of this constitutional amendment emphasised and confirmed that “the 
organisation of the French Republic is decentralised”. Other major amendments to the 
constitution included: the right to hold local referenda and the right to petition (Article 72-1) and 
the financial autonomy of territorial collectivities (Article 72-2). The expression ‘local 
collectivities’ (collectivités locales) was replaced with the expression ‘territorial collectivities’ 
(collectivités territoriales). The constitutional amendment in Article 72 recognised the following 
as territorial collectivities in France: Communes or councils, departments (departements), 
regions (regions), collectivities with special status (collectivités a statut particulier), and 
overseas collectivites (collectivités d’outre-mer) (FR, 2003a). 
The constitutional amendment of 28 March 2003 was followed by the enactment of laws to 
enforce some of the new principles of decentralisation which were enshrined in the Constitution. 
These laws include the following: 
- Law no 2003-705 of 1 August 2003 (FR, 2003b), relative to local referenda: This law 
was in response to Article 72-1 of the Constitution of the French Republic. Territorial 
collectivities can propose by referendum a decision on issues within their domain of 
authority for the electors to approve. It is a mechanism for citizens to participate directly 
in local decision-making as stipulated in Chapter II of the law. Also, citizens have the 
right to petition that an issue be included on the agenda of the local assembly provided it 
falls within its authority  
- Law no 2004-758 of 29 July 2004 (FR, 2004a), relative to the financial autonomy of 
territorial collectivities: This law was enacted to define the principle of autonomy as 
espoused in Article 72 of the French Constitution. The law redefined the French system 
of financing territorial collectivities, and the financial relations between the central 
government and the lower levels of government. Territorial collectivities had financial 
autonomy, both in income and expenditure. According to this law, the transfer of 




accompanied by the transfer of necessary resources as stated in Article 72-2 of the 
Constitution (FR, 2003a). The law equally defined the revenue generating authority of the 
territorial collectivities, and the conditions for ensuring fiscal equality between the 
collectivities, given that the territorial collectivities do not have equal revenue generating 
strengths. 
- Law no 2004-809 of 13 August 2004 (FR, 2004b), relative to the rights and obligations of 
territorial collectivities: This law enumerates the new competencies transferred by the 
central government to the territorial collectivities. It defines the principles for financial 
compensation accompanying these new competencies, the modalities for the transfer of 
personnel from the central government to the territorial collectivities, and the guarantees 
provided to the civil servants transferred to the central government. The law defines the 
distribution of the different competencies between the central government and the lower 
levels of government, some of which include the following: Communes (municipal 
services, primary education infrastructure, land-use planning and issuance of building 
permits); departments (health and social services, construction and maintenance of public 
infrastructure, transportation and secondary school infrastructure); and regions 
(coordination of regional economic planning and policy, vocational training, and 
industrial development). 
Although each of the lower levels of government was attributed new responsibilities, the bulk of 
these new responsibilities was transferred to the regions and the departments. 
c) Act III of decentralisation 
This phase of decentralisation in France can be defined as various efforts by President Francois 
Holland to enhance the decentralisation process initiated in 1982. Some of the main laws 
promulgated during this period include the following: 
- Law no 2014-58 of 27 January 2014 (FR, 2014) on the modernisation of territorial public 
action and the creation of metropoles: This law otherwise known by its French acronym 
(Loi MAPTAM or MAPTAM law) clarifies the authority of territorial collectivities and 
the coordination of decentralisation stakeholders by creating territorial conferences for 
public action (conference territoriale de l’action public). The territorial conferences for 




regions. MAPTAM law also created metropoles with three of these metropoles having 
special status: Paris, Lyon and Marseille. 
- Law no 2015-29 of 16 January 2015 (FR, 2015a) on the specialisation of regions: The 
main aspect of this law is the fusion of over 22 regions to form 13 regions. This was 
effective from 1 January 2016. 
This evolution of decentralisation in France since the Defferre Laws of 1982 indicates that 
decentralisation in France is a dynamic process which is frequently modified to suit to changing 
landscape of the political environment in France.   
3.2.2. Institutions for the implementation of decentralisation in France 
To understand the overall functioning of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in 
France, it is necessary to present the organisational structure of the French government. This is 
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According to Figure 3.1 above, France operates a four-level decentralisation system: The central 
government, the regions, the départements (departments), and the communes. At the central 
government level, the Minister of Interior is in charge of the central government representatives 
(the prefects) while the Minister of Territorial Cohesion equally ensures the interractions 
between the central government and territorial collectivities (regions, departments and 
communes). 
The Region is led by a Regional Prefect appointed by the Council of Ministers, who represents 
the central government in the region. Also, there is a regional council which is led by an elected 
President. The Regional Prefect ensures administrative control over the legality of the decisions 
of the President of the regional council. 
The Département is led by a Departmental Prefect appointed by the Council of Ministers, who 
represents the central government in the department. Similar to the regions, there is a 
Departmental Council headed by an elected President. The Departmental Prefect ensures the 
administrative control of the legality of decisions taken by the Departmental Council President 
on the one-hand, and the decisions taken by mayors of the communes within the département on 
the other hand.   
The Arrondissement is headed by a Sub-Prefect who is an assistant to the Departmental Prefect. 
He/she assists the Departmental Prefect in exercising administrative control over the communes 
located within the department.  
Before the 1982 decentralisation reforms in France, a number of institutions had already been 
established to manage the partial decentralisation that was practiced at the time. Since 1982, 
some institutions have either been created or reformed to ensure the effectiveness of the 
government decentralisation efforts. Some of these institutions are examined below. 
a) The General Directorate of Local Collectivities or Direction Generale des Collectivities 
Locales (DGCL) 
This is one of the directorates in the French Ministry of the Interior although the directorate is 
jointly administered by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Territorial Cohesion. It is one 
of the key directorates at central government level that deals exclusively with the functioning of 




directorate is in charge of drafting the various regulations that concerns the territorial 
collectivities, sharing the financial resources between the central government and the lower 
levels of government, and defining the status of actors in the lower levels of government (elected 
officials and personnel). The DGCL equally ensures the functioning of the secretariats of various 
institutions of collaboration between the central government and the lower levels of government 
such as: The national conference of territories; the local finance committee; the national council 
for the evaluation of norms; the supreme council for territorial public service; the national 
council for the training of elected local officials; the territorial public service deontology 
commission; and the national council for funeral operations (FR, 2019a:1). 
b) The Prefects (Le Prefet) 
The functions of prefects in France is defined by decree no 2004 – 374 of 29 April 2004 (FR, 
2004c) modified by decree no 2010 – 146 of 16 February 2010 (FR, 2010) relative to the 
authority of prefects, and the organisation and actions of central government services in the 
regions and departments. Article 1 of decree no 2004 – 374 of 29 April 2004 (FR, 2004c) states 
that prefects exercise central government authority in their areas of command. They also 
represent the Prime Minister and other ministers, and ensure the implementation of central 
government decisions. There are two types of prefects in France: The regional prefect and the 
departmental prefect. 
The regional prefect ensures the coherence of central government services in the region working 
closely with the departmental prefects whose actions are coordinated by the regional prefect 
(Article 2, decree no 2010 – 146 of 16 February 2010) (FR, 2010). Regarding the transfer of 
authority to local levels of government, the regional prefect ensures administrative control of the 
regional council and its institutions to ensure that decisions of the regional council are in line 
with the law (Article 4, decree no 2004 – 374 of 29 April 2004) (FR, 2004c). 
According to Article 9 of decree no 2004 – 374 of 29 April 2004 (FR, 2004c), the departmental 
prefect oversees the implementation of central government policies in the department. Similar to 
the regional prefect, departmental prefects ensure administrative control over departmental 
councils, communes and their institutions to certify the legality of the decisions (Article 10, 




The Prefect was one of the mechanisms used to enforce centralisation in France. However, the 
role of the Prefect has changed significantly since the initiation of decentralisation reforms in 
1982.  
c) The Regional Councils 
The administration of regions in France is the responsibility of regional councils elected by direct 
universal suffrage (Article L4131 – 1) (FR, 2019b). The elected regional councillors constitute 
the regional assembly or the legislative arm of the region which holds deliberations on various 
decisions concerning the region. The other organs of the regional council are the President and 
bureau, the Permanent Commission, and the Regional Economic, Social and Environmental 
Council (RESEC).  
The President and the bureau of the regional council are designated by the regional councillors 
from amongst their peers. The President heads the bureau, and is assisted by Vice-Presidents and 
members delegated by the Permanent Commission. As the executive arm of the region, the 
President of the regional council prepares and executes the deliberations of the regional council 
(Articles L4133 – 1, L4133 – 8, & L4231 – 1) (FR, 2019b).   
The Regional Economic, Social and Environmental Council (RESEC) is a consultative assembly 
at the disposal of the regional council and the President of the regional council. Its missions 
include: Advising the regional council on the stakes and consequences of regional economic, 
social and environmental policies; participating in consultations organised at regional level; and 
contributing to the monitoring and evaluation of regional policies. Members of the RESEC 
include representatives of associations and foundations working in the domain of the 
environment, experts in environmental and sustainable development issues, representatives of 
youth associations aged below 30, trade unions, companies and institutions dealing with issues 
affecting the region (Articles L4134 – 1 & L4134 – 2) (FR, 2019b). 
Some of the authority transferred to the regional councils by the central government include: 
Development of regional economic policies and plans, industrial development, construction of 





Despite being recognised as a level of government below the central government, the regional 
councils in France cannot enact their own laws like states in Federal governments, such as 
Germany, can do. At present, there are 13 regions in France. 
d) The Departmental Council 
The departments in France are a level of government located directly below the regions. The 
departmental council (formerly referred to as general council before the 2014 reforms) is the 
elected assembly or legislative organ of the department representing the population and all the 
territories in it (Article L3121 – 1) (FR, 2019b). The members of the departmental council are 
called departmental councillors. The other organs of the department include the President of the 
departmental council, the Permanent Commission and the bureau of the departmental council. 
The president of the departmental council is a departmental councillor elected by other 
departmental councillors. He/she is the executive organ of the department, thus, prepares and 
executes the deliberations of the departmental council. The President of the departmental council 
heads the bureau of the council assisted by members delegated by the Permanent Commission of 
the departmental council (Articles L3122 – 1, L3122 – 8, & L3221 – 1) (FR, 2019b). 
Some of the authority transferred to departmental councils includes: The maintenance of 
departmental roads or intercity roads, social policies and welfare allowances, and the 
construction of secondary schools. France currently has a total of 96 departments. 
e) The Communes and Intercommunal cooperation  
The commune in France is the lowest level of government located below the department. They 
range from large cities of over 2 million inhabitants, to towns of 10.000 inhabitants, or a hamlet 
of 10 persons because the communes are formed based on pre-existing villages. France has the 
highest number of communes in Europe with over 36.000 representing 40% of communal 
administration within the European Union (Rocheron et al., 2016:10). 
The governance of French communes is the responsibility of elected officials who constitute the 
municipal council (conseil municipal), a mayor and his/her deputies who are elected from the 




One of the specificities of French communes is the need to improve on local democracy and 
provide proximity services to the population. Hence, inhabitants of a commune have rights to 
information and to be consulted about every decision which concerns them (Article L2141 – 1) 
(FR, 2019b). Municipal councils of communes with 80.000 or more inhabitants can subdivide 
the commune into districts and create district councils for each district. These district councils 
can be consulted by the mayor to seek their opinions on certain issues concerning their district. 
The district council can equally participate in the elaboration, implementation, and evaluation of 
various actions that concern their district (Article L2143 – 1) (FR, 2019b). In addition, municipal 
councils can also create consultation committees to handle specific issues affecting the commune 
or part of the commune. There is a communal accessibility commission in communes of 5.000 or 
more inhabitants which ensures the participation of disadvantaged groups in communal 
activities. Proximity services can be provided through mobile services, or the setting up of annex 
municipal council services in various districts of communes with 100.000 or more inhabitants. 
This is a means of bringing services closer to inhabitants of various parts of the commune 
(Articles L2143 – 2, L2143 – 3 & L2144 – 1) (FR, 2019b).  
Some of the authority transferred to communes by the central government include: Construction 
of nursery and elementary schools, communal roads, local police and public order, urban 
development, local ports and canals, housing development, cemeteries, incentives towards 
culture and sports development,  provision of local social services, management of local 
transport systems, and the development of gas and electricity networks. 
The French laws on decentralisation encourages the communes to be involved in intercommunal 
cooperation known in French as intercommunalité. According to Arsenault (2005:2), 
intercommunal cooperation is founded on the free will of communes to elaborate common 
development projects within the framework of promoting communal solidarity through the 
creation of public intercommunal cooperation institutions (Etablissements Publics de 
Cooperation Intercommunale – EPCI). The intercommunal cooperation institutions are tasked 
with performing certain functions such as garbage collection and urban transport, elaborate 
economic development projects and town planning. The Chevenement Law of 1999 is 
considered as one of the most successful in promoting intercommunal cooperation in France. 
This law outlines two types of intercommunal cooperation institutions in France: Those without 




 Intercommunal institutions without fiscal authority: These are the traditional syndicates 
of Communes in which communes come together and contribute financially to the 
syndicate, but the syndicate cannot levy its own taxes. Syndicates can either be set up for 
a particular purpose (waste management, water and energy distribution) or to deal with 
several issues. This is a loose form of intercommunal cooperation because communes can 
leave the syndicate when they deem it necessary. 
 Intercommunal institutions with fiscal authority: There are various forms of these 
institutions such as the community of communes (communauté des communes) which 
brings together communes in rural areas; the community of agglomeration (communauté 
d’agglomération) which concerns towns, medium sized cities and their suburbs; the 
urban community (communauté urbaine) which concerns larger cities and their suburbs; 
and the metropole which concerns some major cities (Arsenault, 2005:2 – 3).  
3.2.3. Intergovernmental relations in France 
Intergovernmental relations in France takes place at two major levels: The local level 
(representing each of the lower levels of government below the central government), and at the 
central government level. At the lower levels of government, the central government is 
represented by the regional prefects in the regions, and the departmental prefects in the 
departments and the communes. The prefect on behalf of the central government ensures the 
administrative control of the actions of the regional and departmental councils, and the 
communes. He/she also ensures the implementation of national policies at these lower levels 
bearing in mind the promotion of national interest and the respect for the laws of France. The 
laws on decentralisation in France are quite specific on the relationship between each of the 
lower levels of government and the prefects. 
 At the level of the commune, Article 133 of law no 2004-809 of 13 August 2004 (FR, 
2004b) stipulates that the mayor on his/her request receives necessary information from 
the departmental prefect for the exercise of his/her duties. The departmental prefect also 
at his/her request receives necessary information from the mayor for the exercising of 
his/her duties. 
 At the level of the department, Article 1 (V) of law no 2013-403 of 17 May 2013 (FR, 




to exchange necessary information for the exercise of their duties. It also requires that 
every year, the departmental prefect through a special report, informs the departmental 
council of the activities of the various deconcentrated central government institutions 
within the department. This special report from the departmental prefect is open to debate 
by the departmental council in the presence of the prefect. More so, the departmental 
council president and the departmental prefect jointly coordinate the actions of 
departmental council services and central government field offices in the department. 
 At the level of the region, law no 96-142 of 21 February 1996 (FR, 1996) stipulates that 
the president of the regional council and the regional prefect should each exchange 
information necessary for the exercise of their specific duties. The law also requires the 
regional prefect to inform the regional council, through a special report, of the activities 
of various central government services in the region. As in the departmental council, this 
report is open to debate by the regional council in the presence of the regional prefect. 
The regional council president and the regional prefect jointly coordinate the actions of 
regional council services and central government field offices in the region. Also, in each 
region, a conference for the harmonisation of investments meets twice annually bringing 
together the regional prefect, the regional council president, departmental prefects and 
departmental council presidents. This conference enables information exchange on the 
investment programmes of the central government, the region and the departments within 
the region (Article 1 (V) of law no 2013-403 of 17 May 2013) (FR, 2013). 
There is visibly an effort by the French legislators to balance the authority of the central 
government with that of the lower levels of government through collaboration, coordination and 
accountability. The information exchanges between the prefects and the mayors, departmental 
and regional council presidents, are mechanisms to strengthen cooperation between the central 
government representative and local level and the executives of the territorial collectivities. The 
obligation of the regional and departmental prefects to report to the departmental and regional 
councils annually on the activities of central government services in the department and regions, 
is a means for the lower levels of government to hold the central government accountable for its 
various activities at these levels. Moreover, there is the shared responsibility between the 




coordinate the actions of central government field offices and the services of regional and 
departmental councils. 
In addition, French regions, departments and communes share responsibilities on issues of 
gender equality, culture, sports, tourism and promotion of regional languages (Article L1111 – 4) 
(FR, 2019b). Hence, in each region, there is a Territorial Conference for Public Action 
(Conference Territoriale de l’Action Public) which seeks to promote concertation on these 
shared responsibilities between the regional council, the departmental councils and the 
communes. This conference formulates proposals on all issues related to the exercise of authority 
and implementation of policies that requires coordination between the territorial collectivities. 
The conference is chaired by the president of the regional council and its participants include 
presidents of departmental councils and representatives of various communes within the region 
(Article L1111 – 9 – 1) (FR, 2019b). 
At the central government level, there are a number of institutions acting as a forum for 
consultations and action between central government institutions involved in the implementation 
of decentralisation and the lower spheres of government. Some of these institutions include: The 
local finance committee; the national council for the evaluation of norms; and the national 
conference of territories. 
 The local finance committee: This committee brings together representatives from the 
national assembly, the senate, regional councils, departmental councils, public 
intercommunal cooperation institutions, mayors, and the prefects. This committee has four 
main missions, according to Article 113 of law no 2015-991 of 7 August 2015 (FR, 2015b) 
on the new territorial organisation of the French Republic: Provide government and 
parliament with the necessary analysis for the elaboration of the finance law that concerns the 
territorial collectivities; produce an annual report on the financial situation of territorial 
collectivities based on the administrative and financial accounts of these collectivities; 
collect, analyse, update and publicise statistics and data on the management of territorial 
collectivities in order to promote the development of good practices; and evaluate local 
public policies. This committee can also be consulted by the central government on bills 
concerning finances of territorial collectivities, whereas, consultation of the committee is 




 The national council for the evaluation of norms: This council is made up of 
representatives of the national assembly, the senate, regional councillors, departmental 
councillors, councillors of public intercommunal cooperation institutions, municipal 
councillors, and prefects. According to Article 10 of law no 2016-1888 of 28 December 2016 
(FR, 2016), this council is consulted by the government on the financial and technical impact 
of legal texts that create or modify laws applicable to territorial collectivities and their public 
institutions. It also examines the evolution of the rules applicable to territorial collectivities 
and their public institutions, and evaluates the technical and financial impact of these rules 
vis-à-vis the stated objectives. The council can suggest, in its evaluation, various mechanisms 
for the adaptation of legal norms to the stated objectives if the application of these norms 
entails disproportionate material, financial and technical consequences for the territorial 
collectivities and their public institutions. 
 The national conference of territories: This institution was created in 2017 by French 
President Emmanuel Macron. Placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, the national 
conference of territories is made up of members of government, representatives of 
parliament, territorial collectivities, and existing organisations for territorial consultations. 
The objective of this institution is to strengthen the relationship between the elected 
authorities in the regions, departments and communes and the central government through a 
“pact of trust”. It will enable the territorial collectivities to be involved from inception in all 
central government decisions that concern them. The conference meets every six months and 
until now, it has already convened two meetings (July and December 2017). The 
establishment of the national conference of territories seeks to redefine the division of roles 
between the central government and lower levels of government by valorising the 
indispensable role of the lower governmental levels (FR, 2017:3 – 5).  
There are other institutions for intergovernmental relations at central government level apart 
from the above-mentioned, such as: The higher council of territorial public service; the national 
council for the training of elected local officials; the territorial public service deontology 





3.3. DECENTRALISATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa experienced different forms of government since the establishment of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910 until the fall of apartheid in 1994. According to Kahn et al. (2011:50), the 
1909 South African Act or Constitution of the Union provided for three spheres of government 
(central, provincial and local spheres), which had little or no authority. Relations between the 
lower spheres of government and the central government before 1994 was characterised by 
subjugation of the lower spheres to the central government. The majority of the decisions were 
made by the central government and the lower spheres could only implement these decisions. 
Since 1994, the government of South Africa has introduced numerous reforms which have 
significantly modified and improved the governance landscape within and between the different 
spheres of government. The South African perspective of decentralisation and intergovernmental 
relations can be understood through an examination of the existing legislative and institutional 
framework. 
3.3.1. Legislative framework of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in South 
Africa 
The various legislative texts governing decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in South 
Africa include: The Constitution, 1996 (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1996); the Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998 (No 117 of 1998) (RSA, 1998); the Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (No 32 of 
2000) (RSA, 2000); the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 (No 97 of 1997) (RSA, 
1997); the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (No 56 of 2003) (RSA, 2003); and the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005). 
a) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The South African Constitution was promulgated into law on 18 December, 1996. Chapter 3 of 
this Constitution focuses on co-operative government and intergovernmental relations which are 
the specificity of the South African context. Section 40 (1) states that government is made up of 
the national, provincial and local spheres which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated as 
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According to Figure 3.2 above, the national government comprises the two houses of Parliament 
(National Assembly elected by voters, and the National Council of Provinces representing the 
nine provincial legislatures and organised local government) on the one hand, and the national 
executive comprising the President and the Cabinet on the other hand. 
The provincial sphere consisting of the nine provincial legislatures and the provincial executives 
with the Premiers at the helm of each province. National government departments are 
represented in the provinces by provincial departments. 
The local sphere comprises 283 municipalities. According to the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 
(No 117 of 1998) (RSA, 1998), there are three categories of municipalities as seen in Figure 3.2 
above: 
- Category A or metropolitan councils (currently 6); 
- Category C or district councils (currently 46); and  
- Category B or local councils (currently 231) 
Section 41 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 (RSA, 1996) enumerates the principles 
governing co-operative government and intergovernmental relations among the various spheres 
of government in South Africa some of which include:  
- Respect for the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in 
the other spheres;  
- Not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution;  
- Exercising their authority and performing their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in 
another sphere; and 
- Co-operating in mutual trust and good faith by fostering friendly relations, assisting and 
supporting one another, informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters 
of common interest, coordinating their actions and legislation with one another, adhering 




Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the Constitution focus on the roles and responsibilities of each of the 
spheres of government, the conditions under which the national government can intervene in the 
provincial government, and the conditions under which the provincial government can intervene 
in the local government. 
b) The Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (No 117 of 1998) 
The objective of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, include the following: To provide for the 
establishment of municipalities in accordance with the requirements relating to categories and 
types of municipalities; to establish the criteria for determining the category of municipalities to 
be established in an area; to define the types of municipality that may be established within each 
category; to provide for an appropriate division of functions and authority between categories of 
municipalities; to regulate the internal systems, structures and office-bearers of municipalities; to 
provide for appropriate electoral systems; and to provide for other related matters. 
c) The Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (No 32 of 2000) 
The Municipal Systems Act, 2000, enumerates the fundamental principles, mechanisms and 
processes that can enable municipalities to promote the socio-economic development of local 
communities and ensure access to basic services affordable to all. This Act defines the legal 
nature of a municipality; explains how municipal authority and functions are exercised, and 
mechanisms for community participation; and establishes an enabling framework for the core 
processes of planning, performance management, resource mobilisation and organisational 
change which form the basis for the notion of a local government that is development oriented. 
Other objectives of this Act include: To provide a framework for local public administration and 
the development of human resources; to empower the poor and ensure that municipalities put in 
place service tariffs and credit control policies that take into account the needs of the poor 
through providing a framework for the provision of services, service delivery agreements and 
municipal service districts; to establish a framework for support, monitoring and standard setting 
by other spheres of government to progressively build local government into an efficient, 
frontline development agency capable of integrating the activities of all spheres of government 
for the overall socio-economic development of communities in harmony with their natural 




d) The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 (No 97 of 1997) 
The objective of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997, is to promote cooperation 
between the national, provincial and local spheres of government with regard to fiscal, budgetary 
and financial issues; to prescribe a processes for determining the equitable sharing and allocation 
of revenue raised nationally; and to provide for other related issues. Two intergovernmental 
fiscal relations structures are created by this Act. They are the Budget Council chaired by the 
Minister of Finance which brings together provincial members of the executive council for 
finance; and the Local Government Budget Forum chaired by the Minister of Finance which 
comprises the provincial members of the executive council for finance, five representatives 
nominated by the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), and one 
representative nominated by each provincial organisation (Parts 1 & 2, Act 97 of 1997). The Act 
also explains the process for revenue sharing between the national, provincial and local spheres 
of government, and the timeframes for the Financial and Fiscal Commission to submit its 
recommendations to both Houses of Parliament, Provincial legislatures, and the Minister of 
Finance (Part 3, Act 97 of 1997). 
e) The Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (No 56 of 2003) 
The objectives of the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 include: To secure sound and 
sustainable management of the financial affairs of the municipalities and other institutions within 
the local sphere of government; to establish treasury norms and standards to govern the local 
sphere of government; and to provide for other related matters. Chapter 5 of this Act imposes 
some mandates on the national government and the provincial government towards the 
municipalities in the spirit of co-operative government as stated in the Constitution, 1996. Some 
of these mandates include capacity building for municipalities; transfer of funds from the 
national and provincial governments to the municipalities; and provide timely information and 
assistance to the municipalities to help them plan properly and prepare their budgets according to 
the laid down rules. The municipalities, in turn, also have certain responsibilities towards the 
national and provincial governments, and the other municipalities. Some of these mandates 
include providing budgetary and other financial information to the relevant municipalities, the 




commitments towards other municipalities, the provincial and national organs of the 
government. 
f) The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (No 13 of 2005) 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 is in line with Section 41 (2) of the 
South African Constitution which stipulates that an Act of Parliament must establish the 
structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations. The objectives 
of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 include: Establishing a framework for 
the national, provincial and local governments to promote and facilitate intergovernmental 
relations; to provide for mechanisms and procedures that would facilitate the settlement of 
intergovernmental disputes; and to facilitate coordination in the implementation of policy and 
legislation in line with the principles of coherent government, effective provision of services, 
monitoring the implementation of policy and legislation, and realisation of national priorities. 
Chapter 2 of this Act creates formal intergovernmental structures such as the President’s 
Coordinating Council, National intergovernmental forums, Provincial intergovernmental forums, 
and Municipal intergovernmental forums (which are further divided into District 
intergovernmental forums, and Inter-municipality forums). The Act also explains the 
mechanisms for the conduct of intergovernmental relations and the settlement of 
intergovernmental disputes in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
From these legislative texts, it can be deduced that the government of South Africa preferred to 
opt for a unique approach consisting of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations 
which encompasses decentralisation. 
3.3.2. Institutional framework of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations 
in South Africa 
In order to effectively uphold the principle of co-operative government which is at the core of the 
South African model of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations, a number of 
institutions have been established. These institutions exists at parliament level (the National 





a) The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
The NCOP is one of the houses of parliament which represents the provinces in the national 
legislative process to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere 
of government process and provides a national forum for public consideration of issues affecting 
the provinces (Section 42 (4), Constitution of South Africa, 1996) (RSA, 1996). Each province 
sends a single delegation to the NCOP, composed of 10 delegates with the premier of the 
province as the head of delegation, who is called upon to cast a vote on behalf of the province. 
Amendments to the South African Constitution, 1996, on issues affecting the provinces, require 
the vote of at least six of the nine provinces before an amendment can be approved. The 
authority of the NCOP depends on the extent to which the legislation has an impact on the 
provinces (Section 76, Constitution of South Africa, 1996) (RSA, 1996). Kahn et al. (2011:83) 
refer to the NCOP as the “house of provinces” because voting is on provincial basis and each 
province has a single vote. 
Section 67 of the South African Constitution, 1996, provides for the participation, when 
necessary, of ten part time representatives designated by organised local government to represent 
the different categories of municipalities in the National Council of Provinces. However, these 
representatives do not have the right to vote. 
b) Institutions at the various spheres of government  
Numerous institutions have been established at the different spheres of the South African 
government to promote effective intergovernmental relations. These institutions include the 
President’s Coordinating Council; national intergovernmental forums; provincial 
intergovernmental forums; district intergovernmental forums and municipality forums which 
were all created by the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005. Others include the 
Forum of South African Directors General, and the Budget Council and Local Government 
Budget Forum (which were created by the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997). 
The President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) 
According to the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (RSA, 2005), the PCC is a 




governments and organised local government to seek their views on those matters; consults 
provincial governments and organised local government on the implementation of national 
policy and legislation in provinces and municipalities; the co-ordination and alignment of 
priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments; and other 
matters of strategic importance that affect the interests of other spheres of government. Also, the 
forum enables the president and members to hold discussions on the performance regarding the 
provision of services so as to detect failures and initiate preventive or corrective action when 
necessary; and examine reports from other intergovernmental forums on matters affecting the 
national interest, and reports dealing with the performance of provinces and municipalities 
(Section 7, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005).  
The PCC is chaired by the President and comprises the Deputy President, the Minister in the 
Presidency, the Ministers for Provincial and Local Government, Finance and Public Service, the 
Premiers of the nine provinces and a representative of municipal councils designated by the 
South African Local Government Association – SALGA (Section 6, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 
2005). 
National intergovernmental forums 
Section 9 (1) of No 13 of 2005 (RSA, 2005) encourages cabinet ministers to establish national 
intergovernmental forums in their areas of work to enhance intergovernmental relations. This is a 
consultative forum which is used for the following purposes: Raise matters of national interest 
within a particular area with the provincial governments and representatives of local 
governments where necessary in order to obtain their opinions; to consult provincial 
governments and where necessary representatives of local governments on developing national 
policy and legislation relating to matters affecting that functional area, implementing national 
policy and legislation in that functional area, coordinating and aligning the strategic and 
performance plans of that functional area with priorities, objectives and strategies of national, 
provincial and local governments. The forum also discusses the performance with regards to the 
provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action 




The cabinet minister for each specific functional area chairs the forum which comprises the 
deputy minister, the member of the executive council of provinces responsible for that functional 
area in the province, a municipal councillor designated by the national organisation provided the 
functional area for which the forum was established concerns local government. The national 
intergovernmental forums must report to the `President’s `Coordinating Council (Sections 10 & 
11, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005). 
Provincial intergovernmental forums 
These forums, also known as the Premier’s intergovernmental forum, seek to promote and 
facilitate intergovernmental relations between the province and local governments in the 
province. It is a forum for consultation for the provincial premier and local governments to 
discuss and consult on matters of mutual interest such as: The implementation of national policy 
and legislation in the province affecting local government interests; matters arising in the 
President’s Coordinating Council and other national intergovernmental forums affecting local 
government interests in the province; drafting national policy and legislation on matters affecting 
local government interests in the province; development and implementation of provincial policy 
and legislation relating to these matters; coordination of provincial and municipal development 
planning to ensure coherent planning within the province; coordinating and aligning strategic and 
performance plans and priorities, objectives and strategies of the provincial government and 
local government in the province; and other matters that could affect the interest of local 
governments in the province. The forum also examines reports from other provincial 
intergovernmental forums on issues of mutual interest to the province and local governments in 
the province; and district intergovernmental forums in the province (Section 18, No 13 of 2005) 
(RSA, 2005). 
This forum is chaired by the provincial premier and comprises the member of the executive 
council of the province in charge of local government, any member of the executive council 
designated by the premier, the mayors of district and metropolitan municipalities in the province; 
a municipal councillor designated by the national local government association in the province 
(Section 17, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005). The Premier’s intergovernmental forum reports 




policy and legislation in the province and matters of national interest. In addition, the premier 
can establish a provincial intergovernmental forum for a specific functional area to enhance 
effective and efficient intergovernmental relations between the province and local governments 
in the province regarding that functional area (Sections 20 & 21, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005).  
Moreover, premiers of two or more provinces can establish an interprovincial forum for the 
purpose of promoting and enhancing intergovernmental relations. Such a forum serves as a 
framework for consultation, information and best practice sharing, capacity building, and 
cooperation on shared provincial development challenges (Sections 22 & 23, No 13 of 2005) 
(RSA, 2005).  
District intergovernmental forums and forums between municipalities  
This is a forum to enhance intergovernmental relations between the district municipality and the 
local municipalities in the district. It is a consultative forum for the district municipality and local 
municipalities in the district to consult each other on matters of mutual interest. Some of these 
matters include: Drafting and implementing national and provincial policy and legislation 
relating to issues affecting local government interests in the district; discussing matters arising 
from the Premier’s intergovernmental forum affecting the district; providing mutual support and 
services in the district; ensuring coherent planning and development in the district; coordinating 
and aligning strategic and performance plans and priorities, objectives and strategies of the 
municipalities of the district; and dealing with other matters of strategic importance affecting the 
interests of municipalities in the district. Matters arising from the district intergovernmental 
forum may be referred to the Premier’s intergovernmental forum, or other provincial 
intergovernmental forums (Section 26, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005). 
The mayor of the district municipality or the administrator (if the municipality is subject to an 
intervention) chairs the district intergovernmental forum which comprises the mayors of the local 
municipalities in the district or a councillor designated by the municipality, should there be no 
mayor. If any of these municipalities are under intervention, the administrator participates in the 




Moreover, two or more municipalities can establish an inter-municipality forum to serve as a 
consultative framework for the municipalities to: Share information and best practices, capacity 
building, cooperate regarding common municipal challenges affecting them, and reviewing other 
issues of strategic importance influencing the interests of the participating municipalities 
(Sections 28 & 29, No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005).  
Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) 
FOSAD was established in June 1998 by the cabinet to coordinate policy and facilitate 
intergovernmental cooperation at both the horizontal and vertical levels of government (Kahn et 
al., 2011:4). According to Thornhill et al. (2002:114), some of the functions of FOSAD include: 
Providing technical and administrative support to the President’s Coordinating Council; adopting 
an intergovernmental approach to examining crosscutting issues such as rural development 
strategies, urban renewal programmes, human resource development strategies and economic 
development strategies; acting as technical advisors to cabinet committees; preparing reports for 
the cabinet strategic planning session in the months of January and July; and examining the 
cabinet’s memos dealing with crosscutting issues such as integrated rural renewal development 
strategies, and formulating recommendations to the cabinet.  
FOSAD is chaired by the Director General in the Office of the President, and brings together all 
nine directors general of the provinces, and the directors general of various departments at 
national level. 
The Budget Council and Local Government Budget Forum 
The Budget Council and the Government Budget Forum were established by the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 (RSA, 1997). Through the Budget Council, 
national government and the provincial governments can consult on fiscal, budgetary or financial 
matters affecting the provincial sphere of government; examine proposed legislation or policy 
with financial implications for the provinces or specific provinces; and examine matters 
concerning the financial management or monitoring of the finances of the provinces or any 




provincial members of the executive council for finance (Sections 2, 3 & 4, No 97 of 1997) 
(RSA, 1997).  
The Local Government Budget Forum enables the national government, the provincial 
governments and organised local governments to consult on fiscal, budgetary or financial matters 
concerning the local sphere of government; examine proposed legislation or policy with financial 
implications for the local governments; and examine matters on the financial management or 
monitoring of the finances of local governments. This forum is chaired by the Minister of 
Finance and comprises the provincial members of the executive council for finance, five 
representatives nominated by the national local government organisation, and one representative 
nominated by each provincial organisation (Sections 5, 6 & 7, No 97 of 1997) (RSA, 1997). 
c) The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
This is the national organisation of local governments with nine provincial associations. It was 
established in line with Section 163 of the South African Constitution, 1996 (RSA, 1996), on 
organised local government which prescribed that an Act of Parliament establish national and 
provincial organisations to represent the municipalities, as well as define the procedures through 
which the local governments may consult with the national government or a provincial 
government, and designate representatives to participate in the National Council of Provinces. 
This led to the passing of the Organised Local Government Act, 1997 (No 52 of 1997) (RSA, 
1997). The role of SALGA boils down to the effective representation of the interests of local 
governments within the system of government as a whole, and actively participating in the 
intergovernmental relations system by providing common policy positions on numerous issues 
and voicing local government interests (SALGA, 2016:21). SALGA represents the interests of 
local governments in forums such as the National Council of Provinces, the Financial and Fiscal 






3.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The objective of this chapter was to examine the international context of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations as practiced in some countries around the world. It focuses on 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in the French Republic and the Republic of 
South Africa. There are differences between the French system and the South African system. 
While the French system is a centralised unitary system characterised by the appointment of 
central government representatives or the Prefects to supervise the actions of the regional, 
departmental and local councils, the South African government system is a unitary system with 
federal characteristics. This is because, the provincial governments in South Africa can pass their 
own legislation as long as it respects the Constitution. Also, South Africa opted for a unique style 
of decentralisation, and cooperative government between the different spheres of government is 
a demonstration of their distinct yet interdependent character. Both France and South Africa have 
engaged in decentralisation reforms aimed at strengthening the role of the lower levels or spheres 
of government. They have equally been involved in adjusting the laws and institutions to suit the 















POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF DECENTRALISATION 
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CAMEROON 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
Since the independence and reunification of Cameroon in 1961, there have been numerous 
constitutional amendments and changes in the systems of government. The federal system that 
was adopted at reunification in 1961 was abolished in favour of a unitary system in 1972 which 
still applied to this day. Also, Cameroon during this period experienced different forms of 
decentralisation. Nonetheless, never has the commitment to decentralisation by the government 
been as profound as it is today beginning in 1996. Since then, a number of policy instruments 
have been put in place aimed at defining the context of decentralisation in Cameroon, and several 
institutions have equally been created to implement decentralisation and hence, 
intergovernmental relations. This chapter examines the legislative and institutional framework of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon. 
4.2. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF DECENTRALISATION AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CAMEROON 
Decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon are governed by a series of laws. 
The main laws are the Constitution of Cameroon, 1996; the 2004 laws on decentralisation; and 
the law on the financial regime of regional and local authorities (See Figure 1.1 on p. 9 for 
structure). 
4.2.1. The Constitution of Cameroon, 1996 
Decentralisation, as it is practiced in Cameroon today, is embodied in the 18 January 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon as per law no. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 (Republic of 
Cameroon (RC), 1996). This was a revision of the 1972 Constitution of the United Republic of 
Cameroon. The 1996 Constitution has some specificities pertaining to decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations. Firstly, the concept of decentralisation was recognised in the 




decentralised unitary state”. Secondly, the Constitution created lower levels of government 
below the central government such as the regional councils and local councils which did not 
exist in the previous Constitution. This implies that the central government will transfer some 
authority and resources to these regional and local councils to enable them carry out their duties 
of promoting the economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of their 
communities (Article 55 (1), Constitution of Cameroon, 1996) (RC, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
regional and local councils must carry out their duties bearing in mind the principle of identity of 
the law. According to this principle and in line with Article 55 (3), the central government 
exercises supervisory control over the regional and local councils to check the legality of their 
actions. In addition, these regional and local councils shall have administrative and financial 
autonomy in the management of regional and local interests (Article 55 (2), Constitution of 
Cameroon, 1996) (RC, 1996). 
4.2.2. The 2004 Laws on Decentralisation  
The Parliament of Cameroon in June 2004 voted three bills which were promulgated by the 
president into law on July 22, 2004. This study closely examines these three bills. 
a) Law no. 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 on the Orientation of Decentralisation 
Law no. 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 2004a) lays down the general rules on the orientation of 
decentralisation from the Cameroonian context. It explains the context of decentralisation and 
the principle of transfer of authority; the organisation and functioning of regional and local 
authorities; supervision of regional and local authorities; and the monitoring organs of the 
decentralisation process.  
Section 2 of this law defines decentralisation as “devolution of special authority and resources by 
the central government to elected regional and local councils. It is the driving force for the 
promotion of local development, democracy and good governance.” The regional and local 
councils carry out their activities in line with ensuring national unity, territorial integrity and the 
primacy of the central government. These regional and local councils, which are elected, are 
endowed with administrative and financial autonomy for managing regional and local interests, 
particularly in promoting the economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports 




from authority transferred to the local councils and the principles of decentralisation in 
Cameroon are subsidiarity, progressiveness and complementarity (Section 9) (RC, 2004a). 
Moreover, the authority transferred to the regional and local councils are not exclusive because 
they are concurrently exercised with the central government. In essence, the central government 
is directly involved in the exercising of the authority transferred to the regional and local 
councils. 
The central government exercises supervisory authority over the regional and local councils to 
ensure the harmonious development of the regions and councils based on national solidarity, 
potentials of regional and local councils, and inter-regional/inter-council balance (Section 10) 
(RC, 2004a). The central government has appointed representatives in the regional councils and 
local councils who ensure the supervision of these councils. The governor represents the central 
government in the regional council, while the senior divisional officer represents the central 
government in the local councils. The role of these central government representatives is to 
ensure administrative control, and respect for the rules and regulations, safeguard national 
interests, and maintain law and order (Section 67) (RC, 2004a). Decisions of the regional and 
local governments must be forwarded to the respective central government representatives for 
prior approval before they can go into effect. Decisions in the following domains must be 
approved by the representative of the central government (Section 70) (RC, 2004a): 
- Initial and annex budgets, below-the-line accounts and special expenditure authorisations; 
- Loans and loan guarantees; 
- International cooperation partnership agreements; 
- Land issues; 
- Securities and shares; 
- Agreements on the execution and control of public contracts in line with the threshold 
stipulated by the law; 
- Award of public service contracts; 
- Recruitment of certain personnel according to the laid down procedures; and 
- Regional and council development plans, as well as regional land development plans to 




The central government representative can inform the regional council president or the mayor of 
any illegalities observed in their decisions by way of writing, and forwards the matter (s) to the 
competent administrative court. The central government representative can also cancel decisions 
of regional and local councils that are grossly unlawful although the regional and local council 
executives can challenge such decisions before a competent administrative court (Sections 71 
and 73) (RC, 2004a). 
The executives of the regional and local councils and the central government representatives 
shall, upon request, receive from each other information required for the performance of their 
duties, and the regional and local councils must be informed of the content of all 
correspondences from the central government representative (Section 77) (RC, 2004a). 
b) Law no. 2004/019 of 22 July 2004 to lay down decentralisation rules applicable to 
regions 
Law no. 2004/019 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 2004c) explains how the decentralisation rules will be 
applied to regions as a level of government below the central government. Article 2 states that a 
region is a decentralised territorial collectivity made up of many administrative divisions 
(departements). Although the Constitution provides for 10 regions, it gives the President of the 
Republic the authority to create other regions as well as change the names and geographical 
delimitations of the current regions (Article 60, Constitution of Cameroon, 1996) (RC, 1996).  
According to Part III Law no. 2004/019 (RC, 2004c), authority has been transferred to the 
regions in the following domains: 
- Regional economic development;  
- Environmental protection and management of natural resources; 
- Urban planning, development and housing; 
- Health, population and social welfare; 
- Education, literacy education and vocational training; 
- Youths, sports and leisure; 
- Culture and development of national languages.     
The organs of the region include the regional council and the president of the regional council. 




representatives of the administrative divisions that make up the region, and they are called 
regional councillors. (Article 26) (RC, 2004c). The president of the regional council is the 
executive of the region and is assisted by a regional bureau comprising a first vice-president, a 
vice-president, two questors and two secretaries. The members of the bureau of the regional 
council are regional councillors elected by their peers, and it must reflect the sociological 
composition of the region. 
Part V of Law no. 2004/019 (RC, 2004c) makes provisions for inter-regional cooperation and 
solidarity. It defines decentralised cooperation as an agreement in which two or more regions put 
their resources together to achieve common objectives, and it can be between regions in 
Cameroon, or between a region in Cameroon and a foreign region. It also allows regions in 
Cameroon to become members of international organisations of twinned regions, and the 
cooperation agreement must be approved by deliberation of the regional council, and by the 
minister in charge of decentralisation through the central government representative (Articles 83 
and 84) (RC, 2004c). 
Law no. 2004/019 (RC, 2004c) has no specific section on the relationship between the region 
and the central government on the one hand, and between the regional council and the local 
councils within the region on the other hand. However, there are some specific parts of this law 
that can point to the nature of these relations: 
- The regional council may propose to the local councils under its jurisdiction measures to 
foster the coordination of local development and local investment actions (Article 7); 
- If a regional council holds sessions other than its statutory sessions, or on an issue of which 
it has no authority, the central government representative exerts all necessary measures to 
halt the meeting (Article 8 (1)); 
- The central government representative convenes the first meeting of the regional council 
on the second Tuesday following the proclamation of election results (Article 31 (2)). 
He/she can also request an extraordinary meeting of the regional council (Article 2); 
- The central government representative or his delegate must be present at all regional 
council meetings and can take the floor to speak each time he requests to do so. However, 
he can neither vote, nor preside over the regional council meeting and his declarations are 




budgetary year, the central government representative presents a special report to the 
regional council on the activities of central government services, or field offices, in the 
region. This report is subject to open debate in his/her presence (Article 42); 
- The representative of the central government, working with the president of the regional 
council, coordinates the activities of the regional services and central government field 
offices in the region. The central government representative organises a harmonisation 
conference at least twice annually on the investment programmes of the central 
government in the region with the participation of the president and bureau of the regional 
council (Article 69); 
- Matters of common interest can be debated in conferences in which the regions concerned 
are represented by a three-man special commission. The central government representative 
in the regions concerned can take part, or be represented, in these conferences and the 
decisions arrived at must respect the laws on decentralisation or else the meeting will be 
declared illegal by the central government representative (Articles 94 and 95); 
- Mixed working groups can be created by an accord between the regional council and the 
central government, or with public institutions, or with local councils, to work on a service 
which will be beneficial to all parties concerned (Article 96). 
It is worth noting that the regional councils are yet to go operational in Cameroon. However, this 
law on the rules of decentralisation applicable to regions shows that the regions will have a great 
role to play in terms of intergovernmental relations with the central government on the one hand, 
and with local councils on the other hand. 
c) Law no. 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 to lay down decentralisation rules applicable to local 
councils 
Law no. 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 2004b) explains how the rules of decentralisation apply 
to councils as the local authorities in Cameroon. The local councils are recognised as the lowest 
level of government (decentralised local authority) and are created by decree of the president of 
the Republic of Cameroon (Article 2), their mission is to promote local development and 




transferred to the local councils involves the promotion of local development in the following 
domains as enumerated in Part III of the law (RC, 2004b): 
- Local economic development;  
- Environmental protection and management of natural resources; 
- Urban planning, development and housing; 
- Health, population and social welfare; 
- Education, literacy education and vocational training; 
- Youths, sports and leisure; 
- Culture and development of national languages. 
The organs of the local council include the deliberative organ made up of the elected councilors, 
and the executive organ made of the mayor and deputy mayors. The mayor and deputy mayors 
are themselves local councillors elected by their peers. 
Part V of Law no. 2004/018 (RC, 2004b) concerns special regulations applicable to urban 
centres. The president of the Republic of Cameroon by decree can elevate some urban centres to 
city councils by virtue of their specific nature. A city council is a local council which comprises 
at least two councils called sub-divisional councils. Article 110 mentions the domains in which 
authority has been transferred to the city council by the central government which include: 
- Management of public squares, city greens, parks, gardens, lakes, rivers; 
- Industrial refuse and household waste management, cleaning of city roads, urban 
sanitation; 
- Development of urban environmental action plans, protection of lawns, public cemeteries, 
sports facilities; 
- Management of urban development projects, community land reserves, community cultural 
centres, community facilities; 
- Construction and management of markets, bus stations, slaughter houses, urban passenger 
transport; 
- Drafting and implementation of community investment plans, community development 




- Formulating recommendations on the draft development plan of the region before its 
approval; 
- Management of primary and secondary community roads and equipment, including public 
lights, road signs, rainwater drainage, safety facilities and bridges; 
- Ensuring the coordination of urban networks for the supply of power, drinking water and 
telecommunications services and of stakeholders in community traffic zones; and 
- Development of urban circulation plans covering the entire circulation network. 
Similar to other local councils, the organs of the city council include the deliberative organ and 
the executive organ. However, the deliberative organ is made up of the mayors of each of the 
sub-divisional councils that form the city council, and five other councillors from these sub-
divisional councils who are called senior councillors. The executive organ of the city council is 
made up of a government delegate and assistant government delegates appointed by the president 
of the republic of Cameroon. The government delegate exercises all the functions of a mayor 
within the city council as stipulated in the laws. 
Part VI of Law no. 2004/018 (RC, 2004b) makes provisions for inter-council cooperation and 
solidarity. It defines decentralised cooperation as an agreement in which two or more councils 
combine their resources to achieve common objectives, and it can be between Cameroonian 
councils, or between a Cameroonian council and a foreign council. It also allows Cameroonian 
councils to become members of international organisations of twinned cities, and the cooperation 
agreement must be approved by the minister in charge of decentralisation through the central 
government representative (Article 131 and 132) (RC, 2004b). In addition, the law provides for 
the creation of council unions bringing together councils of the same administrative division or 
region through a signed convention to handle issues of inter-communal interest. The council 
union is an inter-council public entity which has legal status, enjoys administrative and financial 
autonomy, and is subjected to the law on the orientation of decentralisation and the law on the 
rules applicable to councils (Articles 133 and 134) (RC, 2004b).   
Law no. 2004/018 (RC, 2004b) makes no special provisions regarding the relationship between 
the local councils and the central government. However, the central government through its 




local council. Apart from approving the decisions of the local councils, the representative of the 
central government performs the following other functions: 
- Requests an extraordinary meeting of the municipal council and if the mayor does not 
agree, the representative of the central government can convene the meeting (Article 31 (2) 
and (4)); 
- Attends all council meetings and can speak each time he requests to do so. However, he 
can neither vote, nor preside over the council session and his declarations are registered in 
the minutes (Article 36 (3)); 
- Convenes the first meeting of the council on the first Tuesday following the declaration of 
the municipal election results. This meeting is meant to elect the mayor and the deputy 
mayors (Article 60(1)). 
From the law on the rules of decentralisation application to local councils, there are three types 
of local councils in Cameroon: councils, sub-divisional councils, and city councils. While the 
mayors of councils and sub-divisional councils are elected, the government delegates of city 
councils are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic.   
4.2.3. Law no. 2009/011 of 10 July 2009 on the financial regime of regional and local 
councils 
Law no. 2009/011 of 10 July 2009 (RC, 2009a) defines the financial regime of regional and local 
councils. It lays down the conditions for the elaboration, execution and control of the execution 
of the budgets of regions and local councils. It applies to regions, councils, sub-divisional 
councils, city councils and other regional and local councils created by law (Section 1). The 
budgets of regional and local councils must show programmes that promote the economic, 
social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of the regions and councils. These 
budgets must also be consistent with the economic and financial objectives of the central 
government, and the competent central government services must provide the regional and local 
councils with the required information needed to prepare their budgets (Section 4).  
Part II of the law explains the different revenues and expenditures of the regional and local 
councils which are the two main parts that constitute the contents of their budgets. The revenue 




operating and investment expenses, and non-discretionary, discretionary or forbidden 
expenditures. Part III focuses on the presentation of the budget of regional and local councils. It 
defines the budgetary principles, and the budgeting process consisting of budget preparation, 
adoption and approval.  
Part IV of Law no. 2009/011 (RC, 2009a), which focuses on the budget execution of regional 
and local councils identifies the president of the regional council, the mayor of the council and 
sub-divisional council, the government delegate of the city council and the president of the 
council union as the authorising officers of their respective budgets. Hence, they are responsible 
for the execution of budgetary operations in collaboration with the accounting officers (Sections 
54 and 55). Other issues dealt with in this part of the law include revenue operations, expenditure 
operations, cash operations, and the methods for managing local public institutions (direct 
management and delegated management methods). Part V of the law defines the accounting 
system of regional and local councils. This comprises the accounting principles, the accounts of 
authorising officers and accounting officers, and the stores accounting. 
Part VI of this law defines the mechanisms for control of the budget and management of regional 
and local councils. It establishes four levels of control which include control by the deliberative 
organ of the regional and local councils; administrative control by specialised central 
government services; judicial control by the audit bench of the supreme court; and independent 
audits which may be requested by the central government representative, the deliberative organ 
or the executive organ of the regional or local council (Sections 104 to 108). Part VII on the 
transitional, miscellaneous and final provisions of this law sets up the National Local Finance 
Committee, which is in charge of mobilising revenue for the regional and local councils, as well 
as ensuring the proper management of these funds. 
There is no specific section in Law no. 2009/011 (RC, 2009a) on the fiscal relations between the 
central government and the lower levels of government. A reading of the law, however, indicates 
in some sections the intergovernmental fiscal relations between the central government and the 




- The central government shall create institutions to ensure the balanced development of all 
the regional and local councils based on national solidarity, the potentials of the regional 
and local councils, and inter-regional and inter-council balance (Section 5); 
- The central government representative must approve a regional or local council tax or fee 
which must be provided for the law and adopted by the deliberative organ of the said 
council (Section 11); 
- The central government provides the regional and local councils with allocations and 
subsidies for the discharge of their duties. However, the general allocation granted to sub-
divisional councils is a mandatory expenditure for the city council (Sections 15 and 16); 
- Where the regional or local council executive fails to convene the deliberative organ to a 
council budgetary session at least 15 days before the session or three days in the event of 
an emergency, the central government representative shall order the convening of this 
session without delay (Section 41); 
- The central government representative plays an arbitration role when the deliberative 
organ of a regional or local council refuses to adopt the budget (Section 42); 
- The central government representative issues an order to approve the budgets of regional 
and local councils. If there are any irregularities with the budget and the regional or local 
councils concerned have not made the necessary adjustments, the central government 
representative can amend the budget on his own initiative without increasing the 
expenditure (Section 47); 
- Any acts of misconduct on financial issues identified by the deliberative organ of the 
regional or local council may be referred to the central government representative or any 
other competent authority (Section 105 (2)); 
- The central government representative can request an independent audit of the regional or 
local council (Section 108). 
The law on the financial regime of regional and local councils in Cameroon is complemented by 
Law no 2009/019 of 15 December 2009 (RC, 2009b) on the tax system of regional and local 





The legislative framework of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon 
identifies some key actors and institutions in charge of the implementation of decentralisation 
and ensuring intergovernmental relations. The next section examines the role of some of these 
actors and institutions.  
4.3. ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DECENTRALISATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
CAMEROON 
There are many actors and institutions in Cameroon in charge of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations. Some of these actors and institutions are charged with the 
implementation of decentralisation, while others are charged with monitoring and evaluation of 
decentralisation at both central government level and lower levels of government (See Figure 1.1 
on p. 9 for structure). 
4.3.1. Actors and institutions charged with the implementation of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations  
The implementation of decentralisation occurs both at central government level and at the lower 
levels of government. To this end, there are various actors and institutions at these levels charged 
with implementing decentralisation and ensuring intergovernmental relations as per the 
provisions of the laws.  
a) Implementation of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations at central 
government level 
The main actors and institutions charged with the implementation of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations at central government level include: The President of the Republic of 
Cameroon, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, 
the other Ministerial departments, the Senate and the Special Council Support Fund for Mutual 
Assistance (FEICOM).  
 The President of the Republic of Cameroon 
The President of the Republic of Cameroon is arguably one of the most indispensable actors of 
decentralisation in Cameroon as a result of the authority conferred on him by the Constitution 




(RC, 1996), the President defines national policies, establishes and organises the administrative 
services of the nation, and makes various appointments to most civil and military positions. He 
appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the cabinet (Article 10) (RC, 1996). With regards 
to decentralisation, the president appoints the governors and the senior divisional officers who 
are the central government representatives in the regions and the local councils respectively 
(Article 58) (RC, 1996). 
With regards to the regions, the President can create more regions, change the names and modify 
the boundaries of the current regions (Article 61). He can also suspend (for a period of two 
months) or dissolve the regional council, as well as suspend or dismiss the President and the 
bureau of the regional council if it carries out activities contrary to the Constitution; undermines 
national security or public law and order; endangers national integrity; and if they have 
difficulties functioning normally (Article 59, Constitution of Cameroon, 1996 (RC, 1996); 
Article 48, Law no. 2004/019 (RC, 2004c)).  
Regarding the local councils, the President of the Republic by decree creates local councils, 
determines their nomenclature, the headquarters and their territorial jurisdiction. He can also by 
decree change the names of the councils, their headquarters, or modify their territorial 
jurisdiction, as well as temporarily regroup certain councils together on the recommendations of 
the minister of decentralisation (Article 2, law on rules applicable to councils) (RC, 2004b). The 
President of the Republic can dissolve the municipal council, and dismiss the mayor and 
executive of the council should they undermine the constitution, national security, territorial 
integrity or they fail to function normally (Articles 47, 94 and 95, law on rules applicable to 
councils) (RC, 2004b). In the case of city councils, they are created by the President of the 
Republic who equally appoints the government delegates and the assistant government delegates 
with the full authority to function as mayors and deputy mayors (Articles 109 and 115, law on 
rules applicable to councils) (RC, 2004b).   
The law on the financial regimes of regional and local councils in Section 5 (2) authorises the 
president of the Republic to set up the necessary institutions that would ensure the balanced 
development of the regional and the local councils (RC, 2009a). 
It is clear from this analysis that the President of the Republic of Cameroon is influential in terms 




to define the policies, set up the institutions, and make appointments to positions in these 
institutions at both the central government and the lower levels of government.  
 The Prime Minister 
According to Article 12 of the Constitution of Cameroon, 1996 (RC, 1996), the Prime Minister 
as the Head of Government coordinates government action by ensuring the effective 
implementation of national policies as defined by the President. He can also appoint to civil 
posts, subject to the prerogatives of the President of the Republic. 
In matters of decentralisation, the Prime Minister ensures that various ministerial departments 
take into account decentralisation in their strategies. In February 2010, a series of prime 
ministerial decrees were signed to lay down the conditions for the exercising of some authority 
transferred by the central government to the local councils (RC, 2010). These prime ministerial 
decrees of February 2010 officially started the operational face of decentralisation in Cameroon. 
The Prime Minister convenes and presides over the meeting of the National Decentralisation 
Council which is one the institutions in charged with evaluating the progress of decentralisation 
in Cameroon. 
 The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD)   
The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD), according to 
Presidential decree No 2005/104 of 13 April 2005 (RC, 2005) organising it, had its missions 
defined under the domains of territorial Administration, civil protection and decentralisation. In 
the domain of decentralisation, its missions were threefold: 
- The drafting and monitoring of the implementation of legislation regarding the 
organisation and functioning of regional and local authorities; 
- Exercising central government supervisory authority over the regional and local 
authorities under the authority of the President of the Republic; and 
- Ensuring the periodic evaluation of the implementation of decentralisation. 
The Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation approves the election of mayors 
and their deputies, and he can suspend a councillor, the mayor and deputies, the municipal 




councils) (RC, 2004b). He/she appoints and dismisses the secretary general for the local council, 
as well as the municipal treasurer in a joint order with the Minister of Finance. Moreover, he/she 
authorises the recruitment of local council personnel from the 7th category and approves their 
contracts. He equally approves some key local council decisions, amongst them, decentralised 
cooperation agreements.  
As regards the regions, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation initiates 
the process for the suspension or dissolution of a regional council by the President of the 
Republic and recommends the creation of a special delegation to oversee the running of the 
regional council under such circumstances (Article 48 rules applicable to regions) (RC, 2004c). 
The Minister also proposes candidates to be appointed to the post of secretary general of the 
regional council by the President of the Republic (Article 68, rules applicable to regions) (RC, 
2004c). Decentralised cooperation agreements of regional councils and other inter-regional 
arrangements must be approved by the Minister of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation. 
The Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation presides over the Inter-
ministerial Committee for Local Services, the National Committee on Local Finance 
(CONAFIL), and the Concertation Committee for the implementation of decentralisation.  
The decentralisation landscape in Cameroon has been characterised by the creation of the new 
Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development (MINDELDEV). This Ministry was created 
by Presidential decree no 2018/190 of 2 March 2018 (RC, 2018a), reorganising the government 
of Cameroon, as a separate ministry in charge of regional and local councils. This function was 
previously performed by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation from 
which the new Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development was born.  
Article 2 of Presidential decree no 2018/449 of 1 August 2018 (RC, 2018b), regarding the 
organisation of the ministry of decentralisation and local development, states that the ministry of 
decentralisation and local development oversees the elaboration, implementation and evaluation 
of government policy on decentralisation, and the promotion of local development. Specifically, 




- In the domain of decentralisation: Elaborating rules and legislation relative to the 
organisation and functioning of regional and local councils; evaluation and control of 
regional and local councils; monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
decentralisation; exercising supervisory authority of the central government over the 
regional and local councils under the authority of the President of the Republic; 
- In the domain of local development: The promotion of the socio-economic development of 
regions and local councils; and the promotion of good governance in the regional and local 
councils. 
Evidently, there are some few additions to the mission of the new ministry, notably the emphasis 
on the promotion of local development and good governance within the regional and local 
councils. 
Article 87 of Presidential decree no 2018/449 of 1 August 2018 (RC, 2018b) also created 
deconcentrated services or field offices of the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local 
Development at the lower levels of government. These deconcentrated services are the Regional 
Delegations for Decentralisation and Local Development which works directly with the regional 
councils, and the Divisional Delegations for Decentralisation and Local Development which 
works directly with the local councils.  
Although the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development is already functional, all 
structures at both national level and the lower levels of government have not yet been set up. 
Therefore, the analysis of this study would make use of the former Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation.  
 The other ministerial departments  
Other ministerial departments come into play within the framework of the authority and 
resources transferred to the councils in line with the prescriptions of the law to lay down 
decentralisation rules applicable to councils. The series of Prime Ministerial decrees of February 
2010 laid down the conditions for the transfer of authority by nine ministerial departments to the 
local councils. These ministries include: 
- Ministry of social affairs 




- Ministry of culture; 
- Ministry of basic education; 
- Ministry of livestock, fisheries and animal husbandry; 
- Ministry of water and energy; 
- Ministry of women empowerment and the family; 
- Ministry of public health; and  
- Ministry of public works.  
In terms of intergovernmental relations, the prime ministerial decrees of February 2010 (RC, 
2010) defines the authority and resources to be transferred by these respective ministries to the 
local councils; and requires each of these ministries to prepare duty specifications containing the 
terms and technical conditions for the exercising of the authority transferred by the central 
government. In addition, while the central government would ensure the monitoring and 
evaluation of the authority transferred to the local councils, the decrees require that the local 
councils and the competent field offices of each ministry concerned draw up a six-monthly report 
on the state of the implementation of the authority transferred by the central government. This 
report is addressed by the central government representative (Senior Divisional Officer) to the 
Minister of Decentralisation and the Ministers concerned with the authority transferred to the 
councils.   
The Ministries of Finance and the Economy, or Public Investment, are key amongst these 
ministries, particularly in their role of financing decentralisation and follow-up of local 
development projects. All the ministers concerned with the transfer of authority to the regional 
and local councils, as well as those involved in the financing of decentralisation are members of 
the Local Services Inter-ministerial Committee. 
 The Senate 
The Senate in Cameroon is one of the institutions that was created by the 1996 Constitution (RC, 
1996). It is one of the houses of the Cameroonian parliament representing the regional and the 
local councils to ensure that the interests of each region are reflected in all legislation. Each 
region of Cameroon is represented by ten senators, seven elected by indirect universal suffrage 




 The Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance (FEICOM) 
This institution, better known by its French acronym FEICOM (Fonds Special d’Equipement et 
d’Intervention Intercommunale), is a public establishment created by Law No74/23 of 5 
December 1974 (RC, 1974). It was reorganised by presidential decrees no 2000/365 of 11 
December 2000 (RC, 2000), and no 2006/182 of 31 May 2006 (RC, 2006a). FEICOM is placed 
under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Regional and Local Councils, and the financial 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Some of the missions conferred upon FEICOM include 
the following: 
- Provision of mutual assistance to councils through solidarity contributions and cash 
advances;  
- Financing council and inter-council investment projects; pooling and redistribution 
additional council taxes;  
- Financing the training of council and civil status staff;  
- Providing funds to the Common Decentralisation Fund; 
- Pooling and paying the quota of 50% of forest royalty and 100% of automobile stamp 
duty to councils; and  
- Providing assistance to councils for fund raising, as well as the design, implementation 
and monitoring of development projects.  
FEICOM finances local development in Cameroon through a series of mechanisms and specific 
programmes such as the Assistance Code of FEICOM (CIF), the Special Investment Framework 
for City Councils and Councils with High potentials (CAPIC), the Programme of Assistance to 
Low Income Councils (PACARF), the Special Assistance to the International Activities of 
Councils (CAFAIC), and the BEST PRACTICES AWARD. FEICOM is often referred to as the 
“Bank of Local Councils” and it implements its assistance at the level of the regions through the 
regional agencies or branch offices around Cameroon.  
 The National Community-Driven Development Programme (PNDP) 
The National Community-Driven Development Programme (PNDP) is an instrument of the 
ministry of economy, planning and regional development (MINEPAT) whose development 




decentralised funding mechanism to ensure decentralised participatory development in rural 
areas (FEICOM, 2012:23). The programme aims to contribute to the amelioration of basic socio-
economic services of the communities, reinforce decentralisation, and improve on the ability of 
local authorities to assume their mission of promoting local development and planning. 
Specifically, the programme is designed to support: the establishment of a mechanism for funds 
to be transferred to rural councils in order to finance priority community infrastructures; assisting 
the government of Cameroon to set up and execute a decentralised financing mechanism to 
ensure participatory community development in rural areas. This agency endeavours to establish 
a mechanism for transferring funds to councils in the rural areas for the financing of basic 
infrastructure, capacity building of the councils in the planning and the management of their own 
development and drawing up of a local and regulatory framework for decentralised rural 
development. The programme targets mainly the councils in the rural areas prioritising the 
financing of Council Development Plans (FEICOM, 2012:24). 
PNDP was put in place in 2004 and consisted of three phases of four years each. Phase I, called 
the initiation phase, ended in 2009 and covered 155 councils in six regions. Phase II, which 
ended in 2014, was called the extension phase and covered all ten regions with all 329 councils 
in the rural areas. The programme is currently in phase III, called the consolidation phase, and 
covers all local councils, including sub-divisional councils (PNDP, 2013:2). The programme has 
regional branches or offices in each of the regions of Cameroon. 
Apart from the abovementioned institutions, it is important to mention the role of the Local 
Government Training Centre (CEFAM) which trains municipal administrators for all the 
councils in Cameroon. It was created by Presidential decree No 77/494 of 7 December 1977 
(RC, 1977b) under the supervision of the ministry of regional and local councils and the ministry 
of finance. It has contributed to enhancing the decentralisation process in Cameroon through 
providing the local councils with adequately trained personnel. 
b) The implementation of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations at the 
lower levels of government  
At the lower levels of government in Cameroon, the key actors and institutions of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations are the central government representatives and 




 Central government representatives and field offices of ministries 
The central government has appointed representatives and field offices of the respective 
ministries at each of the lower levels of government. The central government representatives are 
the governor of the region, the senior divisional officer in the division, and the divisional officer 
in the sub-division. In matters of decentralisation, the governor exercises supervisory authority 
over the regional council while the senior divisional officer exercises supervisory authority over 
the local councils within his/her administrative unit. This explains why on November 12, 2008, 
within the framework of the restructuring of the offices of regional governors, Decree No 
2008/377 (RC, 2008c) created a department of regional development in the governor’s offices 
(Article 27). This department assists the governor to perform the following functions (Article 
34): 
- Exercise supervisory authority of the central government over the regional council and its 
institutions; 
- Propose recommendations regarding the harmonious functioning of the regional council 
and its institutions; 
- Examine various issues related to regional planning and development; 
- Examining contentious files concerning the decisions of regional councils in 
collaboration with the division for administrative and legal affairs; 
- Controlling the legality and budgets of the regional and local councils; 
- Supporting the institutional development of the region and its institutions; 
- Monitoring and evaluating the elaboration and implementation of regional and communal 
development plans; and 
- Monitoring the activities of regional development committees. 
Still in line with these reforms, a service in charge of local development was created in the 
offices of senior divisional officers (Article 44). This service assists the senior divisional officer 
in performing the following functions relative to decentralisation (Article 50): 
- Supervising the activities of local councils and their local establishments; 





- Controlling the budgets and the legality of the decisions of local councils and their local 
institutions; 
- Monitoring and evaluation of decentralised cooperation initiatives; 
- Monitoring and evaluation of income generating projects; 
- Ensures the promotion, monitoring and evaluation of local development initiatives.  
The governors and senior divisional officers, as central government representatives in the regions 
and the local councils respectively, exercise supervision on behalf of the President of the 
Republic and the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation.  
The different ministries of the central government have field offices at the level of each region 
and each division. Some of these ministries have effectively transferred some authority and 
resources to councils. As a result, the field offices of the ministries concerned with the transfer of 
authority to councils, are supposed to provide technical support and the necessary assistance for 
the execution of projects in the councils. These field offices are required to provide a semester 
report on the state of the implementation of the authority transferred to the local councils through 
the senior divisional officer.  
The central government representatives ensure the general supervision, coordination, and control 
of the activities of these central government field offices at both regional and divisional levels. 
Therefore, from this perspective, central government representatives should ensure a proper 
working relationship between the field offices of the central government and the elected regional 
and local councils which have the responsibility to promote the development of their respective 
communities. 
 The regional and local authorities 
The regional and local authorities are the elected lower levels of government created by Part X of 
the 1996 Constitution (RC, 1996) and comprise the regional councils and local councils. 
Regional and local councils have legal personality, as well as administrative and financial 
autonomy in the management of regional and local issues. They are freely administered by 
councillors elected under conditions stipulated by the law, and have as duty to promote the 
economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of their respective 




headed by an elected regional council president - under the supervision of the governor who is 
the central government representative for the region. There are currently ten regions in 
Cameroon. However, the regional councils have not yet been established, hence, in the 
meantime, the central government representative (the governor) now plays the role of regional 
executive pending the institution of the regional councils. 
The local councils are the lowest level of elected government in Cameroon and there are three 
types of local councils: City councils, sub-divisional councils (which are located within the city 
councils), and councils. The city councils are headed by government delegates appointed by the 
president of the Republic, while the sub-divisional councils and councils are headed by mayors 
who are elected.  There are altogether 374 local councils in Cameroon which are divided as 
follows: 14 city councils, 43 sub-divisional councils, and 319 councils. The local councils are 
placed under the supervision of the senior divisional officer (central government representative) 
of the division in which the councils are located.  
4.3.2. Institutions for the monitoring and evaluation of decentralisation 
The Law on the orientation of decentralisation provides for two main institutions charged with 
the monitoring and evaluation of decentralisation in Cameroon: The National Decentralisation 
Council in the office of the Prime Minister, and the Inter-ministerial Committee for Local 
Services under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation. 
There is also the National Committee on Local Finance, created by the law on the financial 
regime of regional and local councils. 
a) The National Council on Decentralisation  
The National Council on Decentralisation was created by the laws of 22 July 2004, and 
presidential decree no 2008/013 of 17 January 2008 (RC, 2008a) elaborated on its organisation 
and functioning. The main mission of this council is to monitor and evaluate the implementation 
of decentralisation. To this end, it submits to the president of the Republic the annual report on 
the state of decentralisation and functioning of local services and formulates recommendations 
on the annual programme of the transfer of authority and resources to the regional and local 




This council is presided over by the prime minister as its chairperson, with the minister of 
regional and local councils as the vice-chairperson. The other members of the council include the 
cabinet ministers for agriculture, urban development, lands, finance, basic education, vocational 
training, water and energy, secondary education, public service, youth affairs, economy and 
planning, public health, sports and physical education, and public works; two senators designated 
by the bureau of the senate; two members of the national assembly designated by its bureau; and 
two representatives of the economic and social council designated by its bureau. Other persons 
can be invited to meetings of the council if the agenda of such meetings concerns them (Article 
3) (RC, 2008a). 
The council meets twice annually and in extraordinary sessions should the need arise. For the 
proper functioning of the council, a permanent secretariat has been set up and headed by a 
permanent secretary who prepares the council’s meetings and ensures the implementation of the 
resolutions of the council. 
b) The Inter-ministerial Committee for Local Services 
The Inter-ministerial Committee for Local Services was also created by the 2004 laws on 
decentralisation and its organisation and functioning was laid down by decree no. 2008/014 of 17 
January 2008 (RC, 2008b). This is an inter-ministerial concertation organ under the authority of 
the minister of regional and local councils involving all the ministries from which competences 
have been transferred to local councils. Its mission is to prepare and monitor the transfer of 
authority and resources to the regional and local councils as per the directives of the ministries 
involved. To this end, this committee elaborates the programme of transfer of competences and 
resources, and prepares the related texts on these transfers; evaluates the human and material 
resources necessary to the exercise of authority transferred; evaluates the costs of these transfers 
and proposes new mechanisms of financing the transfer of authority by the central government; 
conducts studies and prospective analysis on decentralisation; elaborates an annual report on the 
state of decentralisation and the functioning of local services; and submits proposals on issues 
related to decentralisation to the national decentralisation council (Article 2) (RC, 2008b).  
This committee is presided over by the minister of regional and local councils, and comprises the 




minister’s office; a representative from each of the following ministries: decentralisation, social 
affairs, agriculture, commerce, culture, urban development, lands, finance, basic education, 
livestock and fisheries, vocational training, water and energy, secondary education, environment 
and nature protection, public service, industry and mines,  youth affairs, economy and planning, 
small and medium-size enterprises, women empowerment and the family, public health, sports 
and physical education, tourism and leisure, transport, labour and social security, and public 
works; two representatives of city councils designated by the minister of decentralisation; four 
representatives of councils; two representatives of regions; and two representatives of civil 
society. Other persons can be invited to the meetings of the committee depending on their 
knowledge concerning the agenda of the meeting, and ad hoc committees can be established to 
work on specific issues (Articles 3 and 5) (RC, 2008b). 
This committee meets once every semester in ordinary sessions, and in extraordinary sessions 
when the need arises. At the end of each meeting, a report on the proceedings is sent to the 
chairman of the national decentralisation council. Moreover, a technical secretariat has been 
created to ensure the proper functioning of this committee and placed under the coordination of 
the director of regional and local authorities in the ministry of decentralisation. 
c) The National Committee on Local Finance (CONAFIL) 
This committee was created by the law on the financial regime of the regional and local councils, 
and its organisation and functioning was defined by Prime Ministerial decree no 2011/1732 of 18 
July 2011 (RC, 2011a). It is a concertation organ placed under the authority of the minister of 
regional and local councils, whose mission is to monitor the optimal mobilisation of finances for 
regional and local councils, as well as the proper management of local finances. Thus, the 
committee elaborates and monitors the implementation of appropriate strategies for the optimal 
mobilisation of financial resources for regional and local councils; ensures the effective transfer 
by the central government of local taxes and financial resources that should accompany the 
transfer of authority; conducts studies on the relationship between the funds disbursed to regional 
and local councils and the competencies and resources transferred to them; formulates 
recommendations in proposed bills, legislation and regulations on financial matters concerning 




management of regional and local councils; monitors, when necessary, the management of 
municipal treasuries and their indebtedness; proposes all necessary measures to ameliorate the 
quality of local expenditures; and provides statistics and analysis on local finances. This 
committee provides an annual report on local finances to the inter-ministerial committee for local 
services, which is validated and integrated in the annual report on decentralisation (Article 2) 
(RC, 2011a). 
The National Committee on Local Finance is presided over by the minister of regional and local 
councils who is the chairperson, and the minister of finance is the vice-chairperson. The other 
members of the committee include: a representative of the secretariat general of the prime 
minister’s office; the permanent secretary of the national decentralisation council; four 
representatives of the ministry of regional and local councils; a representative of the ministry of 
the economy; the director general of the special council support fund for mutual assistance 
(FEICOM) or his representative; the director general of taxation or his representative; the 
director general of customs or his representative; the director general of budget or his 
representative; the director general of the treasury or his representative; the director of public 
accounting at the directorate general of the treasury; the paymaster general of the treasury; two 
treasury pay generals; two representatives of FEICOM; two representatives of regions; the 
national president of the association of local councils; three representatives of city councils; five 
mayors of which two represent sub-divisional councils; and two municipal treasurers (Article 3) 
(RC, 2011a). 
The committee meets once every two months in ordinary session, and in extraordinary sessions 
when the need arises. For the accomplishment of its missions, this committee has a technical 
secretariat placed under the coordination of the director of regional and local councils in the 
ministry of regional and local councils. In addition, Article 11 of this decree on the organisation 
and functioning of the national local finance committee provides for the creation of Regional and 
Divisional Local Finance Committees at the level of various regions and divisions. 
These institutions for the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of decentralisation in 
Cameroon are, in essence, intergovernmental relations forums. This is reflected in their missions, 




representatives from the various levels of government (central, regional and local government) 
meet to reflect, discuss and take decisions on the transfer and exercise of authority and resources 
from the central government to the lower levels of government. The prime ministerial decree on 
the organisation and functioning of the national local finance committee further creates regional 
and local finance committees. This could be a mechanism to ensure intergovernmental relations 
at the lower levels of government between the representatives of the central government in the 
regions and divisions, the field offices of the central government at regional and divisional 
levels, and the regional and local councils. 
Apart from the abovementioned institutions, there is also the Inter-ministerial Commission on 
Decentralised Cooperation which ensures the monitoring and evaluation of decentralised 
cooperation in Cameroon. This commission is also chaired by the minister of regional and local 
councils. 
4.3.3. Other institutions involved in the implementation of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations in Cameroon 
Apart from the aforementioned actors and institutions, the government of Cameroon and the 
local councils have created some specialised institutions to accelerate the implementation of 
decentralisation and ensure intergovernmental relations between the regional and local councils 
and the central government. These institutions include the United Councils and Cities of 
Cameroon, and the Concertation Committee for the implementation of decentralisation. 
a) The United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) 
The United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) is the national association of local 
councils which brings together all the 374 councils, sub-divisional councils and city councils in 
Cameroon. It is an umbrella organisation responsible for overseeing the interests of its members. 
The UCCC plays an intermediary role between the central government and the local councils, 
and assists them to safeguard their prerogatives through taking the necessary action regarding 
upstream problems, anticipative participation in focus groups or by sharing views on certain draft 
bills and legislation. The UCCC was created in 2003 following the merger of the two former 




Association of Councils and Cities of Cameroon). Some of the objectives of UCCC according to 
Article 3 of its Constitution include (UCCC, 2005): 
- Reinforce decentralisation;  
- Forge solidarity ties between councils and cities of Cameroon and establish continuous 
consultations for promoting local development and improving the living environment and 
conditions of the population;  
- Create a forum for dialogue between councils and cities on the one hand, and the central 
government, development partners and all decentralisation stakeholders on the other 
hand; 
- Promote modern governance based on the participation of all active forces in the 
promotion of collective welfare;  
- Encourage a mutually beneficial partnership between local, regional, national, continental 
and global structures;  
- Exchange information, experiences and models so as to contribute to improving the 
management of local affairs and the working conditions of elected officials and council 
staff; and 
- Encourage the integration of youths, women and the underprivileged classes in the 
management of the city. 
The association is represented at the national level, the regional level and the divisional level by 
the following organs: the general assembly and the national executive bureau; the regional 
assembly and regional executive bureau; and the divisional assembly and the divisional 
executive bureau (Article 8, Constitution of UCCC) (UCCC, 2005). In order to promote 
intergovernmental relations between the local councils and the central government, UCCC has 
among its nine technical committees, a committee in charge of relations with the councils, the 
central government and the traditional institutions (Article 13, Constitution of UCCC) (UCCC, 
2005). 
b) The Concertation Committee for the implementation of decentralisation 
This committee was created by Prime Ministerial order no. 130 of 6 October 2006 (RC, 2006b), 




placed under the authority of the minister of regional and local councils - has as mission the 
coordination and harmonisation of actions, projects and support programmes to the 
decentralisation process. Hence, the committee monitors and evaluates the actions, projects and 
support programmes to the decentralisation process; it informs and involves national and 
international partners in the decentralisation process; and it formulates proposals on the 
intervention of these partners and ensures a proper articulation of their interventions (Articles 1 
and 2). 
The Minister of Decentralisation is the chairman of this committee and its members include: A 
representative of the prime minister’s office; three representatives of the ministry of regional and 
local councils; a representative each of the ministries of finance, external relations, urban 
development, and economy and planning; a representative of the special council support fund for 
mutual assistance (FEICOM); a representative of the local government training centre; a 
representative of the United Councils and Cities of Cameroon; a representative of the National 
Programme on Governance; two representatives of civil society; and a representative of each of 
the international partners or funding agencies. Other persons by virtue of their expertise can be 
invited to the meetings of the committee (Article 3) (RC, 2006b). 
The committee meets once every semester, and submits an annual report to the prime minister on 
the implementation of actions, projects and support programmes to the decentralisation process. 
For the execution of its missions, the committee has a technical secretariat under the 
coordination of a working group in charge of the implementation of decentralisation (Articles 4, 
5 and 6).  
These institutions, the United Councils and Cities of Cameroon and the Concertation Committee 
for the implementation of decentralisation have as common denominator accelerating the 
decentralisation process in Cameroon. Nevertheless, the UCCC is also preoccupied by the 
relationship between the councils and the central government, while the Concertation 
Committee, though not too focused directly with issues on intergovernmental relations, can act 
as another forum for representatives of local councils and the central government to discuss 





4.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Since the constitutional amendment of 1996, the government of Cameroon has resolutely been 
committed to accelerating the process of decentralisation. This is evident in the enactment of 
various legislations and the creation of institutions at both central government level and the 
lower levels of government, aimed at implementing the decentralisation policy. Some of the 
legislation includes the 2004 laws on decentralisation and the law on the financial regime of 
regional and local councils. The institutions have different functions such as financing 
decentralisation (such as FEICOM), supervising the activities of the regional and local councils 
(the minister of decentralisation, through the governor and senior divisional officer in the region 
and division respectively), monitoring and evaluating the implementation of decentralisation 
(such as the national decentralisation council, the inter-ministerial committee for local services 
and the national local finance committee). Although there is no specific legislation on 
intergovernmental relations, this chapter identifies some of the sections of the different 
legislations that to some extent involves the relations between the central government and the 
lower levels of government. Likewise, the various institutions are not specific on ensuring 
intergovernmental relations, some of these institutions, particularly those of the monitoring and 
evaluation of decentralisation, are in essence intergovernmental relations forums bringing 











PRESENTATION OF THE CASE STUDY, THE RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY AND MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents key aspects of the research site, Mezam division. These include the 
location of and the different governance institutions operating in Mezam Division. The chapter 
equally presents the methodology applied in the field research study, and some of the challenges 
encountered in the course of data collection. The last part of the chapter examines some of the 
major research findings regarding intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division.  
5.2. THE CASE STUDY: MEZAM DIVISION 
The Republic of Cameroon has 58 administrative divisions amongst which is Mezam Division. 
This section presents the location of and the governance institutions in Mezam Division. 
5.2.1. The location of Mezam Division  
Mezam Division is one of the seven administrative divisions in the Northwest Region of 












Figure 5.1. Map of Mezam Division  
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2017) 
Mezam Division is bordered to the north by Boyo Division, to the west by Momo Division, to 
the east by Ngohketunjia Division (all in the Northwest Region), and to the south by 
Bamboutous Division in the West Region of Cameroon. Mezam Division covers an area of 1.745 
Km² and has a population estimated at over 600.000. The headquarters of Mezam Division is 
Bamenda (RC, 2012).  
5.2.2. Governance of Mezam Division  
The responsibility for the day to day management of different activities in Mezam Division is 
assured by a plethora of public institutions and actors. These institutions and actors include the 





a) Deconcentrated central government services 
Mezam Division, like other administrative divisions in Cameroon, is headed by a Senior 
Divisional Officer (SDO) appointed by the President of the Republic. The SDO represents the 
President of the Republic and various government ministers at divisional level. In Cameroon, a 
division is an administrative unit comprising of two or more sub-divisions. Mezam Division has 
seven sub-divisions all headed by Divisional Officers (DO) as indicated in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1. Sub-divisions in Mezam Division 
Sub-divisions Headquarters 
Bamenda I Mendakwe 
Bamenda II Mankon 





Source: Author  
The Divisional Officers of the sub-divisions are appointed by the President of the Republic, and 
are answerable to the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division. 
b) Local Councils in Mezam Division  
Through the ongoing decentralisation reforms, the government of Cameroon has created local 
councils which are the elected local governments. In Mezam Division, there are eight local 








Table 5.2. Local councils in Mezam Division 
Name of Council Executive 
Number of 
Councillors 


















Bafut Council Mayor 35 Council 
Bali Council Mayor 35 Council 
Santa Council Mayor 41 Council 
Tubah Council Mayor 35 Council 
Source: Author  
Of the eight local councils located in Mezam Division, there is one city council, three sub-
divisional councils and four councils. The Bamenda City Council covers the territory of the 
Bamenda I, II, and III Sub-divisional Councils. Apart from the government delegate to the 
Bamenda City Council, who is appointed by the President of the Republic, all the mayors are 
elected by the population. 
c) Traditional governance institutions  
According to Presidential decree No 77/246 of 15 July 1977 (RC, 1977a) on the organisation of 
chieftaincies in Cameroon, there are three classes of chieftaincies: First Class Chiefs, Second 
Class Chiefs and Third Class Chiefs. In the Northwest Region of Cameroon, chieftaincies are 
called Fondoms and the Chiefs are referred to as Fons. Mezam Division has 26 Fondoms (mainly 
First class Fondoms and Second class Fondoms) spread across the seven sub-divisions as shown 







Table 5.3. Traditional Fondoms in Mezam Division 
Sub-division First class Fondoms Second class Fondoms 
Bamenda I  Bamendakwe 
Bamenda II Mankon Chomba 
Nsongwa 
Bamenda III  Nkwen 









Bali Bali Bawock 









Source: Author  
According to Table 5.3, there are three first class Fondoms and 23 second class Fondoms in 
Mezam Division. The 1977 Presidential decree assigns a governance role to the traditional 
authorities (in this case Fons) as ‘auxiliaries’ of the administration. In each of the Fondoms listed 
in Table 5.3, there is a Village Council and a Village Cultural and Development Association 
which assist the Fons in the management of village affairs. Over the years, these traditional 
governance institutions have been instrumental in the provision of certain social services such as 






5.3. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This field study makes use of the exploratory research design and more precisely, the case study 
method and interviews. The main idea in an exploratory study according to Ghosh (1992:210) is 
the discovery of facts and insights. The aim of the case study method and interviews is to know 
the factors and causes which explain the complex behavioural patterns of a unit and the place of 
the unit in its surrounding social milieu. The study seeks to understand how decentralisation in 
Mezam Division has influenced the practice of intergovernmental relations.  
The relevance of the exploratory research design can be further justified by the fact that it would 
provide a better understanding of the uniqueness of the Cameroonian context of 
intergovernmental relations which has been subject to many interpretations. Also, with much 
attention which has been focused on the formal legal and institutional frameworks of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, the exploratory design would be 
appropriate to also investigate the informal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations within a 
particular case study, Mezam Division. 
The qualitative research approach of interviews was selected for the study. According to Babbie 
and Mouton (2017:278), qualitative research studies human action within its natural environment 
through the lens of the actors themselves. It emphasises descriptions in detail and a profound 
understanding of phenomena as it occurs in the relevant context. The main advantage of the 
qualitative research approach is that it provides for a detailed one-on-one engagement with the 
research participants, hence enabling the researcher to collect in-depth information (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2017:279). Within the context of this study, the qualitative research approach is 
appropriate because it analyses the perceptions of the main actors of decentralisation within 
Mezam Division on the nature of the relationship between the central government and the local 
governments. 
5.3.1. Research population and sampling  
The study applies the purposive sampling method which, according to Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill (2009:237), is a method used in case study research to select participants who are 
informative. The purposive sampling method helps select people or sites that can enable the 




individuals to participate in the research is that they are “information-rich” based on their 
experience working in the specific domain or the site under study (Creswell, 2012:206). 
The choice of Mezam Division for the study emanates from the fact that it has all the attributes 
of deconcentrated and decentralised local authorities in Cameroon. As concerns the decentralised 
local authorities, Mezam Division has all the various types of local councils (a city council, sub-
divisional councils and councils). Moreover, some of these councils are governed by the ruling 
party and others by the Opposition party. Hence, the researcher was able to verify the influence 
of different political ideologies on decentralisation and how they affect intergovernmental 
relations in Mezam Division. The headquarters of Mezam Division, Bamenda, hosts all the 
Mezam Divisional offices of all deconcentrated state services. This made accessibility to the 
various actors of decentralisation easy. 
The participants for the research were selected from institutions at the central government, 
central government deconcentrated services in Mezam Division, and the local councils in Mezam 
Division. All the participants were purposefully selected based on their knowledge and 















Table 5.4. Officials selected as research participants for the study 
Institution Persons interviewed Number 
Central government level   
Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
- Inspector General in 
charge of Local 
Councils 
- Director of Regional 
and Local Authorities 
2 
United Councils and Cities of 
Cameroon (National 
Executive) 
Chairperson of Committee in 




deconcentrated offices in 
Mezam Division 
  
Office of the Senior 
Divisional Officer for Mezam 
- First Assistant Senior 
Divisional Officer; 
- Chief of Service for 
Local Development 
2 
Local councils   
Bamenda City Council - Secretary General  
(appointed) 
- Finance Controller 
(appointed) 
2 
Bamenda I and II Sub-
divisional Councils 
Mayors (elected) 2 
Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Council 
2nd Deputy Mayor (elected) 1 
Bafut and Bali Councils Mayors (elected) 2 
Tubah Council 2nd Deputy Mayor (elected) 1 




Total  14 
Source: Author  
The government officials who were interviewed as participants in this study can be further 
distributed according to the level of government, the type of government representative, and the 
political party affiliations of the officials. These are represented on the pie charts in Figures 5.1, 
5.2, and 5.3. Only information collected from officials in Mezam Division was used in the study 
because officials at the central government level mostly provided general information pertaining 




Figure 5.1. Percentage distribution by level of government  
 
79% of the research participants were selected from the Mezam divisional level against 21% at 
the national government level. This is because Mezam Division is the focus of this study and it 
has institutions that represent the interest of the national government. The central government 
representatives can implement certain measures to coordinate government action in Mezam 
Division which may not necessarily require the authorisation of the central government. 
Figure 5.2. Percentage distribution by type of government 
 
Central government officials represent 36% of the research participants while local councils in 
Mezam Division represent 64% of the research participants. The central government officials 
include those at national government level and national government representatives in Mezam 
21%
79%
Percentage distribution by level of government 
National level Mezam Divisional level
36%
64%
Percentage distribution by type of government 




Division. The local councils include selected representatives from all the types of local councils 
in Mezam Division (city council, sub-divisional councils and councils). 
Figure 5.3. Percentage distribution by political affiliation 
 
Mezam Division has eight local councils of which four are controlled by the ruling party, the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), while the other four are controlled by the 
main Opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF). This study selected 57% of the local 
council participants from Opposition controlled local councils and 43% from local councils 
controlled by the ruling party. Although there was a possibility of interviewing officials from all 
the local councils in Mezam Division, there was no response from some of the councils 
controlled by the ruling party despite several attempts that were made to contact them.   
Table 5.4 above enumerates a list of institutions and officials who were selected and interviewed 
for this study. It is important to understand why these particular institutions and officials were 
selected for this study. 
a) Institutions at central government level  
The main institutions at central government level that were selected for this research are the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD), and the United Councils 
and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) National Executive. 
Although this research was carried out at a time when the government of Cameroon had just 
created the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development, the organizational structure of 
43%
57%
Percentage distribution by political affiliation




this Ministry was still unknown. Moreover, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation had been handling the responsibility for government policy on decentralisation 
since the 1996 reforms. Hence, the research focused on the main officials working on 
decentralisation issues in the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation. These 
officials include the Inspector General in charge of Regional and Local Authorities, and the 
Director of Regional and Local Authorities. As per the organizational structure of the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, these were the main officials involved in the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy and ensuring the supervision of local councils by 
the central government. This is because they were in charge of performing the following 
functions: elaborating government policy on decentralisation; drafting legislation relative to 
regional and local authorities; monitoring the implementation of legislation that involves 
regional and local authorities; controls over the decisions of the regional and local authorities; 
and representing the interest of regional and local authorities in different decision making forums 
at central government level. 
The United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) has as one of its main missions ensuring 
dialogue between Councils and Cities on the one hand, and the central government on the other 
hand. This explains why amongst the 10 Committees that make up the UCCC, there is a 
Committee in charge of relations with the central government. The chairman of this committee 
was selected as a participant in this study by virtue of his duties of promoting dialogue between 
local councils and the government. 
b) Central government deconcentrated offices in Mezam Division  
The Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Mezam represents the central government in Mezam 
Division. He has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the field offices of all central 
government ministries, and supervising the activities of all local councils in Mezam Division. 
Most importantly, only the Senior Divisional Officer or his designated representative can speak 
on behalf of the central government when appearing before the local councils. This study 
examines the relationship existing between local councils in Mezam Division and the central 
government, thus some officials in the Office of the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam 
Division were selected for the study. These officials include the First Assistant Senior Divisional 




Senor Divisional Officer for Mezam Division represents the SDO in most meetings with the 
local councils, and he handles important files concerning the local councils in the absence of the 
SDO. The Chief of Local Development Service on his part assists the SDO in supervising the 
activities of local councils and controlling the budgets and legality of the decisions of the local 
councils. This explains why they were selected as participants in the study.  
c) Local council executives in Mezam Division 
The local council executives are the elected and appointed officials who have the mandate of 
managing the affairs of their respective local councils. The elected officials include the mayors 
and deputy mayors, while the appointed officials include the government delegate for the city 
council, and the secretary general, municipal treasurers and finance controllers of all the 
councils.  
The study of intergovernmental relations focuses mainly on the interactions among senior 
government officials in the different spheres or levels of government. For the purpose of this 
study, information was collected from the secretary general and the finance controller of the 
Bamenda City Council; the mayors of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, Bafut and Bali councils; and 
the deputy mayors of the Bamenda III and Tubah Councils. The secretary general of the 
Bamenda City Council was selected for the study because the government delegate was 
unavailable and the secretary general is the immediate assistant to the government delegate.  
The diversity of local council executives enabled the researcher to collect data that captures 
intergovernmental relations between the local councils and the central government on the one 
hand, and intergovernmental relations within the Bamenda city council (which covers the 
territory of the Bamenda I, II and III sub divisional councils) on the other hand. The diversity 
equally takes into consideration the political affiliations of the local council executives. The 
Bamenda city council, Bamenda I council and the Bali council, are controlled by the ruling 
CPDM party, while the other councils (Bamenda II, Bamenda III, Bafut and Tubah) are 
controlled by the main Opposition SDF party. This enabled the researcher to investigate the 





d) Mezam Divisional Chaiperson, United Councils and Cities of Cameroon  
The United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) which is the umbrella association of local 
councils in Cameroon is represented in all 58 divisions in Cameroon through a Divisional 
Executive elected by the local councils within the divisions. The presence of the UCCC in every 
administrative unit is to ensure that the interests of local councils are represented and considered 
at every local level. The UCCC Divisional Executive, like the National Executive, has as one of 
its mandates to create the conditions for permanent dialogue between the local councils within 
the division and the central government representatives and field government offices. In this 
regard, the chairperson of the Mezam Divisional Executive of the UCCC was selected as a 
participant in this study. 
5.3.2. Data collection techniques and sources  
Primary data was obtained using semi-structured interviews with the 14 officials from different 
institutions at the national level and the Mezam Divisional level of government purposefully 
selected for the study. The researcher had the opportunity to interview each of the selected 
officials one-on-one with the help of semi-structured interview questions. 
The purpose of these one-on-one interviews was to acquire qualitative data from the selected 
government officials at central government level and Mezam Divisional level on the existing 
formal and informal forums for dialogue between central government and local councils, the 
effectiveness of these forums in building a conducive working relationship between central 
government and local councils, and how central government representatives and local councils 
perceive the supervisory authority of the appointed central government officials over councils as 
enshrined in legislation. The interviews were equally essential in identifying and determining the 
effectiveness of mechanisms for coordinating central government and local council actions, 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts that could arise between central government and local 
councils, and mechanisms for enforcing central government and local government 
accountability.  
Two interview semi-structured questionnaires were used to collect data: one was used for 
interviews with officials at central government level and central government deconcentrated 




councils in Mezam Division that were selected for the study. The semi-structured interview 
questions were designed in accordance with the objectives of the study and research questions. 
The semi-structured interview questions specifically probed the extent to which the 
decentralisation policy is changing the nature of the relationship between the central government 
and local councils in Mezam division, the relationship between the Bamenda City Council and 
its three sub-divisional councils (Bamenda I, II and III Councils), and how intergovernmental 
relations could be improved in Mezam division.  
The researcher contacted the officials selected for the study by writing a formal letter to their 
institutions requesting an interview. Attached to these letters was the letter approving the 
research topic and nominating the thesis supervisor from the School of Public Leadership of 
Stellenbosch University, a letter of introduction from the thesis supervisor confirming that the 
research student had started writing his thesis and needed data to complete it, the informed 
consent form, the research proposal and the interview guide. All the institutions responded 
positively to the request and granted verbal permission to conduct the interviews. Arrangements 
were made and the interviews were scheduled after working hours in the offices of the officials 
and in a few cases over the weekend in the homes of the officials because they felt more 
comfortable to engage in a conversation at home. 
Each of the interview sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes to 120 minutes and the interview 
questions were semi-structured and open-ended enabling the researcher to collect more in-depth 
information through a series of follow-up questions related to the study. 
5.3.3. Ethical considerations 
One of the requirements for Stellenbosch University students carrying out research that involves 
any direct contact with people is to obtain ethical clearance from the institution. This study 
required the collection of data through one-on-one interviews with some selected research 
participants. The researcher applied for and obtained the ethical clearance certificate from the 
School of Public Leadership before undertaking fieldwork for data collection. 
Although the questions on the interview guide did not touch on sensitive issues, there was a 
possibility that follow-up questions during the interview sessions could open access to some 




the various respondents. Before each interview session, the research participant was required to 
read and sign two informed consent forms. The research participant kept one of the informed 
consent forms and the other one was kept by the researcher. Some of the research participants 
did not understand the need for informed consent. Rather, they required adequate proof that the 
researcher was a student as had been indicated in the request for interview. 
In some government offices, authorisation was needed before the researcher could have access to 
any information as per the procedures. This was the case in the Office of the Senior Divisional 
Officer for Mezam Division where authorisation was needed to access information in any of the 
departments. The authorisation signed by the Senior Divisional Officer provided access to all the 
necessary data in the Mezam Divisional office, and significantly facilitated the interview 
sessions with the First Assistant Senior Divisional Officer and the Chief of the Service for Local 
Development. Aside from the informed consent forms, these officials had the liberty to talk 
freely on issues covering decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division. 
These officials were instrumental in arranging meetings with some of the local council officials 
who had been selected to be part of the study. 
5.3.4. Socio-political environment during the data collection exercise  
The period 2018 to 2019 has been challenging for the Republic of Cameroon. At the time of the 
fieldwork, the socio-political environment in Cameroon in general and the Northwest Region, 
especially Mezam division in particular, was characterised by some key events. 
The Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon (the Anglophone regions) are currently 
involved in an armed conflict between the government and separatist groups advocating for the 
creation of a separate state. This struggle dates back to September 2016 when Anglophone 
(Common law) lawyers started peaceful protests against the appointment of French judges in 
common law courts. The government responded by arresting lawyers and seizing their robes. 
The lawyers were joined by Anglophone Teacher’s Trade Unions on 21 November 2016 who 
called for school boycotts across Anglophone Cameroon to protest the appointment of French 
teachers to teach in English schools. In essence, the Anglophone lawyers and teachers were 
calling for the preservation of the Anglophone legal and education systems which to them was 




created the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium to better channel their grievances to 
the government and open the door for negotiations. 
The government responded in January 2017 by outlawing the Consortium, arresting its leaders 
and shutting down the internet in Anglophone Cameroon for over 90 days. In the course of 2017, 
the crisis degenerated into an armed conflict with the creation of numerous armed separatists 
groups in Anglophone Cameroon. The President of Cameroon declared war on the separatists 
groups on 30 November 2017 and since then, it has been difficult to find a solution to the crisis. 
There have been numerous calls for inclusive dialogue without preconditions from the 
international community but there have been no signs of any significant steps towards dialogue. 
Mezam Division, like all the other 13 Divisions in the two English-speaking regions of 
Cameroon was a theatre of what could seemingly be described as a “battle zone”. It was 
characterised by the exchange of gun fire between the armed forces and the separatist groups. 
This threat caused the governor of the Northwest region and the senior divisional officer for 
Mezam to impose a curfew restricting movements from 06:00 to 18:00. 
Also, the President of Cameroon signed a decree on March 3 2018 splitting the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralisation into the Ministry of Territorial Administration 
and the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development. The organisational structure of this 
new ministry of decentralisation and local development was decided upon by presidential decree 
in August 2018 and the officials of this ministry were appointed in November 2018. The field 
work was carried out at a time when new institutions were being established and new officials 
appointed at national level and the local levels to perform the functions that hitherto had been 
performed by other institutions and officials.  
Moreover, the year 2018 was a crucial electoral year in Cameroon because all three major 
elections were scheduled to take place at different periods of the year. The senatorial elections 
were scheduled for April 2018, the parliamentary and municipal elections for August 2018, and 
the presidential elections for October 2018. Unfortunately, in Cameroon, election dates are not 
known to the public as only the president of the Republic has the authority to convene the 
Electoral College. Nevertheless, the parliamentary and municipal elections which were 
scheduled for August 2018 were postponed and the mandates of parliamentarians and municipal 




guarantee that most of the mayors who had been elected in 2013 would still be occupying their 
offices during the data collection. Had matters been different, it would have been laborious 
convincing mayors who would have lost elections to participate in the study. In some cases, 
certain mayors do not wish to talk about municipal council affairs, especially those who were 
hoping to renew their mandates yet lost elections. There was also the probability that the 
elections would have led to the selection of new mayors and council officials which could have 
influenced the dynamics of the research, particularly with regards to the research participants. 
More so, it is possible that the new mayors and local council officials could have very little or no 
information about the functioning of local councils and the decentralisation system.   
5.3.5. Field challenges 
These socio-political events which characterised the fieldwork environment had an impact on the 
conduct of the research. The researcher faced certain challenges in the course of the data 
collection exercise which are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, the socio-political environment in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon in general, 
and the Northwest Region in particular, was and is still characterised by much tension due to the 
armed conflict between the security forces and the armed separatist groups. Movements to all 
parts of Mezam Division were restricted and vehicles were at times prevented from circulating 
due to the sporadic exchange of gunfire. In some cases, roads leading to some local councils 
were blocked and even when the roads were opened, the council premises were completely 
deserted because of the atmosphere of tension and insecurity in the area. This was precisely the 
case with the Bafut and Bali councils where in the few days before the commencement of the 
fieldwork, the areas had been characterised by periods of gunfire and many people had fled to 
the neighbouring city of Bamenda. This atmosphere of tension made data collection - especially 
from the council archives - quite tedious because the researcher had to wait for the security 
situation to significantly calm down before visiting these councils. Some of the interview 
sessions that had been scheduled with the mayors living in these areas had to be postponed on 
several occasions. In the English-speaking regions, Mondays are considered ‘ghost town’ days as 
people are expected to remain indoors as part of the protest. The leaders of the separatist groups 




heeded. As a result of this insecure climate, the data collection at the level of Mezam Division 
initially planned for a month was extended to two months.   
Secondly, the process of meeting some of the research participants was complicated due to 
bureaucratic red tape. In one of the local councils, the request for permission to interview the 
mayor was deliberately kept in the mail office for over eight days. In other instances, some of the 
officials - under the guise of having much work to do - referred the researcher to a junior staff 
member who had little or no knowledge about the subject matter. Apparently, the said official 
had not understood the purpose of the research, thus had not taken time to read through the 
request for an interview submitted by the researcher. For example, one mayor, because he was 
busy, proposed that the Human Resource officer should participate in the interview on his behalf. 
In the course of the interview, it was observed that this person had scanty knowledge of the 
decentralisation policy and the manner in which the council relates with the central government 
representative. To resolve this issue, the researcher contacted the deputy mayor who was better 
informed with regards to the subject matter. 
Thirdly, fieldwork was initially scheduled for the months of August and September 2018. 
However, there was a major delay in obtaining ethical clearance from Stellenbosch University 
caused by a limited understanding of how the ethical clearance application system works on the 
part of the researcher. As a result, the fieldwork was postponed to a later date when the ethical 
clearance would have been approved. Notwithstanding this, the period from August to 
September 2018 was used to establish initial contact with some of the research participants, as 
well as explore literature from some of the secondary data sources in Cameroon and Ghana. 
In addition, some of the central government services did not have important information required 
for the research. The researcher was unable to find any document in the archives of the Mezam 
Divisional office containing the history and evolution of Mezam Division. As a result, this 
information had to be collected from other sources not directly linked to the research and it was 
quite a tedious task gaining access to these sources. 
5.3.6. Data presentation and analysis 
The interview sessions were recorded using a tape recorder and later transcribed by the 




which the officials are working (that is, the central government level and the Mezam Divisional 
level). At the Mezam Divisional level, the data was classified according to government officials 
(from the office of the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division) and the types of local 
councils (city council, sub-divisional councils and the councils). The purpose of this 
classification was to examine the trends in terms of the similarities and differences of the 
perceptions of central government officials on the one hand, and local council officials in Mezam 
Division on the other regarding intergovernmental relations. However, only data collected from 
officials at the Mezam Divisional level was relevant for this research because officials at the 
central government level provided mostly generic information pertaining to Cameroon as a 
whole. 
The data collected was analysed using thematic analysis which is a form of qualitative data 
analysis. This is because through thematic analysis, the researcher can review the relationship 
between concepts and the data collected. Thematic analysis offers the possibility of relating the 
concepts and the opinions in a different context, and comparing them to data collected in another 
context (Alhojailan, 2012:40). 
5.4. PRESENTATION OF THE MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Based on the review of documents in the Mezam Divisional Office and the interview questions, 
the major findings of this research tackle issues related to intergovernmental relations forums in 
Mezam Division. These findings equally present the functioning of various mechanisms for 
intergovernmental relations such as supervision, coordination, conflict resolution and 
accountability. Some of the interview questions and responses (italics) are presented below. 
a) The existing intergovernmental relations forums in Mezam Division 
The institution that currently brings together central government representatives and all local 
councils in Mezam Division is the Mezam Divisional Committee for Local Finances. It was 
created by Prefectural Order No 481/PO/E29/LDS of 7 July 2014 (RC, 2014) which also 
appointed members of the Mezam Divisional Committee for Local Finances. The purpose of this 
committee is to monitor the mobilisation of finances for the local councils and oversee the proper 
management of these finances. 




- The Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division (chairperson); 
- The Head of the Local Development Service, Office of the SDO for Mezam Division 
(secretary); 
- The Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council (member); 
- All Mayors in Mezam Division (members); 
- The Regional Paymaster General, Northwest Region (member); 
- The Regional Chief of FEICOM, Northwest Region (member); 
- The Divisional Chief of Taxation, Mezam Division (member); 
- The Chief of Service for Recoveries FEICOM Bamenda (member); 
- All Municipal Treasurers of Councils in Mezam Division (members). 
All 22 members of Mezam CODEFIL meet once every three months (a quarter) to monitor the 
mobilization and use of funds by the different local councils in Mezam Division. As noted by the 
Chief of Service for Local Development in the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division 
(appointed official) (2018:Interview), Mezam CODEFIL has contributed to strengthening the 
relationship between the central government representatives and the local councils in Mezam 
Division. He stated that “Mezam CODEFIL meetings are held on a rotatory basis so that each 
local council will have the chance to host the members of the committee. Also, the first meeting 
which was held in 2014 was used to sensitise the councils on what they should do, how to 
prepare a budget, and the taxes each of the councils should collect”. 
In order to ensure the proper distribution and management of some common sources of revenue 
for the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils, two committees have been established bringing together representatives of the 
respective councils and the central government. These committees include: 
 The Technical Committee for the recovery of global taxes and parking fees in 
Bamenda  
Created by Prefectural Order No 409/PO/E29/712/S1 of 26 October 2011 (RC, 2011c), this 
committee ensures the centralization of the recovery of global transport taxes and parking fees in 
Bamenda. The 13 members of this committee include: 




- The Secretary General of the Bamenda City Council (secretary); 
- The Representative of the Office of the SDO for Mezam (member); 
- The Northwest Regional Chief of FEICOM (member); 
- The Chief of Service for Recovery FEICOM (member); 
- The Mezam Divisional Chief of Centre for Taxation (member); 
- The Municipal Treasurers of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils (members); 
- The Municipal Treasurer of the Bamenda City Council (member); 
- The Secretary Generals of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils (members). 
 
 The Sub-Committee of the Bamenda Local Tax Technical Committee  
Created by Prefectural order No 407/Po/E29/712/S1 of 20 October 2011 (RC, 2011b), this sub-
committee performs the following duties: Collecting, processing and exploiting tax base and 
establishing recovery data; following up of issuing recovery and centralising transactions of 
proceeds from parking fees; updating the transporters card index; updating the transporters data 
base (know your tax payer); and drawing up the statement of distribution of proceeds from taxes. 
The eight members of this sub-committee include: 
- The Northwest Regional Chief of FEICOM (chairperson); 
- The Chief of Service for Recovery FEICOM (secretary); 
- The representative of the Mezam Divisional Office (member); 
- The Municipal Treasurers of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils (members); 
- The Municipal Treasurer of the Bamenda City Council (member); 
- The Secretary General of the Bamenda City Council (member). 
The common denominator relating to these different committees in Mezam Division is that all 
are formal committees because they were created by a Prefectural Order signed by the Senior 
Divisional Officer for Mezam Division. Also, these committees bring together representatives 




government representatives to deliberate on mainly financial issues concerning the local 
councils. 
b) What do you think is the purpose of central government supervision of local councils? 
How effective is this supervision in Mezam Division? 
Central government supervision is a means of ensuring that local council executives comply with 
the regulation on decentralisation. A central government official, the First Assistant SDO for 
Mezam Division (appointed official) (2018:Interview), affirmed that “there is absolute need for 
control or supervision from the central government. If government allowed the mayors without 
control, it would be very chaotic and even with the control, it is not smooth. Mayors have not 
been through any formal education to manage councils and their excesses can only be managed 
through controls.” Another central government official, the Chief of the Service for Local 
Development in the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division (2018:Interview) said that “When a 
mayor promises employment to youths and he gets elected, he gets to the council and finds the 
existing staff. The law states that councils cannot have a wage bill that is above 35% of their 
functional expenditure. The mayor may decide to employ as many young people as he wants, and 
he convinces the councillors to approve this decision through a council deliberation. However, 
when this decision gets to the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for approval, it is rejected by the 
SDO because the wage bill surpasses 35% of the council’s functional budget. In some instances, 
the SDO can notice that there are some persons who have been employed but they are doing 
absolutely nothing, and he decides to reject the mayor’s request to employ more staff. Such a 
mayor will see the SDO as disturbing them from achieving their objectives whereas the SDO is 
ensuring that the actions of mayors comply with the law.” 
The Chief of Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) further asserted that “If a mayor 
decides to construct a road or a school and the proposed plan is sent to the SDO for approval 
who realizes that due to financial constraints, these projects are not feasible and he rejects the 
plan, the mayor sees it as a nuisance. Whereas, if the mayor submitted such a proposed project 
and the SDO lobbied for funds to execute these projects, then supervision would be perceived by 
the mayors as positive.” 
On the part of local council officials, some are in favour of central government supervision. The 




need for central government supervision as such “the absence of qualified staff in the councils 
makes it incumbent on the central government to perform a supervisory role over the councils. 
When the councils will have qualified and competent manpower, then central government 
supervision can be partially or totally removed.” 
Other local council executives are opposed to central government supervision. The 2nd Deputy 
Mayor of the Tubah Council (elected official) (2018:Interview) expressed the opinion that 
“central government supervision is just a question of power at all levels because the supervisory 
authorities give instructions to suit their agenda which is destroying the relationship between 
these authorities and the councils. Mayors present their plans, but the supervisory authority 
blocks its implementation. There is lack of cooperation from the administrative authorities and 
lack of respect for timing which delays the implementation of some council decisions. This 
situation has transformed some mayors into ‘paper-tigers’ who have well written plans but no 
implementation.”  
To another local government official, the 2nd Deputy Mayor of Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Council (elected official) (2018:Interview), “Some SDOs use their supervisory authority to 
extort money from councils for activities that have been budgeted for by the central government 
such as the celebration of the National Day. If the request of the SDO is rejected by any council, 
the said council’s expenditures will not be approved by the SDO. When these councils give 
monies to the SDO that have not been budgeted for, they need to find another way of justifying 
such expenditures else they will be held responsible for misappropriation of funds.” 
c) How do local councils and central government field offices in Mezam Division 
coordinate their activities? How effective are these coordination mechanisms? 
The mayor of Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council (2018:Interview) claimed that “whenever any 
of the central government ministries that have transferred authority to local councils deem it 
necessary, they invite us to meetings and tell us what to do. It is more or less a question of giving 
instructions or a mere information session. Such meetings should enable the participants to 
share ideas rather than sitting in Yaoundé (the capital city) and writing circular letters with 
instructions for people to follow. In my opinion, the dialogue between the councils in Mezam 




However, other local government officials, who face challenges working with some central 
government field offices, send petitions to the central government in Yaoundé and the issue is 
resolved. As attested by the mayor of Bafut Council (elected official) (2018:Interview), “I once 
had a problem with the Mezam Divisional Delegation of Public Contracts because they wanted 
to award a contract to a different contractor whereas I knew someone who could do a better job. 
The contract was awarded to someone else who did an unpleasant job. Unfortunately, I could 
not control the work of this contractor because the contract was not awarded by our council, and 
the municipality could not enjoy the services he was supposed to offer because the work was 
poorly executed. I wrote to the Minister who immediately cancelled the contract and requested 
that it should be redone.”  
d) How are conflicts between central government field offices and local councils in 
Mezam Division resolved? How effective are these conflict resolution mechanisms? 
The Governor of the Northwest Region and the SDO for Mezam Division play the role of 
arbitrators between the local councils and central government field offices when problems arise. 
Using the case of water supply, the Chief of Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) 
explained that “a project for the supply of water was transferred to the Santa Council and 
naturally, the mayor was the project owner. However, the Regional Delegate for Water and 
Energy Resources (representing the Ministry of Water and Energy Resources) for the Northwest 
Region took upon himself to request for the bidding as the project owner (competent authority to 
award the contract). The mayor of Santa Council rejected this regional delegate’s claim and 
immediately wrote to the SDO for Mezam Division to find a solution. Given that the matter 
involved a regional delegate, the matter was referred to the Governor of the Northwest Region 
who intervened and resolved the conflict by stating that the mayor of Santa Council was the 
competent authority to award the project.” 
The Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council had faced a similar situation with the Regional Delegate 
for Women Empowerment for the Northwest Region. The mayor of the Bamenda I Sub-
divisional Council (2018:Interview) declared that “The Bamenda I Council was selected as 
project owner for the construction of a Women’s Empowerment Centre in the Bamenda I 
Municipality. However, the Regional Delegate for Women’s Empowerment for the Northwest 




Bamenda II Municipality that had been burnt some weeks earlier. We argued that the project 
should have been stated as ‘rehabilitation’ and not ‘construction’ of a Women’s Empowerment 
Centre. The matter was addressed to the Governor of the Northwest Region who stated that the 
project be implemented in the Bamenda I Council because the projected was quoted for the 
Bamenda I Council”.  
In some circumstances, the Governor of the Northwest Region and the SDO for Mezam Division 
have failed to resolve conflicts between local councils and central government field offices in 
Mezam Division. As illustrated by the mayor of the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council 
(2018:Interview), “The Council found pieces of land to build structures on that could generate 
income for the Municipality. The SDO for Mezam Division accompanied us throughout the 
process of identifying these portions of lands. The Council met the necessary requirements for 
using these lands and monies had been paid as part of the process. On the day boundary pillars 
were to be planted on these lands to indicate that it could be used by the council, the Customs 
Department prevented us from using one of the lands claiming it belonged to them. Instead of 
trying to resolve the issue, the SDO for Mezam rather referred us to the Governor of the 
Northwest Region, who in turn referred us to Yaoundé (the central government). Moreover, the 
day a meeting was scheduled with the Governor, nobody showed up from the Customs 
Department and nothing has happened till date”. 
e) How are conflicts between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, 
and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils resolved? How effective are these 
mechanisms? 
The SDO for Mezam Division arbitrates in cases of conflicts between the Bamenda City Council 
and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils. The Chief of the 
Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) in the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division 
affirmed that  
“The main areas of conflict between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, 
and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils is the collection of the road degradation tax and the 
temporary occupation tax. For the temporary occupation tax collected from traders occupying 
spaces around a market to carry out their trading activities, the law states that the local council 




collect the temporary occupation taxes around the Bamenda Main Market, the Nkwen Market, 
and the Ntarinkon Market which it owns. The Sub-divisional Councils argue that they should 
collect these temporary occupation taxes because the area occupied by the traders is situated 
outside the market space. This led to a conflict between the Bamenda City Council and the 
Bamenda II and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils. The Bamenda II and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils wrote to the SDO for a solution and the SDO decided that the Bamenda City 
Council who owns these markets should collect the temporary occupation taxes. The mayors of 
Bamenda II and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils where these markets are located were not 
pleased with the SDOs decision.” 
Some of the Sub-divisional Councils resort to dialogue to resolve conflicts with the Bamenda 
City Council. The mayor of the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council (2018:Interview) declared 
that “There is a piece of land in Bamenda I Council which was being claimed by the Bamenda 
City Council. We decided to use this land to construct a Women’s Empowerment Centre and 
when work had started, the City Council wrote to us that we could not use this land as the City 
Council intends to construct an ultra-modern bus station there. So, we started negotiating with 
the City Council on the basis that the land is large enough for both the City Council and the 
Bamenda I Council to execute their respective projects. In the end, the City Council agreed to 
use a portion of the land for the ultra-modern bus station, while the Bamenda I Council will use 
another portion of the land for the construction of the Women Empowerment Centre.” Dialogue 
between the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council and the Bamenda City Council is possible 
because both Councils are controlled by executives of the same political party, the ruling 
Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM). The mayor of the Bamenda I Sub-divisional 
Council (2018:Interview) further disclosed that “when the opposition Social Democratic Front 
(SDF) party was in control of the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council, they often clashed with the 
Bamenda City Council on a number of issues. The City Council for example took control of a 
cattle market that was the jurisdiction of the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council in order to 
reduce the sources of income for the Bamenda I Council. This cattle market has been ceded by 
the Bamenda City Council back to the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council because it is now 
controlled by the ruling CPDM party, and the government delegate of the Bamenda City Council 




The Mayor of Bamenda II Sub-divisional Council (2018:Interview), who is of the opposition 
SDF party, argued that, “When we raise issues during City Council sessions on the excesses of 
the Government Delegate, councillors from the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council often remain 
mute. It means they have no problems or complains on the actions of the Government Delegate.” 
The Mayor of Bamenda II Sub-divisional Council (2018:Interview) further explained that “we 
had a platform created between 2008 and 2009 bringing together the 3 Sub-divisional Councils 
and the Bamenda City Council. We met frequently to dialogue, resolve our misunderstandings, 
and share positive practices in our respective councils. Suddenly, it stopped because the 
Government Delegate who is supposed to convene these meetings has not been doing so. The 
Government Delegate has never really explained why he stopped convening these meetings” 
f) What are the existing mechanisms for the central government to hold local councils in 
Mezam Division accountable? How effective are these mechanisms? 
The findings of the research reveal that the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Mezam Division 
uses control missions from his office to hold local councils accountable. These control missions 
consist of deploying officials from the Service for Local Development to monitor how work is 
carried out in the local councils. Nevertheless, the Chief of the Service for Local Development 
(2018:Interview) in the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division, disclosed that, “Although we 
carry out field missions, it is not effective because we do it from our offices. When we discover 
that a mayor is doing something wrong, we write to the mayor informing him/her that the action 
is incorrect. Then we equally advice the mayor on what to do and how it should be done. I think 
it is important to go down to the field and check some council operations such as the preparation 
of vouchers, collection of revenue, arrangement of treasury receipt booklets. I once went to the 
field and discovered a treasurer issuing treasury receipts and leaving some receipts empty. 
Apparently, there was something unorthodox about this because there should be no empty 
receipts. So, it is important to go around, check these operations, and advise on how it should be 
done properly.” 
g) Can local councils in Mezam Division hold the central government or its 
representatives accountable? 
There exists few or no mechanism for the local councils in Mezam Division to hold the central 




central government accountable, the First Assistant SDO (2018:Interview) for Mezam Division 
declared “councils, hold central government accountable, what powers do they have? The 
mayors can only disobey. The mayors and councillors can refuse to implement instructions 
coming from the central government representative. If the SDO oversteps his bounds, the local 
councils can refuse to comply with such demands if it is wrong or unlawful. Nevertheless, the 
local councils can appeal by calling the attention of the central government to what the SDOs 
are doing which is not correct, but not holding the government accountable.” In the same vein, a 
local council official (the mayor of Bali Council, an elected official) (2018:Interview) decried 
that “Councils cannot hold the SDO or the central government accountable. Just let it be.”  
Some local council executives do send petitions directly to the central government to complain 
about the actions of the SDO. The mayor of the Bamenda II Sub-divisional Council 
(2018:Interview) affirmed, “If I have a problem with the SDO and I know he will not pay 
attention, I write straight to the central government in Yaoundé. I had a problem with the 
Bamenda City Council concerning my finances that were blocked there. I knew that if I 
approached the SDO, he will not resolve the issue because he did not want to see me as I had 
raised some issues that he was not doing right, and he saw me as an obstacle. I wrote directly to 
the central government in Yaoundé who gave instructions and the money was paid.” 
Some of the local council executives decry the lack of accountability from some central 
government institutions. Commenting on intergovernmental fiscal relations and the 
accountability of central government institutions to the local councils, the Finance Controller 
(appointed official) at the Bamenda City Council (2018:Interview) declared that “the Special 
Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance (FEICOM) which has the responsibility for 
centralising and redistributing council finances to ensure that financially weak local councils 
have some revenue have often given us the impression that we are only receiving from them. 
However, FEICOM does not publish its annual figures of the amount it receives from every local 
council relative to what is redistributes. So how can the local councils in Mezam Division 
determine if they are only receiving part of their revenue from FEICOM as claimed or if 





Still commenting on intergovernmental fiscal relations, the Finance Controller of the Bamenda 
City Council (2018:Interview) further indicated that some central government regulations have 
significantly reduced local council revenue. He stated that “Government has created the Large 
Tax Payers Zone where every company with a turnover of 1 billion XAF (approximately 
$1,712,300) pays taxes directly to the central government. This therefore implies that the big 
companies in Bamenda like the inter-urban transport companies and the brewery companies pay 
their taxes directly to the central government. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to assess 
whether the local councils in Bamenda are only receiving money from the central government. 
This is because these large tax payers have not and do not disclose the exact amount they pay as 
taxes to the central government.”  
5.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter focused on presenting the case study of the research, Mezam Division, and the 
methodology that was utilised for the research. Mezam Division is located in the Northwest 
Region of Cameroon and is bordered by Bamboutous Division in the West region, Ngoketunjia 
Division, Boyo Division and Momo Division in the Northwest region. Mezam Division is 
headed by a Senior Divisional Officer who represents the central government in the division 
similar to other divisions in Cameroon, and it has seven sub-divisions headed by Divisional 
Officers. There are eight local councils in Mezam comprising a city council, three sub-divisional 
councils and four councils which constitute the elected local governments as per the ongoing 
decentralisation reforms. In addition to these, Mezam Division has over 26 traditional Fondoms 
spread across the seven sub-divisions of which three are first class Fondoms while 23 are second 
class Fondoms.   
The study uses the exploratory research design and the qualitative research approach which 
provide detailed descriptions of phenomena in a given context. Research participants were 
selected using the purposive sampling method and these participants were selected from 
institutions at the central government level and Mezam Divisional level. Primary data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with the selected participants at the central 
government level and the Mezam Divisional level, although only information collected from the 




political climate that characterized the data collection exercise and some of the challenges 
encountered.  
According to some of the key findings of the research, Mezam Division has intergovernmental 
relations institutions. These institutions which deal exclusively with financial management issues 
are classified according to the relationship between the central government representatives and 
local councils in Mezam Division, and the relationship between the Bamenda City Council and 
the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils. The findings further 
unveil the functioning of various mechanisms for promoting intergovernmental relations in 






A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS’ 
INITIATIVES IN CAMEROON: MEZAM DIVISION 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
The decentralisation process in Cameroon has created a platform for the establishment of various 
committees in Mezam Division bringing together representatives of the central government and 
local councils. This does not suggest that the committees are the most effective component of 
intergovernmental relations. It is worth examining other components of intergovernmental 
relations such as supervision, coordination, conflict resolution, and accountability. This chapter 
critically analyses the research findings on intergovernmental relations initiatives in Mezam 
Division based on the interviews conducted with the different research participants. It is a critical 
evaluation of the different intergovernmental relations initiatives in Mezam Division which 
analyses the Cameroonian legislation on decentralisation relative to intergovernmental relations, 
the mechanisms of intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division (supervision, coordination, 
conflict resolution and accountability) and highlights the major challenges facing effective 
intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division. This critical evaluation employs an integrated 
approach using ideas from the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), international context (Chapter 
3), the policy framework in Cameroon (Chapter 4), and the interviews (Chapter 5).  
6.2. ANALYSIS OF CAMEROON’S POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 
DECENTRALISATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of intergovernmental relations, according to Wright 
(1978:13), is the policy component which outlines the intentions and actions of the institutions 
and officials concerned, as well as the corresponding consequences of the actions of these 
institutions and officials. In order to appraise the influence of decentralisation on 




policy and regulatory framework regarding decentralisation. This analysis can be examined from 
two dimensions: the legislative framework and the institutional framework. 
6.2.1. The legislative framework  
The main legislative instruments of decentralisation in Cameroon include the Constitution of 
1996, the 2004 laws on decentralisation (Orientation of Decentralisation, Rules applicable to 
Regions and Rules applicable to Local Councils), and the law on the financial regime of regions 
and local councils. There is neither a specific regulation on intergovernmental relations, nor is 
there any section of these laws that focus exclusively on the relationship between the central 
government and lower levels of government. Instead, some sections of these laws make mention 
of certain aspects of intergovernmental relations.  
The 2004 laws on decentralisation, particularly law no 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 2004a) on 
the Orientation of Decentralisation, defines decentralisation in Cameroon as “devolution of 
authority and resources by central government to elected regional and local councils which have 
administrative and financial autonomy in managing regional and local interests”. A closer 
reading of these laws, however, contradicts the principle of devolution in its originality. This is 
because the law provides for the appointment, by the central government, of some local council 
executives such as the government delegates who head the city councils, and some key officials 
in the local councils such as the secretary generals and the municipal treasurers. The central 
government equally appoints administrators (Senior Divisional Officers) to supervise the actions 
of the elected local councils on behalf of the central government. The role of the supervisory 
authority erodes the administrative and financial autonomy of local councils in Cameroon and a 
fundamental precondition for devolution: the autonomous, independent nature of local councils 
regarded as a separate level of government with the central government exercising minimal or no 
control (UNDP, 1997:6). Therefore, although the legislation on decentralisation in Cameroon 
focuses on the devolution of authority to local councils, this devolution has numerous features of 
deconcentration or administrative decentralisation.  
Considering that the type of decentralisation influences the nature of intergovernmental relations, 
the legislation on decentralisation in Cameroon does not clarify the nature of intergovernmental 
relations. According to the principle of devolution in its pure form, the relationships between the 




This is properly articulated in the French decentralisation system (on which the Cameroonian 
system is based) through frequent exchange of information between the Departmental prefect 
and the local council mayors for the exercising of their duties. Although the Cameroonian 
legislation on decentralisation encourages the exchange of information between the SDO and the 
mayors for the exercising of their functions, the emphasis is on supervision or “tutelle” which is 
one of the fundamental characteristics of administrative decentralisation as elaborated by the 
European Union (2007:16). There is a propensity to perceive this system as a strict command and 
control vertical intergovernmental relations in which the SDOs, acting on behalf of the central 
government, are viewed as superiors to the mayors, and the latter must respect every instruction 
of the SDO. 
6.2.2. The institutional framework 
The Cameroonian legislation on decentralisation establishes institutions at the different levels of 
government to ensure the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of decentralisation. There 
are no institutions that have specifically been established by the legislation to promote 
intergovernmental relations although it is one of the functions of the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation. However, some of the institutions for the monitoring and 
evaluation of decentralisation such as the National Decentralisation Council, the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Local Services, and the National Committee on Local Finance can be considered 
as national intergovernmental relations forums. This is because they bring together 
representatives from the different levels of government.  
Moreover, these institutions, acting as intergovernmental relations forums, exists only at central 
government level. The only exception is the National Committee on Local Finance, which as per 
Article 11 (1) of Prime Ministerial Decree No 2011/1732 of 18 July 2011 (RC, 2011), exists in 
each of the lower levels of government through Regional Committees on Local Finance, and 
Divisional Committees on Local Finance. At the local level, it is therefore the responsibility of 
the senior divisional officer, the deconcentrated central government officers, the mayors, and 
government delegates (where they exist) within an administrative Division to define the nature of 
their local intergovernmental relationships, and establish their local intergovernmental relations 
forums in line with their needs and aspirations. The French and South African legislations 




clearly define their functions. This is in line with the constitutional/legal approach to 
intergovernmental relations in which the Constitution and legal texts lists all government 
institutions involved with clear descriptions of the responsibilities of each of these institutions 
and its members (Hattingh, 1998:11). In the case of Cameroon, this approach seems limited 
looking at the nature of the legislation.  
In addition, the Cameroonian legislation on decentralisation encourages inter-council 
cooperation and solidarity through an agreement in which two or more councils pool their 
resources to achieve common goals. The legislation equally fosters the creation of Council 
Unions in which councils within a particular administrative division or region of Cameroon can 
sign a convention aimed at handling inter-communal interests. This section of the law has been 
exploited by the local councils in Cameroon to establish the United Councils and Cities of 
Cameroon (UCCC) which has a national executive, regional executives, and divisional 
executives. Hence, the UCCC is represented at the different levels of government and one of its 
main missions is to create a dialogue forum for councils and cities on the one hand, and the 
central government on the other hand. The establishment of the UCCC can be viewed as a 
mechanism for promoting horizontal intergovernmental relations among the local councils which 
have come together to lobby the government on actions and policies directly and indirectly 
affecting the local councils. The challenge though is the effectiveness of the actions of the 
divisional executives of the UCCC who have the responsibility to promote effective 
intergovernmental relations in their respective administrative units.  
6.3. ANALYSIS OF THE DECENTRALISATION STRUCTURE IN CAMEROON AND 
THE LINK TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS  
In Cameroon, the structure of decentralisation has been subject to changes over time, the most 
recent being the creation of a new Ministry in charge of decentralisation and local development 
in March 2018. The impact of the decentralisation structure on intergovernmental relations in 
Cameroon can be analysed through the lens of decision-making. Ribot (2002:1 – 2) conceives 
decentralisation as centre-local relations which focus on strengthening local governments. In the 
case of Cameroon, does the decentralisation structure encourage centre-local relations which 




On a positive note, the structure of decentralisation in Cameroon is clearly defined in the 
legislation as seen in Figure 1.1, similar to the French Republic and South Africa which both 
have well defined structures (Figure 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). Article 55 (1) of the Constitution 
of Cameroon, 1996 (RC, 1996) creates lower levels of government below the central 
government, regions and local councils, which are elected and endowed with administrative and 
financial autonomy. Since 2010, the central government has transferred some authority and 
resources to the local councils to perform their functions of promoting local development. This is 
according to the World Bank’s (1999:108) prescriptions for decentralisation as the transfer of 
political, fiscal, and administrative authority to government units at sub-national level which are 
elected, is autonomous, and have the capacity to take binding decisions in certain policy areas. 
Also, the structure provides for the central government to be in constant connection with the 
lower levels of government through the central government representatives - the governors, and 
SDOs. All of these are a strategy to ensure that decentralisation actions across all levels of 
government are coherent and properly coordinated. The deconcentrated offices of central 
government ministries are responsible for providing technical support to the local councils, and 
facilitating communication between the central government ministries and local councils. 
However, the decentralisation structure in Cameroon poses a challenge particularly for 
intergovernmental relations or centre-local relations. There are multiple actors involved in the 
implementation of decentralisation at the local level - each having their own interests and 
perceptions of decentralisation. The majority of these key actors are central government field 
officials appointed in the central government field offices, with some clearly feeling at times that 
they are superior to, - or are not in any way answerable to - the local councils. Aside this, most 
central government ministries still take decisions that must be implemented by the local councils 
working closely with the respective central government field offices. When these decisions, 
made at the central government level, do not represent the realities at local council level, such 
decisions cannot be implemented. In essence, the local councils and the central government field 
officers at times are cut off from some decision making processes by the central government.  
The new structure of decentralisation in Cameroon, particularly the creation of the Ministry of 
Decentralisation and Local Development, introduces slight changes in the nature of the 




greater extent, it still maintains the status quo. This is because the new Ministry of 
Decentralisation and Local Development equally has deconcentrated offices in the lower levels 
of government, hence adding the number of appointed officials involved in the implementation 
of decentralisation. 
Firstly, the Regional Governors and the Senior Divisional Officers in the Divisions are still 
vested with the authority to supervise the actions of the Regional Councils and the Local 
Councils respectively. However, the Presidential decree, organising the Ministry of 
Decentralisation and Local Development, repeals Articles 34 and 50 of Presidential decree No 
2008/377 of 12 November 2008 (RC, 2008d) on the organisation and functioning of the Services 
of Heads of Administrative Units in Cameroon. Henceforth, the responsibilities of the Division 
for Regional Development, as per Article 34 of Presidential decree No 2008/377 of 12 
November 2008 (RC, 2008d), have been transferred to the Regional Delegations of the Ministry 
of Decentralisation and Local Development. In the same vein, the functions of the Local 
Development Services in the Offices of the Senior Divisional Officers, as defined by Article 50 
of Presidential decree No 2008/377 of 12 November 2008 (RC, 2008d), have been transferred to 
the Divisional Delegations of the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development. 
Therefore, in their work with the Regional Councils and the Local Councils, the Regional 
Delegates and Divisional Delegates of the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development, 
like the heads of field offices of all other ministries, must work closely with the Regional 
Governors and the Senior Divisional Officers. 
Secondly, the field offices of the new Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development (the 
Regional and Divisional Delegations) have specialised offices in charge of supporting and 
ensuring the harmonious functioning of some intergovernmental relations institutions at regional 
and divisional levels. In the Regional Delegations, there is the Bureau for assistance to the 
Regional Committee on Local Finances, and in the Divisional Delegations, there is the Bureau 
for assistance to the Divisional Committee on Local Finances. 
Although a new Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development has been created in 
Cameroon, the field offices of this new Ministry are yet to be put in place. Thus, its work, 
particularly its contribution to intergovernmental relations at various levels of government, can 




6.4. ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISMS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
IN MEZAM DIVISION  
Interactions amongst and between different spheres or levels of governments within a country 
involves different instruments. Some of these instruments include supervision, coordination, 
conflict resolution, and accountability. This section analyses these mechanisms as they operate in 
the intergovernmental relations’ arrangements in Mezam Division. 
6.4.1. Supervision of councils by central government representatives in Mezam Division 
One of the main controversies regarding the decentralisation process in Cameroon has been the 
supervision of elected local councils by appointed central government officials. This has been 
considered as a means through which the central government maintains its hold on the councils, 
hence a major source of friction between the central government and these elected local councils.  
To illustrate the importance of central government supervision over local councils, the 
Cameroonian legislation on decentralisation emphasises central government supervision as an 
interaction mechanism between the central government and local councils. The case of central 
government supervision over local councils in Mezam Division presents varying perceptions of 
the purpose of this supervision. According to the central government officials in Mezam 
Division, supervision is meant to ensure that local councils act within the confines of the law as 
these local councils do not have well-trained staff. This opinion is equally shared by some local 
council officials who support central government supervision. On the other hand, other local 
council officials oppose supervision due to the way it is carried out, that is, command and control 
by the supervisory authorities. This reduces the intensity of the relations between the supervisory 
authorities and the local councils.  
Although in the French Republic, the central government supervises the actions of the local 
councils through the appointed departmental prefects, this supervision has been subject to 
considerable adjustments since 1982 and limited strictly to legal checks which are referred to the 
competent courts. The Cameroonian decentralisation system rather practices an integrated 
prefectural system reminiscent of what was practiced in France prior to 1982. The supervision of 
local councils by central government appointees is among the key ingredients of administrative 




Generally, the central government officials who support central government supervision over 
local councils herald the opinion that the central government supervision is effective, especially 
in those areas in which the law requires that the central government exercises control over 
matters such as approving the decisions and budgets of local councils. However, some of the 
central government officials are of the opinion that to some extent and depending on the 
circumstances, councils understand or do not understand the purpose of central government 
supervision. When central government supervision is in favour of the mayor’s actions, it is seen 
as being positive, whereas when the supervision stifles the mayor or blocks an unlawful act, it is 
perceived as a hindrance to the smooth functioning of the council. For local government officials 
who oppose central government supervision, they think this supervision should be eliminated 
completely. According to them, the central government should rather institute the necessary 
mechanisms which would be at the disposal of the local councils to perform well.  
Central government supervision over local councils can be seen as government regulation and 
oversight which is one of the structural instruments of intergovernmental relations (Radin, 
2014:645). Supervision also creates an avenue for a vertical relationship between the central 
government and the local councils as the central government wields more authority (Kahn et al., 
2011:12). It equally underscores the influence of deconcentration or administrative 
decentralisation strategies on intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division because the SDO 
exercises control over the local councils on behalf of the central government. 
6.4.2. Mechanisms for coordination in Mezam Division  
Coordination is one of the structural instruments of intergovernmental relations which is used for 
integrating units structurally that are separated by functions, level, or geography (Radin, 
2003:611 and 2014:643). The research findings identify a pivotal role for the Governor of the 
Northwest Region and the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division in ensuring 
coordination between the central government field offices and local councils in Mezam Division. 
Depending on the level of the central government field office involved in an issue, the 
coordination of the activities of the central government field offices and local councils in Mezam 
Division is carried out by either the Governor of the Northwest Region (in matters that involve 
the Northwest Regional Field Office) and by the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division 




2010, which define the conditions for the transfer of authority to the local councils, the domains 
reserved for the central government and those reserved for the local councils are specified. In 
Mezam Division, Divisional Field Offices of central government ministries act as technical 
advisers to the mayors, hence they are often invited to ordinary and extraordinary council 
sessions by the SDO to formulate recommendations on issues that fall within their area of work.   
In France, the departmental prefect and the president of the departmental council jointly 
coordinate actions of deconcentrated central government services in the department, and the 
departmental council services. The responsibility for coordination is jointly held by the 
appointed departmental prefect and the elected president of the departmental council as per 
Article 1 (V), Law No 2013 – 403 of 17 May 2013 (FR, 2013). Similarly, in South Africa, 
district intergovernmental forums coordinate strategic plans and priorities of municipalities of 
the district as per Section 2, No 13 of 2005 (RSA, 2005). 
Institutions, such as the departmental council in France and the district intergovernmental 
relations forums in South Africa, are absent in Cameroon. Hence, the coordination responsibility 
is entirely concentrated in the hands of the appointed Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) in the 
Division (similar to the Departement in France). Perhaps, this explains why in Mezam Division, 
some local council executives complain of the absence of dialogue opportunities with the central 
government ministries because these central government officials focus on writing letters with 
instructions for them (local council executives) to follow. This form of communication between 
the central government and the local councils in Mezam Division could be a means of informing 
the local councils of government’s decisions and intentions that could affect them, which is a low 
intensity degree of informal intergovernmental relations according to Hattingh (1998:38). Also, 
it is normal that instructions from the central government be conveyed to the local councils by 
the SDO and the central government field officers in Mezam Division because they are 
appointed by the central government and can only implement instructions that have been 
received from above. This could equally explain why when some local council officials in 
Mezam Division encounter difficulties working with field offices of the central government 




Just like the supervision of local councils in Mezam Division, the current existing coordination 
mechanism in Mezam Division reinforces the practice of vertical intergovernmental relations 
between the central government and local councils in Mezam Division.  
Section 77 of Law No 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 2004a) on the Orientation of 
Decentralisation in Cameroon, encourages the SDO and local council executives to exchange 
information required to effectively perform their duties. However, the exchange of information 
between the SDO and local council executives is non-existent in Mezam Division due to the 
hierarchical perception in which the SDO is seen as superior to the local council executives. The 
exchange of information is vital to coordination.  
6.4.3. Mechanisms for conflict resolution in Mezam Division 
Conflict resolution or conflict management is one of the behavioural instruments for 
intergovernmental relations which involves consensus building among various actors and 
adopting a negotiated approach rather than a ‘decide, announce and defend’ approach to 
decision-making (Radin, 2003:614 and 2014:647). The findings of this research identifies the 
Governor of the Northwest Region and the SDO for Mezam Division as the main players 
involved in conflict resolution, depending on the issues to be handled. The findings equally 
identify two levels of conflict resolution in Mezam Division: conflict resolution involving local 
councils and central government field offices on the one hand (vertical intergovernmental 
relations), and conflict resolution involving the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, 
Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils on the other hand (horizontal 
intergovernmental relations). 
 Conflict resolution involving local councils and the central government field offices in 
Mezam Division  
Based on the research findings, the Governor of the Northwest Region and the SDO for Mezam 
Division have been successful in resolving some conflicts between local councils and central 
government deconcentrated offices through arbitration. These conflicts involve attempts by some 
deconcentrated central government services to usurp the responsibilities of local council 
officials, or misinterpretation of the nature of development projects destined for some of these 




issues when they arise. However, these central government representatives (Governor and SDO) 
are at times left helpless when the conflicts concern issues that do not directly involve the 
responsibility of local councils, such as the use of public land. Conflicts of such nature could 
only be resolved by the central government and this sometimes leaves local council officials 
frustrated over the fact that the central government representatives are unable to protect their 
interests. The dispute over the ownership of land between the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council 
and the Customs Department is an example of one of such circumstances.  
Generally, local council officials in Mezam Division affirm that in most instances, when 
conflicts arise between their councils and the central government field offices, the most 
appropriate mechanism for resolving these conflicts is through dialogue. When dialogue between 
them fails, writing a petition to the SDO for Mezam Division or the Governor of the Northwest 
Region is usually the last resort. At this point, the SDO for Mezam Division or the Governor of 
the Northwest Region arbitrates and resolves the conflicts if they fall within their competence; 
otherwise the matter is referred to the central government where the conflict resolution process 
may become even more complicated due to the administrative bottlenecks.  
 Conflict resolution involving the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda 
II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils 
The Bamenda City Council covers the territory of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III 
Sub-divisional Councils. Although the decentralisation laws clarify the competencies of the City 
Council and the Sub-divisional Councils, there are still some misunderstandings and overlaps 
which are a breeding ground for conflicts.  
In the domain of local tax collection, there is a popular debate in Cameroon between the city 
councils and sub-divisional councils about the issue of which of the local councils collect what 
tax. The city council and sub-divisional council officials all have different interpretations and it 
is up to the central government representative (SDO) to provide clarifications. Nevertheless, the 
major problem with the collection of taxes reserved for either the city council or the sub-
divisional councils in Bamenda is encroachment by the revenue collectors of either councils. For 
example, revenue collectors of the Bamenda City Council can take advantage of the fact that the 




point to collect a tax that is meant to be collected by the Sub-divisional Council revenue 
collectors. 
Dialogue as a tool for resolving conflicts between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, 
Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils is imperative. As of now, dialogue only 
occurs between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council because 
both are controlled by officials from the same political party, the ruling CPDM party (the 
Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils are controlled by the opposition SDF 
party). One would expect all these local councils to constantly dialogue because they already 
have an available platform for dialogue which is the fact that they are part of the legislative or 
deliberative organ of the Bamenda City Council. However, this dialogue has been rendered 
impossible due to these local government officials thinking and acting along political party lines 
(the ruling CPDM party and the opposition SDF party). The strict adherence to political party 
philosophy contributes to slowing the intensity of intergovernmental relations between the 
Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils. Even the platform established to encourage and facilitate dialogue between these local 
councils is non-functional because the Government Delegate appointed by the central 
government to head the Bamenda City Council has not convened a meeting of this platform. 
Moreover, the low intensity of relations between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, 
Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils can be explained by the fact that the 
Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council considers himself as superior to the mayors 
of the Sub-divisional Councils. Given that he is appointed by the President of the Republic of 
Cameroon, he is answerable to the person who appointed him rather than the local population he 
is meant to serve. Therefore, this apparent superiority complex of the Government Delegate 
tends to create a vertical relationship between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, 
Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils (similar to the relationship between the 
central government and the local councils) instead of the horizontal relationship that is supposed 
to be a feature of these local councils. 
From the different conflict resolution mechanisms, it is important to underscore the 
communication aspect that characterises the relationships between the central government field 




Council and the Sub-divisional Councils. Communication like conflict resolution is one of the 
behavioural instruments of intergovernmental relations in which the players involved listen to 
each other, manage their conflicts, and find ways of building consensus amongst them (Radin, 
2003:614). Also, the Pattern-Maintenance function of the structural functionalism theory 
(Parsons, 1961: 38) can be used to explain the mechanisms for conflict resolution in Mezam 
Division. The purpose of dialogue between the central government representatives and councils, 
and the City Council and Sub-divisional Councils or arbitration by the Governor of the 
Northwest Region or the SDO for Mezam Division is to institutionalise values that would 
maintain the stability of the decentralisation policy in Mezam Division.  
The South African legislation, particularly Sections 28 & 29 of the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act (No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005), proposes inter-municipality forums as a platform 
to review strategically important issues affecting the interests of participating municipalities. The 
Technical Committee for the recovery of global taxes and parking fees in Bamenda and the Sub-
committee of the Bamenda Local Tax Committee can act as other mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III 
Sub-divisional Councils. This is because these committees are to some extent intermunicipality 
forums between the Bamenda City Council, and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III 
Sub divisional Councils. However, the limitations of these committees reside in their exclusive 
focus on financial issues because apart from the local council representatives and representatives 
of the SDO for Mezam Division, most of the other members of these committees are from 
central government field offices who deal with financial issues.  
6.4.4. Mechanism for accountability in Mezam Division 
The supervision of local councils by the central government and its field agents is often justified 
as a means of ensuring compliance with the law and accountability of the local councils to the 
central government (Radin, 2014:645). According to the findings of the research, the SDO for 
Mezam Division at times sends officials of the Service of Local Development to check the work 
of the local councils.  
Apart from field missions, the SDO can constitute an audit team to check the accounts or 
dealings of any council if some specific figures do not add up, or if he receives a written petition 




this study affirmed that they are subject to periodic control missions from some central 
government ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Planning, and 
Regional Development, the Ministry of Public Contracts, and the Supreme State Audit.    
Field missions from the Office of the SDO are challenging in Mezam Division because the staff 
complement in the Service for Local Development at the Office of the SDO is inadequate. 
Currently, the office is made up of just two persons charged with managing the affairs of eight 
local councils. This explains why the SDO for Mezam Division prefers writing letters to these 
local council officials to point out some of their shortcomings rather than deploying staff to the 
field for proper control.  
While the central government and its representatives in Mezam Division have instituted various 
mechanisms to hold the local councils accountable, there are few or no mechanism for the local 
councils in Mezam Division to hold the central government and its representatives accountable. 
According to the principle of complementarity in Cameroon’s decentralisation system, the 
authority transferred to local councils in not exclusive. This authority is concurrently exercised 
by the central government and the local councils. This is buttressed by UNDP (1997:4) which 
considers decentralisation as co-responsibility between various levels of government, and each of 
the levels has a complementary role. Judging by this definition, co-responsibility implies that the 
local councils are accountable to the central government on the one hand, and the central 
government is accountable to the local councils on the other hand. This appears not to be the case 
in Mezam Division because the system is structured in a manner that a central government 
representative could easily get away with wrong-doing towards the local councils due to no 
checks and balances. This probably explains why a local council official, when asked about 
holding central government officials accountable, responded “…just let it be”.  
The system of co-responsibility between the central government and the lower levels of 
government is visibly practiced in the French Republic. According to Article 1 (V) of Law No 
2013 – 403 of 17 May 2013 (FR, 2013), the departmental prefect presents an annual report to the 
departmental council on the activities of the deconcentrated central government institutions 
within the department. The departmental council debates on this report in the presence of the 
departmental prefect, which can be a means of holding the departmental prefect (by extension 




The mechanisms for accountability can be explained by the institutional pluralism theory due to 
its emphasis on organisational and institutional distribution of roles that are needed in executing 
specific tasks (Cohen and Peterson, 1998:9). Each of the actors involved in intergovernmental 
relations in Mezam Division have specific roles and tasks. Hence, each of them should be 
accountable to each other with regards to the execution of their respective tasks. It means that 
although the central government and its field representatives wield much authority over the local 
councils, they are still somehow accountable to the local councils on the manner in which they 
perform their roles.  
Communication equally plays a great role in ensuring accountability, particularly individual 
communication (Radin, 2014:648). There needs to be open interactions between central 
government officials, central government representatives and local council executives on various 
policy issues that cut across all the levels of government. This requires a shift from the 
‘command and control’ or one-way communication approach (in which central government 
officials pass down information to lower levels), to a ‘negotiated and persuasive’ or two-way 
communication approach (in which officials at all levels of government exchange views through 
roundtable dialogues).  
6.5. SOME CHALLENGES TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN MEZAM 
DIVISION  
Although there are no rules specifying the nature of intergovernmental relations in Mezam 
Division, the local councils and the central government still find a way to work with each other 
in addressing local development issues. However, there are a number of actions or perceptions 
from the central government or its representatives in Mezam Division, and the local council 
officials in Mezam Division, that impede the consolidation of a convivial working relationship 
between the central government or its representatives and the local councils in Mezam Division. 
a. Shortcomings of the intergovernmental relations forums in Mezam Division 
The intergovernmental relations forums in Mezam Division refers to the Mezam Divisional 
Committee for Local Finance (Mezam CODEFIL) which brings together representatives of the 
central government and all the local councils in Mezam Division; the Technical Committee for 




Bamenda Local Tax Technical Committee which brings together representatives of the central 
government, the Bamenda City Council, and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils. The overarching weakness of these forums is its exclusive focus only on 
handling financial issues. Intergovernmental relations transcend finance to include all other 
aspects that affect the proper functioning of local councils. 
One of the main difficulties faced by Mezam CODEFIL is the irregular convening of its 
meetings. Although meetings are supposed to be held regularly (every three months) as 
stipulated by the Prefectural Order, so far only five meetings have been held since the inaugural 
meeting in 2014. According to the Chief of Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) in 
the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division, “The irregular meetings are due to inadequate 
financial resources because funding for the running of CODEFIL comes from the central 
government. Although the local councils are also supposed to provide funding for the running of 
CODEFIL, this measure is not effective because the budgets of the local councils in Mezam 
Division do not financially support the operations of Mezam CODEFIL.”  
On the other hand, the main challenge faced by the Technical Committee and the Sub-committee 
is the level of commitment to collecting the unified taxes from each of the local councils 
involved. This is because some of the councils such as the Bamenda II and the Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils have a high concentration of socio-economic activities hence they would do 
most of the collection. The Bamenda I Sub-divisional Council is an administrative area with a 
lesser concentration of commercial activities compared to the Bamenda II and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils. In the end, all these councils receive equal amounts which appear to be 
unfair to the councils (Bamenda I and Bamenda II) who do most of the collection. 
b. The dominant role of the central government  
The central government plays a dominant role in awarding public contracts meant for local 
councils in Mezam Division. For example, in the domain of education, central government has 
transferred the construction of classrooms to local councils (building and equipping) but most, if 
not all these contracts are still awarded at central government level in Yaoundé. At times, some 
contractors just casually appear at the council premises and inform the mayor that they have been 




The influence of the central government in the awarding contracts was confirmed by the mayor 
of the Bamenda II Sub-divisional Council who said that the central government is geographically 
far from Mezam Division. Yet, central government officials tend to make decisions on behalf of 
local councils that cannot be verified. The mayor Bamenda II Sub-divisional Council 
(2018:Interview) declared: “I applied for a road and instead of giving me the authority to 
request for tender files as project owner at the level of the council, the contract was awarded in 
Yaoundé. I just realised that work had commenced on one of the roads in the municipality and 
when I approached the contractor for inquiries, he informed me that he had been awarded the 
contract in Yaoundé. Contracts awarded by the council for the construction of roads have been 
properly executed, whereas this contract that was awarded in Yaoundé has been stagnant for 
years now because I do not have the authority to control this contractor.”  
Most often, officials at the central government level feel they are the highest hierarchy, and that 
they can take certain decisions which, if taken at the local level, will be ineffective. However, 
experience shows that most of the decisions that are being made at central government level end 
up failing to achieve the desired objectives. Even when these objectives are attained, the results 
are unsatisfactory. 
c. Local councils cannot freely manage their finances  
Local councils do not have the authority to manage most of the financial resources transferred to 
accompany or finance contracts awarded or competencies transferred by the central government. 
These financial resources are still being managed by the national treasury and not by the treasury 
of the local councils. The Chief of Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) in the Office 
of the SDO for Mezam Division confirms:  
“A mayor can have the authority to award a contract for the construction of 2 classrooms. 
Although this mayor signs the contract and prepares the bills, it is not the municipal treasury of 
his council that pays for the contract but the public treasury of the central government. In some 
cases, the central government even dictates the price at which the contract must be awarded. 
However, the same classroom constructed for $20.000 could also be constructed for $10.000 if 
the mayor had the free hand to fully manage the contracts and the finances of the contract. Given 
that the central government has already prescribed the amount for the tender, the contractors 




Apparently, the central government interferes almost directly in exercising the authority and 
resources transferred to local councils. This is because the central government can decide on who 
will execute the financial part of an arrangement, and even who has the responsibility for the 
execution of the project without consulting the local councils concerned by these projects. 
d. Central government decides on the location of projects within the local councils  
The central government has transferred to local councils the responsibility to implement projects 
and equally dictates the localities where these projects should be implemented within the 
respective local council areas. The mayor of Bafut Council (2018:Interview) decried “I 
requested for the construction of classrooms in any government primary school in my 
municipality and when the request was approved, the central government selected a school in a 
locality which already had numerous buildings. Whereas, there was a government primary 
school that had been existing for long without any classroom buildings, everything there was 
managed through community contributions. I stood my grounds, wrote a petition with pictures 
and forwarded to Yaoundé. I personally went to Yaoundé to justify my petition and in the end, it 
was decided that the classrooms be built where there was need for it. If I was consulted before, it 
would have been better and such confusion could have been avoided.” 
From the foregoing argument, it can be concluded that to some extent, there is inadequate 
communication regarding projects between the central government officials, the central 
government representatives and the local council officials in Mezam Division. 
e. Pressure from local politicians and influential elites on central government officials  
In some cases, the decision by the central government officials to dictate on the location of some 
projects within a local council can be due to the influence of local politicians or influential elites 
at central government level. For example, a politician can go to Yaoundé and lobby for the 
construction of classrooms in a secondary school and instead of these classrooms being 
constructed where there are no buildings, he/she prefers that it should be constructed in a school 
which is saturated with buildings just because he/she hails from that area. He/she wants the 
impact to be felt and for the people to see that he/she is working whereas if the mayor and the 





f. Inadequate collaboration between central government officials, central government 
representatives and central government field offices in Mezam Division   
The findings of the research indicate that the SDO for Mezam Division, as central government 
representative, is at times faced with situations which he is unable to manage. When decisions 
are already made at the central government level, the SDO cannot overturn them even if they are 
wrong or do not fit with the local realities in Mezam Division. As regards a contract, even if the 
SDO overturns the decision, the project will not be paid for by the public treasury of the central 
government because the quotation will differ from the initial quotation sent by the central 
government. So the SDO is obliged to write back to the central government with his observations 
and recommendations.  
Referring to the example of the provision of portable water in some local councils in Mezam 
Division, the Chief of Service for Local Development (2018:Interview) in the Office of the SDO 
for Mezam Division, explained: 
“The Minister of Water and Energy resources approved a project for the construction of bore-
holes in the Santa, Bafut, and Tubah Councils. The quotation for these projects specified bore 
holes, and the various localities within the local councils where the bore holes should be 
constructed. The Mezam Divisional Delegate for Water and Energy who is the technician went to 
the field for feasibility studies in the prescribed areas and did not approve any of the projects. 
This is because according to the Delegate’s report following the feasibility studies, the gravity-
fed water supply system will be more lasting, self-sustaining, than digging bore-holes. The 
recommendation was that the project be transformed into the gravity-fed water supply system for 
each of the three councils because there were streams uphill that could be exploited. Given that 
the Minister of Water had prescribed boreholes, the project could not be changed and the SDO 
for Mezam Division had to write back to the Minister of Water and Energy with the field report. 
The process took a long time before the Minister of Water and Energy approved the proposed 
changes to the initial project.”  
From the foregoing, it appears the role of the SDO as central government representative and the 
field offices of central government ministries are being minimised by the same central 
government they represent. Faced with such situations on major development projects, local 




there to promote the interests of the local councils. Moreover, such circumstances can even be 
perceived by these local council officials as a ploy by the central government and its field agents 
to delay or stall the development of their local communities. This is further complicated by the 
fact that most of the central government appointees working in Mezam Division and charged 
with influencing these major decisions hail from different parts of the country and could generate 
a perception of bias. 
g. Inadequate knowledge and cooperation from some local councils 
Some of the local council officials in Mezam Division have limited knowledge on the 
Cameroonian legislation on decentralisation particularly Law No 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 (RC, 
2004b) stating the decentralisation rules applicable to local councils. Some of the local council 
officials that were interviewed for this study demonstrated some lack of understanding for these 
rules and rather blamed the actions of the central government and its representatives, especially 
the SDO for Mezam Division, for impeding the effective implementation of decentralisation. 
This was mainly the case with some of the local council officials from both the ruling CPDM 
party and the opposition SDF party because they have their perception of what decentralisation 
should be and this is seemingly different from what the legislation proposes. As such, these local 
council officials are always in conflict with the central government and its representatives and 
would often be suspicious of any activities by the central government representative that 
concerns their local councils.   
 
6.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
This chapter critically evaluates the different intergovernmental relations’ initiatives in Mezam 
Division. For a proper evaluation of these initiatives, the chapter in the first instance analysis the 
policy and regulatory framework of decentralisation in Cameroon and its resulting influence on 
intergovernmental relations, and Cameroon’s decentralisation structure and its influence on 
intergovernmental relations. Also, the various mechanisms for intergovernmental relations such 
as supervision, coordination, conflict resolution, and accountability are critically analysed.  
This critical evaluation highlights some problems with the legislation on decentralisation in 
Cameroon, particularly the implementation of some decentralisation concepts such as devolution 




with the creation of the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development, they may rather 
contribute to maintaining the status quo because this institution rather increases the number of 
decentralisation stakeholders at national level and lower levels of government. The Governor of 
the Northwest Region and the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam Division are indispensable in 
ensuring supervision, coordination, conflict resolution and accountability although there still 
exists major dysfunctions.   
Nevertheless, the findings equally unveil some challenges to intergovernmental relations in 
Mezam Division such as: the dominance of the central government; the inability of local councils 
to freely manage their finances; the influence of the central government regarding the location of 
development projects in the local councils; lack of collaboration between the central government 
and the local councils, and inadequate knowledge and cooperation from some local councils.  







A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
IN MEZAM DIVISION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
The implementation of the decentralisation policy in Cameroon has paved the way for various 
kinds of interactions between the central government, central government representatives, central 
government field offices, and local councils. In the case of Mezam Division, these interactions 
involve the central government representatives and the local councils on the one hand, and the 
Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils on the other hand by virtue of the type of local councils. The findings of this study 
identified some major challenges which to some extent negatively impact the practice of 
intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division. From these challenges, how then can the 
practice of intergovernmental relations be improved in Mezam Division? This chapter formulates 
some recommendations on strengthening intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division. Given 
that Mezam Division has all types of local councils which exist in other parts of Cameroon (a 
city council, sub-divisional councils and councils), these recommendations could to some extent 
be, applied in other parts of Cameroon. The recommendations propose actions that should be 
undertaken by the central government, the central government representatives and the local 
council executives in Mezam Division. 
7.2. PROPOSED ACTIONS BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO AMELIORATE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CAMEROON 
Despite the existence of different levels or spheres of government within a country, the central 
government still wields more authority than the lower levels or spheres of government. This is 
because in most circumstances, it is the decision of the central government to establish the lower 
levels of government and define their functions. The central government in Cameroon should use 




to introduce some changes in the formal roles and relationships and the patterns of authority and 
leadership based on changing needs and priorities.  
7.2.1. Improving the policy and regulatory framework of decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations in Cameroon 
The policy framework of decentralisation in Cameroon does not clearly define the nature of the 
relationships between the various levels of government. There is thus the need to draft and adopt 
a new regulation regarding intergovernmental relations in Cameroon, and amend certain parts 
and sections of the current policy documents.  
a) Framework document specifying the modalities for relations between the central 
government, regional councils, and local councils in Cameroon 
This framework document should clearly define the nature of all intergovernmental relationships 
in Cameroon. The legislators - while drafting this document - should bear in mind the holistic 
component of intergovernmental relations (Wright, 1978:8). Therefore, this document should 
specify the nature of central – regional relations; central - local relations; central – regional – 
local relations; regional – local relations; and inter – local relations. The framework document 
should be structured as such: 
PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
This document defines the framework for the relationship between the central government, 
regional councils and local councils in Cameroon. The purpose is to strengthen coordination and 
collaboration in drafting, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating policies and legislations. 
This is a vital ingredient to ensuring coherent government and effective provision of services to 
citizens at all levels.  
To this end, the document lays down a set of principles to guide the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations among various levels of government in Cameroon. In addition, the 
document establishes intergovernmental relations institutions at various levels in a bid to 




The document is meant to act as a complement to the constitutional provisions on 
decentralisation as spelt out in Chapter X, and the provisions of the laws on decentralisation 
(Law No 2004/017 on the orientation of decentralisation, Law No 2004/018 on the 
decentralisation rules applicable to local councils, and Law No 2004/019 on the decentralisation 
rules applicable to regions). 
PART II: PRINCIPLES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CAMEROON 
Government officials and institutions at the central, regional and local government levels must 
adhere to the following principles in the conduct of their affairs: 
a. Respect the Constitution and people of Cameroon, 
b. Work to promote the peace, national unity, and the indivisible character of the Republic 
of Cameroon, 
c. Ensure the well-being of the people of Cameroon, 
d. Promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and coherent government, 
e. Not assume any functions other than those conferred on them by the Constitution and the 
laws on decentralisation,  
f. Co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by: 
- Promoting friendly relations;  
- Assisting and supporting each other;  
- Encouraging co-construction through obligatory exchange of information and 
consulting each other on matters of common interest;  
- Coordinating their actions with one another; and  
- Respecting agreed procedures and avoiding legal proceedings against one another.  
PART III: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
REGIONS (REGIONAL COUNCILS) 
a. The Governor represents the central government in the Region. In this capacity, he/she 
serves as the link between the central government and the regional council, and between 
the regional council and the central government.  
b. The Governor shall ensure that regional deconcentrated central government services and 




c. The Governor shall resolve all disputes that may arise between the regional council and 
the regional deconcentrated central government services. If need be, the Governor may 
solicit assistance from the central government.  
d. A Presidential Advisory Council on Decentralisation (PACOD) is established to enable 
consultations between the central government, regional councils and representatives of 
local councils on issues of national interests. PACOD shall strengthen the relationship 
between elected and appointed officials at all levels of government, and ensure the 
effective participation of regional and local councils in policy decisions at the central 
level that concerns them. PACOD shall consists of:  
- The President of the Republic;  
- The Prime Minister, Head of Government;  
- Minister of Decentralisation and Local Development;  
- Minister of Finance; 
- Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development;  
- Presidents of the 10 Regional Councils;  
- 1 representative of local councils from each of the regions;  
- The Chairperson of the United Councils and Cities of Cameroon; and 
- A representative each from the Senate and the National Assembly. 
The President of the Republic chairs the meetings of PACOD which shall be convened twice 
annually in ordinary sessions, and as many times as the need may arise in extraordinary sessions. 
The President may invite other Ministers or stakeholders to the meetings if the order of the 
meeting concerns them.  
The functions of PACOD are similar to the President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) in South 
Africa (RSA, 2005), and the National Conference of Territories in the French Republic (FR, 
2017). 
PART IV: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL 
COUNCILS 
a. The Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) represents the central government in the local 




central government and the local councils, and between the local councils and the central 
government.  
b. The SDO shall ensure that divisional deconcentrated central government services and the 
local councils coordinate their activities to ensure coherence. 
c. The SDO shall resolve all disputes that may arise between the local councils and the 
divisional deconcentrated central government services. Where the SDO is unable to 
resolve a dispute, he/she shall refer the matter to the Governor of the Region. If the need 
arises, the Governor may solicit assistance from the central government in resolving the 
dispute. 
d. A Local Development Forum shall be established in each Division to enhance relations 
between central government institutions and local councils in the Division. The 
organisation and functioning of the Local Development Forum shall be determined by a 
Prefectural Order signed by the SDO of the Division following extensive consultations 
with the relevant stakeholders. This Forum is like the District intergovernmental relations 
forums in South Africa (RSA, 2005).  
e. In the month of December each year, the SDO shall present to the Local Development 
Forum a report on the functioning of central government deconcentrated services in the 
Division. This report shall be open to debate by the members of the Local Development 
Forum in the presence of the SDO. 
PART V: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONAL COUNCILS AND LOCAL 
COUNCILS 
a. The Governor of the Region shall ensure that the regional council and local councils 
coordinate their activities to ensure coherence.  
b. The Governor shall resolve all disputes that may arise between the regional council and 
the local councils. If need be, the Governor may solicit assistance from the central 
government. 
c. A Forum for Regional Development (FOREDEV) shall be set-up to enhance relations 
between the regional council and the local councils within the region. It shall consist of: 
- The President of the Regional Council;  




- Government Delegates to the City Councils;  
- Mayors of Sub-divisional Councils and Councils; and  
- Representative of the Regional Executive of the United Councils and Cities of 
Cameroon. 
FOREDEV shall be a platform for concertation between the regional council and the local 
councils to hold constructive discussions and formulate recommendations on the exercise of 
authority, coordination of policy implementation strategies, evaluation of joint actions, and 
resolution of disputes. The President of the Regional Council shall chair the meetings of 
FOREDEV which shall be convened twice annually. The Governor of the Region shall 
participate in these meetings in an advisory capacity and may speak when required to. Other 
development actors can be invited to these meetings if the order of the day concerns them. 
FORDEV would perform similar functions like the Territorial Conference for Public Action in 
the French Republic (FR, 2017) and the Provincial intergovernmental relations forums in South 
Africa (RSA, 2005).  
PART VI: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CITY COUNCILS AND SUB-DIVISIONAL 
COUNCILS 
a. In Divisions where there is a City Council and Sub-divisional Councils, the SDO shall, if 
necessary and following extensive consultations with these local councils, create a 
Consultative Forum for the City Council and Sub-divisional Councils to discuss and 
tackle issues of mutual interests. 
b. Government Delegates to City Councils and the Mayors of the Sub-divisional Councils 
shall set-up a platform for policy coordination, dialogue, and joint actions. When 
necessary, the SDO of the Division shall be invited to participate in such meetings. The 
outcomes of the meetings shall be communicated to the SDO for effective follow-up.  
PART VII: MISCELLANEOUS AND FINAL PROVISIONS 
a. The intergovernmental relations institutions that have been established in the lower levels 
of government should be established following extensive consultations, and according the 




b. This framework document shall be registered, published according to the procedure of 
urgency, an inserted in the Official Gazette in English and French. 
The drafting of a framework document on intergovernmental relations in Cameroon highlights 
the need for structural reforms like deregulation (Radin, 2003:611 and 2014:644) and the 
facilitation of central government oversight (Radin, 2003:612 and 2014:645).  
b) Proposed amendments to the laws on decentralisation in Cameroon 
Given that this research focused essentially on local councils, the proposed amendments will 
only touch on the law on the orientation of decentralisation in Cameroon (Law No 2004/017 of 
22 July 2004) (RC, 2004a), and the law on the decentralisation rules applicable to local councils 
(Law No 2004/018 of 22 July 2004) (RC, 2004b). 
 Amendments to the law on the orientation of decentralisation in Cameroon 
One of the problems with Cameroon’s decentralisation system is the lack of clarity with the 
terms used. Although the legislation mentions devolution of authority, the practice rather points 
to partial devolution with numerous characteristics of deconcentration.  
Part II of this law, which focuses on Principle of Devolution of Powers, should be amended to 
specify the following elements:  
- Functions transferred to the regional councils. 
- Functions transferred to the local councils. 
- Rights and responsibilities of the central government.  
This section should specify functional domains of concurrent central government and regional 
government competence, and the functional areas of exclusive regional government competence. 
In each of these functional domains, the functions of local councils should be clearly defined as 
is the case in schedule 4 and 5 of the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996), and Law no 2004-
809 of 13 August 2004 (FR, 2004b). With these specifications, the principle of complementarity 
is equally clarified because it is easy to identify the functions of each of the levels of government 




relationship that should exist between the central government and the lower levels of 
government.  
Part IV of this law on Supervision of Regional and Local Authorities should be amended to 
Relations between the Central government and the Regional and Local Authorities. The sections 
under this part should address the following headings: 
- Supervision of Regional and Local Authorities;   
- Exchange of information between the Central government and Regional and Local 
Authorities;  
This part should specify that a separate text would define the modalities for intergovernmental 
relations between the central government, regional councils and local councils. 
 Amendments to the law on the decentralisation rules applicable to local councils in 
Cameroon 
One of the challenges of the relations between the City Councils and the Sub-divisional Councils 
is lack of clarity on the functions transferred to each of these local councils. 
In Part V of this law dealing with Special regimes applicable to Urban Centres, Chapter II on 
Sub-divisional Councils should specify the functions transferred to Sub-divisional Councils just 
like Chapter I of Part V on the City Council clearly specifies the functions transferred to the City 
Councils. This way, both the City Council and the Sub-divisional Councils will be aware of 
where their functions starts and ends. Moreover, if there is need for the exercising of joint 
authority by the City Council and the Sub-divisional Councils regarding a specific function, a 
section of Part V of this law should clearly state the issue and the way this joint authority would 
be exercised. Moreover, the position of Government Delegate which is appointed by the 
President of the Republic should be transformed into an elective position. 
This law has no part or section on intergovernmental relations. Therefore, a new part, Part VII on 
relations between the supervisory authority and the local councils, should be included in this law. 




- The Senior Divisional Officers shall request information from the Government Delegates 
and Mayors required for their duties to be exercised. 
- The Government Delegates and Mayors shall request information from the Senior 
Divisional Officer required for their duties to be exercised.  
- In the months of January and June of each year, the Senior Divisional Officers shall 
convene a meeting of all Government Delegates (in Divisions with City Councils) and 
Mayors. At these meetings, the Senior Divisional Officers shall present a report to inform 
these local council officials on the functioning of various deconcentrated central 
government institutions within their respective Divisions. This report shall be open to 
debate by the local council officials in the presence of the Senior Divisional Officers. 
This part of the law is necessary to encourage frequent exchanges between the supervisory 
authorities and the local council executives which can contribute to facilitating the coordination 
of development actions. It would also create a favourable platform for the local council 
executives to hold the supervisory authority (by extension the central government) accountable.   
7.2.2. Proposals on ameliorating the management structure of decentralisation in 
Cameroon  
The decentralisation structure in Cameroon does not adequately valorise the role of central 
government representatives (Governors and Senior Divisional Officers) and local council 
executives in planning, organising and implementing major decisions. This is important because 
some important decisions on projects to be implemented in local councils are still made by 
officials in various central government ministries. The following actions aimed at reorganisation 
(Radin, 2003:610) should be implemented by the central government: 
a) Emphasising the importance of effective local – intergovernmental relationships 
Cameroon’s decentralisation structure indicates the active presence of the central government in 
the lower levels of government through appointed central government representatives, and 
deconcentrated field offices of central government ministries. The central government should 
recognise and valorise the indispensable role of the Governors and the SDOs as central 
government representatives on the ground. In this instance, the framework document specifying 




serve as a reference. According to this framework document, central government representatives 
are empowered to respond to all queries raised by the local councils, resolve all conflicts that 
may arise between the central government and the local councils, and consult the central 
government if the need arises. This measure could avoid the involvement of officials at the 
central government level in resolving issues that should normally be resolved locally. Also, if 
central government representatives, on behalf of the central government and working with the 
local council executives, provides satisfactory answers to all queries raised by local councils, and 
resolves conflicts, this can contribute to building trust between the central government and local 
councils as the local councils will always view the central government representatives as 
facilitating their work. 
b) Financial grants for local councils and financing of intergovernmental relations 
institutions at the local level 
According to the findings of the research, the running of certain intergovernmental relations 
institutions at the local level like the Divisional Committees on Local Finance (CODEFIL) are 
partly financed by the central government. However, the central government delays the transfer 
of the funds for these institutions, and other activities of local councils. Therefore, the central 
government should outline a comprehensive timeline for the transfer of funds to local councils, 
the amounts to be transferred as a percentage of the central government’s contribution, the 
expected contributions from the local councils, and the purpose of the money transferred. The 
timeline should equally indicate the period within which a detailed report should be submitted to 
the central government. In case the central government is facing any challenges which might 
delay the transfer of these funds to the lower levels of government, then they must communicate 
such challenges appropriately with the lower levels to facilitate planning at the lower levels. 
Moreover, the financial responsibilities of the central government and the regional councils 
towards the local councils should be clearly outline for proper comprehension. This is the case in 
South Africa in Chapter 5 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (No 56 of 2003) (RSA, 





c) The need for local development contracts to be awarded at the local level 
Officials in the central government ministries should avoid direct interference in the awarding of 
certain local development contracts as well as the location of these local development projects 
within the local councils. The central government should transfer the awarding of these contracts 
to the contract boards of the local councils. The SDO with the support of the divisional field 
office of the ministry of public contracts must ensure that the process of awarding these contracts 
by the local councils is in line with the approved criteria.  
Also, the implementation of local development projects should be entirely transferred to the local 
councils which should be required to work closely with the field office of the ministry concerned 
and the SDO to identify the priority areas within the municipality where these projects should be 
implemented. This would improve the working relationship between the central government 
representative, the field office of various ministries that have transferred responsibilities to local 
councils, and the beneficiary local councils. 
d) Financial management of local development contracts by local councils under the 
guidance of central government representatives 
The transfer of the awarding of local development contracts to the local councils equally entails 
that the finances for these local development contracts should be managed by the treasuries of 
these local councils. The central government should encourage local councils to manage the 
finances meant for the execution of contracts within their municipalities under the supervision of 
the Governors and the SDOs while the regional branches of the National Treasury ensure strict 
control. This entails that the central government should transfer finances for local development 
projects to the treasuries of the local councils and notify the Governor and SDO. Payments can 
only be made from the local council treasury after approval by the Governor or the SDO, 
depending on the amounts concerned. The regional branches of the National Treasury must 
ensure strict control on how these finances are used through periodic controls and audits. The 
Public Contracts Board of each local council and the SDO should periodically monitor and 
evaluate the outcomes/impact of the executed contract. This will further valorise the work of the 





The Governors and Senior Divisional Officers generally have the responsibility of ensuring a 
proper working relationship between the central government and the lower levels of government. 
Being closer to the lower levels of government and having full knowledge of how central 
government works, they can better represent and defend the interests of the lower levels of 
government within the central government, and also represent and defend the interests of the 
central government within the lower levels of government which is one of their main functions. 
Therefore, effective intergovernmental relations would entail that local councils build trust and 
enhance their working relationships with the Governors and the SDOs to ensure that there is 
clear understanding in the ranks of governments at the lower levels. 
Intergovernmental relations in Cameroon should be conceived more as a “bottom-up” process in 
which discussions and engagements are more intense at the lower levels of government while the 
central government ensures effective coordination. Through effective local – intergovernmental 
relationships amongst the various units of government, the engagements between government 
officials at the base can be strengthened.  
7.3. RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVING INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
IN MEZAM DIVISION  
The research findings identified some challenges of intergovernmental relations that are peculiar 
to Mezam Division. Some mechanisms need to be put in place by the central government 
representatives and the local councils in Mezam Division to improve intergovernmental 
relations. As Hattingh (1998:39) explains, there needs to be full participation in which there is no 
dominant party, and relations are characterised by joint decision-making. 
7.3.1. The role of the central government representatives in facilitating intergovernmental 
relations 
The findings of this study reveal that the Governors and SDOs, as central government 
representatives, play an important role not only in supervising the activities of local councils, but 
also coordination and conflict resolution at lower levels of government. Although their role is to 
represent and secure the interests of the central government within the local councils, it should 
equally be recognised that these central government representatives have the mandate to 




Governors and the SDOs act as a bridge between the central government and the local councils. 
In this light, the central government representatives in Mezam should take the following actions 
to improve intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division: 
a) Creation of Intergovernmental Relations Forums in Mezam Division  
Most of the existing Intergovernmental Relations Forums in Mezam Division deal exclusively 
with financial issues. In line with the provisions of the framework document specifying the 
modalities for relations between central government, regional councils and local councils in 
Cameroon, the SDO should create other forums to tackle other issues of mutual interest other 
than financial issues in Mezam Division. These forums include: 
 The Mezam Local Development Forum (MELODEF) 
MELODEF should be a consultative forum for the SDO and the local councils in Mezam 
Division to consult each other on matters of mutual interest. Some of these issues could include: 
Providing mutual support and services in Mezam Division; ensuring coherent planning and 
development in Mezam Division; drafting and implementing strategic and performance plans of 
the local councils in Mezam Division; sharing of information and best practices, and capacity 
building for council executives, councillors, and staff of local councils within Mezam Division. 
The members of MELODEF should include: 
- The Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Mezam Division (chairperson);  
- The Mezam Divisional Delegate for Decentralisation and Local Development (secretary);  
- The Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council (elected not appointed) 
(member);  
- The Mayors the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils 
(members);   
- The Mayors of the Bafut, Bali, Santa and Tubah Councils (members); and  
- A Representative of the Mezam Divisional Executive of the United Councils and Cities 
of Cameroon (member).  
MELODEF should meet once every six months, on a rotatory basis in the premises of different 




Division to host their peers alongside the central government representative. The meetings of 
MELODEF should not be limited to senior officials such as the SDO and the local council 
executives. It can be used as a platform for each of the field offices of the central government 
ministries in Mezam Division to exchange ideas with the staff of the local councils. The creation 
of the Mezam Local Development Forum (MELODEF) is similar to the South African 
experience with the District Intergovernmental Relations Forums as provided for in Section 26 of 
the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (No 13 of 2005) (RSA, 2005). 
In addition, MELODEF should be used as a platform for the SDO to present a report on the 
functioning of central government services in Mezam Division. This should provide the local 
council executives with the opportunity to ask the necessary questions in the presence of the 
SDO which is a means of ensuring the accountability of central government and its 
representatives to local councils.  
 The Bamenda City Consultative Forum (BACCOF) 
BACCOF should be a forum for the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and 
Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils to discuss issues of mutual interest affecting their 
respective councils. The members of the Bamenda City Consultative Forum should include:  
- The SDO for Mezam Division or his/her representative (chairperson);  
- The Mezam Divisional Delegate for Decentralisation and Local Development (secretary); 
- The Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council (member);  
- The Mayors of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils 
(members); 
- The Secretary General of the Bamenda City Council (member); 
- The Secretary Generals of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda II Sub-divisional 
Councils (members); 
- The Municipal Treasurer of the Bamenda City Council (member);  
- The Municipal Treasurers of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-
divisional Councils (members); and 
- A Representative of the Mezam Divisional Executive of the United Councils and Cities 




BACCOF meetings should be held once every four months (hence three annual meetings), with 
each of the local councils hosting the members. Also, the SDO for Mezam Division should invite 
other deconcentrated central government officials to be part of these meetings if such persons are 
able to provide valuable information that is necessary for the smooth functioning of the local 
councils in Bamenda City. 
BACCOF can serve as a platform for the City Council and the Sub-divisional Councils to 
coordinate their development actions to ensure coherence as the actions of the City Council and 
those of the Sub-divisional Councils are not mutually exclusive. The SDO for Mezam Division 
could equally use BACCOF as a means of resolving any conflicts that could arise between the 
Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils.  
There is need to avoid the establishment of multiple institutions which might become 
cumbersome to manage or which could lead to the duplication of institutional functions. The 
creation of new intergovernmental relations institutions in Mezam Division by the SDO must be 
done in a coordinated manner taking into consideration the challenges (such as the management 
of markets with the Bamenda City Council) that need to be addressed by these forums.  
b) Scheduling meetings of existing Intergovernmental Relations Forums and other 
informal meetings in Mezam Division  
The SDO for Mezam Division should convene regular meetings of the already existing 
Intergovernmental Relations Forums in Mezam Division such as the Mezam Divisional 
Committee on Local Finance (CODEFIL). The SDO should equally ensure the proper 
functioning of the other committees chaired by his representative or any other officials such as 
the Technical Committee for the Recovery of Global Taxes and parking fees in Bamenda and the 
Sub-committee of the Bamenda Local Tax Technical Committee. The SDO for Mezam Division 
should ensure that the recommendations formulated by the members of these committees are 
effectively implemented within the stated deadlines. 
Moreover, the SDO for Mezam Division should convene regular informal meetings bringing 
together local council executives and central government field officials in Mezam Division to 




These informal meetings can be in the form of “Coffee Think and Talk sessions”. Such informal 
meeting sessions can contribute to fortify the working relationship between the central 
government and the local councils as the discussion environment is more relaxed and they all see 
each other as local development stakeholders. 
c) Decision-making and communication between the SDO and local councils in Mezam 
Division  
The SDO should avoid delays in approving the decisions of local councils, and should 
communicate such potential delays when they are unavoidable. The SDO should use his/her 
supervisory authority to properly communicate and train local council executives and councillors 
on the provisions of the legislation, rather than viewing themselves as superiors appointed to 
command and control these local council executives and the councillors. In a nutshell, the central 
government representatives should not take advantage of local council executives and 
councillors who are not knowledgeable of procedures but should rather provide orientations to 
these local council executives and councillors in their efforts to promote the development of their 
communities. 
Also, the SDO should not abuse his authority through inducing local council executives to error 
by requiring them to make payments for activities which have already been budgeted for by the 
central government, for instance, the National Day celebrations. Such actions contribute to 
undermining the authority of the SDO and hampers the relationship between the SDO and the 
local council executives. 
d) Providing orientation to the personnel of the local councils 
The SDO for Mezam Division should organise frequent field visits to the local councils which 
should not be aimed at punishing local council officials or personnel for wrong-doing, but should 
act as assistance missions. The challenge raised was the lack of personnel at the Service for 
Local Development in the Office of the SDO for Mezam Division. This has been complemented 
with personnel at the Mezam Divisional Delegation for Decentralisation and Local Development 
when it goes operational. Therefore, officials from the Office of the SDO and the Divisional 




determine how they are working, and give them advise on how to carry out certain technical 
operations. 
The central government representatives should provide orientations and when there appears to be 
any difficulties at the local councils, the central government representatives should cooperate 
with the local council authorities to ensure that the local councils are functioning normally and 
properly. The Governors and SDOs must become real agents of local development which entails 
that they be non-partisan and non-complacent in their decisions and actions. 
7.3.2. The role of local councils in enhancing intergovernmental relations 
Various analysis and commentaries on the decentralisation process in Cameroon most often paint 
a picture of local councils being victims of the actions of the central government and its 
representatives. The results of this study identified inadequate knowledge and cooperation from 
some local councils as an impediment to effective intergovernmental relations in Mezam 
Division. Therefore, the local councils in Mezam Division should carry out the following actions 
to enhance decentralisation and intergovernmental relations 
a) Capacity-building training for local council officials  
Capacity-building is one of the intergovernmental relations’ instruments used to ensure that local 
councils effectively and efficiently manage their local development programmes (Radin, 
2003:613 and 2012:647). The local councils in Mezam Division should organise capacity 
building workshops to train the Government Delegate, Mayors, Councillors and council staff 
regarding the legislation on decentralisation, the role of the supervisory authority and local 
councils, and the relationship between the local councils and the central government. As far as 
the City Council and the Sub-divisional Councils are concerned, their executives and staff should 
be trained to manage the different responsibilities transferred to each of the local councils, and 
the relationship that should exist between the City Council and the Sub-divisional Councils. 
Along the same lines, the central government should introduce training programmes on 
decentralisation, intergovernmental relations and municipal council management in all the state 
universities. Although there is a Local Government Training Centre for staff of local councils, 
the training programmes in the state universities would complement the efforts of the 




b) Setting up of an inter-municipality platform for dialogue  
The Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional 
Councils should jointly set-up an inter-municipality forum based on inspiration from the South 
African experience as per Sections 28 & 29 of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
(No 13 of  2005) (RSA, 2005). Such a platform suits this context because the Bamenda City 
Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils together 
make up the City of Bamenda, which is their common locality. This platform will therefore 
provide a framework for consultation through which these local councils can cooperate on 
common challenges affecting them; review issues of strategic importance affecting their 
common interests; share information and best practices; and train their staff. Regardless of their 
political affiliations, they have a responsibility to work for the development of the local 
populations in Bamenda.  
Given that there seems to be some overlaps and misunderstandings in the responsibilities 
transferred to the City Councils and the Sub-divisional Councils by Law No 2004/018 of 22 July 
2004 on the decentralisation rules applicable to local councils, such a forum should enable these 
local councils to coordinate their activities or resolve their conflicts without the intervention of 
the central government representative. However, the functioning of this platform for dialogue 
should respect the principles of horizontal intergovernmental relations (Kahn et al., 2011:12) 
where the government delegate to the Bamenda City Council is not considered as superior to the 
mayors of the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda III Sub-divisional Councils. 
c) Joint planning and implementation of local development projects with field offices of 
central government ministries  
Local councils should make it their responsibility to at all times cooperate with the Mezam 
Divisional field offices of the central government ministries in designing, implementing, and 
evaluating local development projects, regardless of their political affiliations. In case of any 
misunderstandings, the local councils should table the complaint(s) to the competent 
administrative authority at the Mezam Divisional level or the Northwest Regional level. The 
rationale is to avoid situations in which the local councils bypass the central government 




could have a negative outcome on the relationship between the local councils and the central 
government representatives. However, if the local councils feel they have exhausted all available 
options at the Mezam Divisional level and the Northwest Regional level, and no concrete actions 
have been taken, then they can write directly to the central government. Joint action between the 
local councils and field offices of central government ministries in Mezam Division legitimises 
the importance of partnerships as a programmatic instrument (Radin, 2003:614 and 2014:646) 
and group communication as a behavioural instrument for enhancing intergovernmental relations 
(Radin, 2014:648). 
Most of the local council executives in Mezam Division have their perception of what 
decentralisation should be. This has led them to be negative towards the central government 
representatives whom they are supposed to collaborate with. Local council executives in Mezam 
Division should seize various capacity-building opportunities organised by the central 
government or development partners to understand the uniqueness of the Cameroonian system of 
decentralisation, and how they (local council executives) can make the best use of 
decentralisation to promote development at local level. 
d) Financing of Intergovernmental Relations Forums in Mezam Division and the Mezam 
Divisional branch of the United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) 
When drafting their annual budgets, the local councils should make necessary allocations (2% of 
their budgets) for the running of the different Intergovernmental Relations Forums to which they 
belong and avoid over dependence on central government financing. In this way, the central 
government representative or SDO and the local council executives in Mezam Division would 
take full responsibility for managing their local affairs with or without the financial support of 
the central government. 
More so, the local councils in Mezam Division should provide the Divisional Executive of the 
UCCC with the necessary technical and financial resources needed to properly function. The 
local councils should equally ensure that a member of the Mezam Divisional Executive of the 
UCCC participates in all the meetings of the different Intergovernmental Relations Forums in 




present a report on the state of the relationship between the central government representatives 
and the local councils in Mezam Division.  
The research findings to a greater extent shift the responsibility of facilitating intergovernmental 
relations at all levels almost entirely to the central government or its field representatives such as 
the Governors and the SDOs. Yet, the local councils equally need to shoulder this responsibility 
of enhancing intergovernmental relations amongst themselves and with the central government. 
This is because over 97% of local council executives in Cameroon are elected and represent the 
people (apart from the Government Delegates of City Councils who are appointed by decree of 
the President of Cameroon). The main objectives of the local councils in Cameroon is to promote 
development, democracy, and good governance at local level. The weight of these objectives 
makes it imperative for these local councils to regularly consult and learn from their peers which 
entails that the mayors and government delegates must be non-partisan, and regard each other as 
equals. If the local council executives are unable to meaningfully engage with each other, then it 
is possible that any attempts by the central government or its representatives at the lower levels 
to promote intergovernmental relations, would encounter hindrances and negativity from some of 
the local councils.  
7.4. CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which the implementation of decentralisation 
in Cameroon is influencing intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division of the Northwest 
Region. The conclusions of this study will focus on discussing key issues with regards to the 
objectives of the study and formulating proposals for future research. 
7.4.1. Discussions on the objectives of the study 
This study had seven specific objectives, with chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis designed 
to provide answers to the demands of each of the set objectives. The first objective of the study 
was to establish the relationship between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations 
through various theories. The literature review indicates that a direct relationship can be 
established between decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. This is because 
decentralisation creates lower levels of government which must interact with each other and the 




of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations. France and South Africa, the selected 
countries used to explain this international context, each have unique practices of 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations through polices and institutions at the different 
levels or spheres of government.  
The third objective of the study was to identify the laws and institutions governing 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in Cameroon. A careful reading of the 
legislation indicates that Cameroon concentrates more on decentralisation with few aspects of the 
legislation dealing with intergovernmental relations. The fourth objective was to explore the 
existing formal and informal institutions and processes of intergovernmental relations in Mezam 
Division. The research findings reveal the existence of three formal intergovernmental relations 
institutions which deal specifically with financial issues, and various processes such as dialogue 
and the interventions of central government representatives in Mezam Division. The fifth 
objective was to critically analyse the intergovernmental relations initiatives in Mezam Division. 
Some of the main problems identified include irregular meetings of the existing 
intergovernmental relations institutions, the limited role of central government representatives in 
influencing key local decisions that have been approved at central government level, and lack of 
collaboration between the Bamenda City Council and the Bamenda I, Bamenda II, and Bamenda 
III Sub-divisional Councils. The focus of the sixth objective was to formulate recommendations 
on improving intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division and Cameroon as a whole. Some 
of these recommendations include drafting and adopting a policy on intergovernmental relations 
in Cameroon, creation of the Mezam Local Development Forum (MELODEF) and the Bamenda 
City Consultative Forum (BACCOF) to promote local intergovernmental relationships in Mezam 
Division, and organising capacity building and training workshops for local council executives in 
Mezam Division.  
7.4.2. Proposals for future research  
The study has some limitations which could alter the generalisability of the outcomes of the 
research in Cameroon. Firstly, the study focused on one Division (Mezam Division) out of 58 
such Divisions in Cameroon. Thus one cannot conclude that the experiences of 
intergovernmental relations in Mezam Division are similar to those in the other 57 Divisions. 




institutions in these Divisions may have different working mechanisms which can have either a 
positive or negative impact on intergovernmental relations. Secondly, scanty information exists 
on the newly created Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development. The field offices of 
the Ministry are not yet up and running. Thus, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the 
creation of this ministry could further complicate intergovernmental relations at local level. It 
would be preferable to allow these institutions to be established and be fully operational at all 
levels before determining if this new institution is facilitating or impeding intergovernmental 
relations.  
Regarding suggestions for future research, some areas worth investigating further include the 
following: 
- The participation of non-state actors such as traditional and religious authorities, private 
sector and civil society actors in intergovernmental relations in Cameroon 
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ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
Interview guide for selected central government officials 
At the central government level and Mezam Divisional level  
1) What are the existing forums for dialogue between central government and local 
government officials in Mezam? Are these forums formal or informal? What is the 
contribution of these forums to building the relationship between the central government 
and the local governments? 
2) What is the purpose of central government supervision of local councils? Do you think 
local councils understand the purpose for central government supervision? How effective 
is central government supervision over local councils in Mezam? 
3) How do you coordinate the activities of central government field officers and local 
governments in Mezam where there are overlaps (both formal and informal 
mechanisms)? How effective are these coordination mechanisms? 
4) How do you resolve conflicts between central government field officers and the local 
governments when they arise (both formal and informal mechanisms)? How effective 
have these mechanisms been? 
5) How do you resolve conflicts that may sometimes arise between the city council and the 
sub-divisional councils (formal and informal mechanisms)? How effective have these 
mechanisms been? 
6) How do you ensure the accountability of local governments in Mezam to the central 
government? Can local governments hold the central government accountable? If yes, 
how? How effective are these accountability mechanisms? 
7) In your opinion, how can the relationship between the central government and the local 







ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LOCAL COUNCIL OFFICIALS IN                    
MEZAM DIVISION 
Interview guide for local council officials 
1) What are the existing forums for dialogue between central government and local government 
officials in Mezam? Are these forums formal or informal? What is the contribution of these 
forums to building the relationship between the central government and the local 
governments? 
2) What do you think is the purpose of central government supervision of local councils? How 
effective is central government supervision over local councils in Mezam? Do you think 
central government supervision should be done differently? 
3) How do you coordinate your council activities with those of central government field officers 
in Mezam where there are overlaps (both formal and informal mechanisms)? How effective 
are these coordination mechanisms? What is the role of the supervisory authority? 
4) How do you resolve conflicts between the council and central government field officers 
when they arise (both formal and informal mechanisms)? How effective have these 
mechanisms been? What is the role of the supervisory authority? 
5) How do you resolve conflicts that may sometimes arise between the city council and the sub-
divisional councils (formal and informal mechanisms)? How effective have these 
mechanisms been? What is the role of the supervisory authority? 
6) As a local governments, what are the mechanisms in place to ensure you are accountable to 
the central government? Can local governments hold the central government accountable? If 
yes, how? How effective are these accountability mechanisms? 
7) In your opinion, how can the relationship between the central government and the local 












Regional and Local Authorities 
Article 55 
(1) Regional and local authorities of the Republic shall comprise Regions and Councils.  
Any other such authority shall be created by law.  
(2) Regional and local authorities shall be public law corporate bodies. They shall have 
administrative and financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests. They 
shall be freely administered by councils elected under conditions laid down by law.  
The duty of the councils of regional and local authorities shall be to promote the economic, 
social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of the said authorities.  
(3) The State shall exercise supervisory powers over regional and local authorities, under 
conditions laid down by law.  
(4) The State shall ensure the harmonious development of all the regional and local authorities 
on the basis of national solidarity, regional potentials and inter-regional balance.  
(5) The organization, functioning and financial regulations of regional and local authorities shall 
be defined by law.  
(6) The rules and regulations governing councils shall be defined by law.  
Article 56 
(1) The State shall transfer to Regions, under conditions laid down by law, jurisdiction in areas 
necessary for their economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development.  
(2) The law shall define:  
- the sharing of powers between the State and Regions in the areas of competence so transferred.  
(3) The resources of the Regions.  
(4) The land and property of each region.  
Article 57 
(1) The organs of the Region shall be the Regional Council and the President of the Regional 
Council. The Regional Council and the President of the Regional Council shall function within 




(2) The Regional Council shall be the deliberative organ of the Region. Regional Councillors 
whose term of office shall be 5 (five) years shall comprise:  
- Divisional delegates elected by indirect universal suffrage;  
- Representatives of traditional rulers elected by their peers.  
The Regional Council shall reflect the various sociological components of the Region.  
The system of election, number, proportion by category, rules governing ineligibility, 
incompatibilities and emoluments of Regional Councillors shall be laid down by law.  
(3) The Regional Council shall be headed by an indigene of the Region elected from among its 
members for the life of the Council.  
The President of the Regional Council shall be the executive organ of the Region. In this 
capacity, he shall be the interlocutor of the State representative. He shall be assisted by a 
Regional Bureau elected at the same time as himself from among the members of the Council. 
The Regional Bureau shall reflect the sociological components of the Region.  
(4) Members of Parliament of the Region shall sit in the Regional Council in an advisory 
capacity.  
Article 58 
(1) A delegate, appointed by the President of the Republic shall represent the State in the Region. 
In this capacity, he shall be responsible for national interests, administrative control, ensuring 
compliance with laws and regulations, as well as maintaining law and order. He shall, under the 
authority of the Government, supervise and co-ordinate civil State services in the Region.  
(2) He shall exercise the supervisory authority of the State over the Region.  
Article 59 
(1) The Regional Council may be suspended by the President of the Republic where such organ:  
- carries out activities contrary to the constitution;  
- undermines the security of the State or public law and order;  
- endangers the State's territorial integrity.  
The other cases of suspension shall be laid down by law.  
(2) The Regional Council may be dissolved by the President of the Republic, after consultation 
with the Constitutional Council in all the cases provided for under paragraph (1) above.  
The other cases of dissolution shall be laid down by law.  
(3) The automatic replacement of the said organ by the State in the cases provided for under 




(4) The conditions of implementation of this article shall be determined by law.  
 
Article 60 
(1) The President and the Bureau of the Regional Council may be suspended by the President of 
the Republic where such organs:  
- carry out activities contrary to the Constitution;  
- undermine the security of the State or public law and order;  
- endanger the State's territorial integrity.  
The other cases of suspension shall be laid down by law.  
(2) The President and the Bureau of the Regional Council may be dismissed by the President of 
the Republic, after consultation with the Constitutional Council in all the cases provided for 
under paragraph (1) above.  
The other cases of dismissal shall be laid down by law.  
(3) The automatic replacement of the said organ by the State in the cases provided for under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) above shall be decided by the President of the Republic.  
(4) The conditions of implementation of this article shall be determined by law.  
Article 61 
(1) The following provinces shall become Regions:  
- Adamaoua;  
- Centre;  
- East;  
- Far North;  
- Littoral;  
- North.  
- North-West;  
- West;  
- South;  
- South-West.  




a) Change the names and modify the geographical boundaries of the Regions listed in paragraph 
(1) above;  
b) Create other Regions. In this case, he shall give them names and fix their geographical 
boundaries.  
Article 62 
(1) The aforementioned rules and regulations shall apply to all regions.  
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Part, the law may take into consideration the 
specificities of certain Regions with regard to their organization and functioning. 
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